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Abstract 
This dissertation is a study of Jorge Luis Borges’ (1899-1986) short story “Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis 
Tertius” from the collection Ficciones (1944). Critical commentary on the story frequently 
invokes it as metafictional, but it has not been studied adequately as such. I have chosen to 
make three separate, but related analyses of the story, interpreting the findings with the 
overarching theoretical framework of metafiction, and in its extension, the literary theory of 
possible worlds. 
 The first analysis is a structural narratological analysis of the narrator of the story and 
of narrative frames, finding that the regular reading of the narrator as a fictional dramatization 
of Borges himself is upset due to the complexity of the frames. The second analysis discusses 
the philosophical system of the fictional planet Tlön and its corresponding allusions to real-
world philosophers, finding that the philosophical system describes an ontology of fiction. 
The final analysis looks at the myriad duplications and mirrorings in the story, positing the 
duplicating objects called hrönir as a structural metaphor, and analysing two instances of the 
metafictional device mise en abyme. I show that the myriad duplications is dramatized as a 
way of perceiving the actual world, and, as a consequence breaching the boundaries between 
the fictional and real world. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction. Metafiction and possible worlds 
 
S'il n'y avait pas le meilleur (optimum) parmi 
tous les mondes possibles, Dieu n'en aurait 
produit aucun. 
 
— Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Essais de 
Théodicée sur la bonté de Dieu, la liberté de 
l’homme et l’origine du mal (1710) 
 
 
 
 
By his own account, Jorge Luis Borges (1899-1986) first started writing prose fiction 
following an accident during Christmas of 1938, when he was hospitalized due to a blow to 
the head. The wound was complicated by septicaemia, bringing the author close to death. 
Fearing that his creative faculties were lost, the hospitalization led Borges to attempt writing a 
short story. He had previously published several volumes of poetry and essays, so he 
considered that a failure in a genre he was not used to working in would not be as terrible as 
the alternative (Borges 1987: 45).  The result was “Pierre Menard, autor del Quixote,” now 
considered one of the most important short stories of the twentieth century. The second, from 
1940, was “Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius.” The accident in 1938 was followed  by an intensely 
creative decade, during which he published two collections of short stories and a collection of 
essays that are now considered to be among the foremost literary achievements of Argentina, 
if not the world, in the twentieth century.  
 Borges’ personal account regarding the creative origins of his fictions is perhaps 
somewhat embellished: he had already published a book of biographies, Historia universal de 
la infamia—biographies that are more fictional than factual—and a short story, “El 
acercamiento de Al’Mutasim,” a “review” of a book that does not exist. These were already 
suggesting the nature of his later fictions; “El acercamiento” was later to be included in his 
first collection of short stories, Ficciones (1944).  
 Ficciones is divided in two parts: the first, El jardín que los senderos se bifurcan was 
published separately in 1941; the second, Artificios, was added with the 1944 publication. The 
stories reflect the nature of their author, as they are intensely literate with a penchant for 
metaphysics and mysticism. With the publication of El jardín, Borges’ friend Adolfo Bioy-
Casares wrote in a review that Borges had established a new genre: the philosophical fiction. 
This, though perhaps an exaggeration, is a characterization that suits the stories well, since 
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their nature is metaphysical. This metaphysicality extends not only to the nature of mind, but, 
significantly, to the nature of fiction itself. 
 While fiction, and especially the novel, has a tradition of self-awareness, the stories of 
Ficciones explore the implications of fiction as a structuring principle for how man relates to 
existence. Through his knowledge of for example idealist philosophy, Borges explores both 
the fictional nature of how we experience the world, but also how, in reading, the fiction 
becomes our world.  
 These short stories and essays are now widely considered to be early examples of a 
type of self-conscious fiction that was to become popular from the middle of the twentieth 
century onwards. Additionally, some of the themes explored are sometimes considered to be 
progenitors of later structuralist and post-structuralist thought, a standpoint notably voiced by 
Emir Rodríguez Monegal (1990). The presence of a self-consciousness of the processes 
involved in the production and reading of fiction within the fiction itself was later to be 
termed “metafiction.” 
 
1.1 Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius 
This study concerns “Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius,” the first story found in Ficciones, widely 
regarded to be one of Borges’ most important works. Divided into three parts, the story begins 
with an unnamed narrator—often assumed to be a fictionalised version of Borges himself—
that together with a friend, Adolfo Bioy-Casares, discovers a mysterious article about a 
country called Uqbar, a country they have never heard of before. Even more mysterious is that 
this article is only present in Casares’ copy of the encyclopaedia, which is a pirated edition of 
the tenth edition of Encyclopaedia Britannica called the Anglo-American Cyclopaedia. The 
article details the history and geography of this unknown country, noting that its literature is 
of a fantastic nature, and its legends are always about the imaginary realms of Mlejnas and 
Tlön. Other copies of the volume in question do not include the entry, spurring a search for 
other references to Uqbar. The narrator and his friend discover that there are a few books on 
the subject, but unable to acquire them, the investigation into Uqbar is abandoned.  
 However, in part II, the narrator comes upon a book some years later among the 
belongings of the deceased Herbert Ashe, an English engineer and friend of the narrator’s 
father. The book turns out to be the eleventh volume of an encyclopaedia called A First 
Encyclopaedia of Tlön. The encyclopaedia is from an imaginary planet called Tlön, and a 
long discussion of the planet’s philosophical outlook is detailed. There, the dominating 
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philosophical view is idealist, and the narrator explains at length the curious beliefs and 
languages of the planet, comparing throughout to known idealist philosophers like Berkeley 
and Hume. Towards the end of the discussion we get to know of one of Tlön’s most peculiar 
aspects, the hrönir. The hrönir are duplicates of lost original’s objects, brought forth by hope 
and expectation. These copies are not perfect; they are slightly different, perhaps awkwardly 
so.  
 Finally, there is an added postscript which is famously dated seven years in the future 
of the story’s original publication. Now an entire set has been found of the First 
Encyclopaedia of Tlön; another find, a letter to Herbert Ashe from another mysterious entity, 
Gunnar Erfjord, details the creation of the encyclopaedia. It turns out to be the result of a vast 
conspiracy spanning hundreds of years, where a secret society originally set out to create a 
country from scratch—Uqbar. However, upon relocating to the Americas, the society was 
funded by a millionaire by the name of Ezra Buckley, who finds the idea of creating a country 
redundant in light of the newly established United States. His demand was that, in exchange 
for his resources, the society would create an entire planet. The way of doing it was to make 
an encyclopaedia in the manner of the Encyclopaedia Britannica. A hundred years later it was 
finished, and at the time of the narrator’s writing its ideas are starting to infiltrate the mindset 
of the world. Mysterious, seemingly impossible objects have begun to appear, objects that 
seem to come from Tlön. The narrator, deploring this intrusion upon the world of another 
planet, predicts that in a hundred years the planet will be Tlön.  
 In short, the story is about the discovery of a volume of an encyclopaedia that 
describes another planet—or another reality—in which idealist philosophy is the prevailing 
world-view, rather than the positivist scientific and materialist views of our own. The narrator 
of the story details how the inhabitants of this alternate planet view their world. Finally, the 
world-view of the alternate planet comes to supplant our own world—or rather, the world 
from which the narrator tells his story. 
 
1.1.1 Aims 
“Tlön” is one of Borges’ most famous stories, and has been frequently commented upon. One 
of the themes that crop up is its metafictionality, how it dramatizes the nature of literature 
itself. However, there have not been many studies of this aspect of it. In the theoretical 
literature of metafiction Borges is again frequently quoted, but never studied in depth. For this 
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study of “Tlön” I therefore aim to study the metafictional aspects of the story, and, 
specifically, how the story can be read as the actualisation of a possible world.  
 In order to do this, I will make three separate analyses: the first, in chapter 2,  is an 
analysis of the narrative frames, where my hypothesis is that the narrative structure of “Tlön” 
upsets traditional narratives, especially considering the role of the narrator; in chapter 3 I will 
look closely at the philosophies and philosophers alluded to in the story, determining how the 
philosophies can be said to be dramatised in the story, and contextualising the allusions to 
their sources; finally, in chapter 4, I will look closely at the metafictional device of self-
reflection, the myriad duplications throughout the story, and in particular the mise en abyme. 
Each analysis is then interpreted within the framework of metafiction and possible worlds.  
 First, however I will explain the theoretical framework for the interpretation of the 
analyses. This framework is based on two theoretical premises: first, metafictional theory, and 
second, the theory of possible worlds in literature, as it relates to metafiction. Finally, I will 
explain in detail how they relate to my analyses. My discussions of the theoretical framework 
will necessarily be limited; I have decided to focus mainly upon the aspects of theory which 
are directly relevant to my later analyses.  
 A note on the sources: for my primary source I have used Obras Completas vol. 1 
(1989), where the “Tlön” is on pages 431-443. Additionally I have consulted a collected 
facsimile edition of Sur (1976), printed in Nebeln, Liechtenstein, for comparisons between the 
original publication and the current version that is used. I have also provided English 
translations for quotes, taken from Andrew Hurley’s translation in Fictions (2001) unless 
otherwise noted. Citations from the Obras Completas are referenced as “OC” followed by the 
volume number; references to the Hurley’s translation are written as “F”. 
 
1.2 Metafiction 
The theory of metafiction has its origin in the literary developments especially in the 
twentieth century, with the rise of modernist fiction and its successors. As a general rule, what 
today is regarded as metafictional texts were originally developed as an exploration and an 
unveiling of the techniques used in the realist novel of especially the nineteenth century. It  
was an examination of literary tropes that had become so commonplace in fiction that they 
were taken for granted. Metafictional texts partly explore devices of realist fiction with the 
aim of showing that the “realistic” devices they were originally intended to be may be used 
for other purposes than the prevailing realism of the nineteenth-century novel. Consequently, 
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the intention of a metafictional text is to unveil commonplace literary practice, to uncover the 
artifice involved, and make the reader aware of them.  
 In Linda Hutcheon’s seminal study of metafiction, Narcissistic Narrative (1984), she 
succinctly defines metafiction as the following: “‘Metafiction,’ as it has now been named, is 
fiction about fiction—that is, fiction that includes within itself a commentary on its own 
narrative and/or linguistic identity.” (Hutcheon 1984: 1) Patricia Waugh goes further in 
Metafiction: The Theory and Practice of Self-Conscious Fiction (1984), where she along with 
a similar definition to Hutcheon’s makes an engaging claim:  
 
Metafiction is a term given to fictional writing which self-consciously and systematically draws 
attention to its status as an artefact in order to pose questions about the relationship between fiction and 
reality. In providing a critique of their own methods of construction, such writing not only examine the 
fundamental structures of narrative fiction, they also explore the possible fictionality of the world 
outside the literary fictional text. (Waugh 1984: 2, my emphasis) 
 
Whereas Hutcheon restricts her definition of metafiction to the self-consciousness of modern 
fiction, what she terms the “narcissism” of fiction (Hutcheon 1984: 1), Waugh appears to be 
of the opinion that fiction, or literature, has the possibility of having the same ontological 
status as “reality”. While this controversial claim is questionable from a philosophical 
standpoint, one of the themes in “Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius” is strongly reminiscent of 
Waugh’s claim. While the following discussion of the theory of metafiction will focus upon 
the self-consciousness of metafiction, Waugh’s claim also carries outright relevance to the 
theory of possible worlds, which will be discussed later in this chapter. 
 
1.2.1 Origins of the theory of metafiction 
The term “metafiction” was first used by William Gass in Fiction and the Figures of Life 
(1970), yet the notion of self-conscious literature had been explored theoretically prior to this, 
notably by Robert Scholes in The Fabulators (1967) and its revision, Fabulation and 
Metafiction (1979), where he proposed the term “fabulation,” emphasising the turn away from 
literary realism to a greater focus on story-telling as a textual artefact. John Barth, himself a 
prominent writer of metafiction, called this type of literature “The literature of exhaustion” in 
an essay of the same name (1967). Barth considered as the most interesting fiction modern 
fiction that self-consciously explores the existing possibilities of fiction to exhaust them. This 
is not in order to forward the end of fiction or the novel, as some have interpreted it as, but 
rather in order to create new forms and techniques of literature to work with, a stance he 
follows up in the later essay “The literature of replenishment” (1980).  Notably, Barth’s essay 
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is not only a polemic on contemporary literature, but a whole-hearted praise for Borges as the 
foremost representative of the literature of exhaustion.  
 Subsequent theoretical writing on metafiction has held a close affinity to Borges. He is 
mentioned frequently in Hutcheon and Waugh, and given a short (though inadequate) analysis 
in Scholes. In The Literature of Exhaustion: Borges, Nabokov and Barth, John Stark analyses 
the works of Borges with Barth’s expression as a point of departure, which is followed, as the 
title indicates, by analyses of the works of Vladimir Nabokov and John Barth. “Tlön, Uqbar, 
Orbis Tertius” is not analysed in detail, however, and the theoretical base can also be 
considered lacking, especially in light of later developments. 
 
1.2.2 Theoretical development 
Observing a trend in contemporary fiction, Robert Scholes wrote that he originally aimed for 
his study of “fabulation” to address a lack in the development in literary theory, due to his 
view that “readers, teachers, and professional critics at that time were possessed by notions of 
fictional propriety derived from a version of realism that had seen its best days.” (Scholes 
1979: 1) His study concerns the turn away from realism in fiction towards “fabulation,” and a 
refutation of the view that fiction which is not “realistic” carries no importance in the real 
world. One of his views is that modern fiction has returned to allegory through its fictional 
treatment of ideas, and therefore is a return to a type of literary writing that prevailed before 
the rise of the novel. His view is that this shift is the result of a rejection of the ideal of 
realism in fiction, as manifested in social, historical and psychological novels. One result is 
fiction that has turned to the concept of fiction itself as its subject matter. Scholes argues that 
this self-contemplative turn is a rejection of the Platonic view of fiction as mimetic, and thus 
that fiction unconstrained by the formerly mimetic ideals can explore its own nature and its 
mode of conveyance, which is language.  
 The turn towards its own nature and the nature of language, however, does not mean 
that fiction has lost its relevance, but rather that it explores in depth the fundamental means of 
expression we have to interact and explain the world. Through the fictional exploration of 
questions of fictionality and language, a renewed mode of enquiry into areas traditionally 
explored by philosophy is enabled. Scholes formally divides metafictional texts into four 
categories: romance, myth, novel, and allegory, but, as Linda Hutcheon asks about his 
discussion of each aspect of this structure, “where is the meta in this metafiction?” (Hutcheon 
1984: 21) Hutcheon points out that Scholes’ theoretical discussion does little to explain how 
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metafictional texts actually are metafictional, but rather that he is restricted to providing a 
typology of forms they might appear as and then describes them. The theory of how 
metafiction works and what its implications are is therefore lacking.  
 Hutcheon, however, argues that the traditional ideal of realism is what she calls a 
“mimesis of product”. By this she means that traditionally, the Platonic idea of mimesis had 
come to mean that the finished textual product was considered realistic. However, newer 
forms of literature that are termed “unrealistic” are still mimetic, but mimetic of the process 
of creating literature itself, rather than mimetic of the actual world, thus making a clear 
distinction between two types of mimesis, which she calls respectively mimesis of product 
and mimesis of process.1 Thus, she argues, the term “realistic fiction” should be considered a 
genre of writing rather than a mode of writing. The mimesis of process comes about when 
fiction makes fiction itself as its subject matter and lays open to the reader the tools used to 
produce it. Hutcheon further argues that this is a basic condition of the novelistic form itself, 
where early novels came to their full right partly as parodies of earlier texts, as with the case 
of Don Quixote and Tristram Shandy (23, 27). She observes that the Russian formalists 
defined parody as “the result of a conflict between realistic motivation and an aesthetic 
motivation which has become weak and has been made obvious,” (24) and also connecting to 
the parodic the formalist concept of defamiliarization: the laying bare of literary devices to 
bring to the reader’s attention formal elements one has become unaware of through over-
familiarization. 
 
1.2.3 Overt and covert metafiction 
Creating a typology based on the work of Jean Ricardou, Hutcheon establishes four different 
categories of metafiction: overt and covert metafiction as general categories, each of which is 
further specified as being either diegetic (in the sense of “narrative”) or linguistic in nature. 
By overt metafiction it is meant texts where self-consciousness and –reflection is clearly 
evident and thematized, whereas in covert metafiction “this process would be structuralized, 
internalized, actualized. Such a text would, in fact, be self-reflective, but not necessarily self-
conscious.” (23)  
 The overtly diegetic metafictional text is the text that actively involves and makes the 
readers aware they are participating in the fictional universe themselves. It is made through a 
                                                 
1 The distinction is perhaps somewhat misleadingly named, since the mimesis of product is a mimesis of the 
world. 
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self-conscious focus upon the narrative techniques employed, or of the structure of the fiction 
itself. The result is that the reader becomes aware of these in the process of reading. The 
overtly linguistic metafictional text “would actually show its building blocks—the very 
language whose referents serve to construct that imaginative world. That these referents are 
fictive and not real is assured by the generic code instituted by the word ‘novel’ on the cover.” 
(29)  
 By contrast, the self-reflection of covert metafictional texts is not self-conscious in the 
manner that the text explicitly states or thematizes that it is an artefact or a fiction. An 
example of covert metafiction is the use of a strict genre-based structure for the story, before 
the story works against readers’ preconceptions of the genre’s structure.2 Another, and 
specifically relevant to Borges’ work, is fantasy-literature.3 Fantasy-literature is considered 
covertly diegetically metafictional, due to its basic premise of creating a different universe to 
play the story out in. All fiction can be considered an act of creating a separate universe; 
fantasy-literature depends on a separate universe that is unquestionably a creation, while at 
the same time insists on the created world’s self-sufficiency, thus forcing the reader to read an 
unquestionably fictional world as if it were real. 
 Hutcheon goes on to do readings of texts representing the categories of her typology, 
finally emphasizing the new role of the reader in literary texts, considering with it the 
narrative theory around the theory that had emerged in the previous years (esp. Gérard 
Genette and Wolfgang Iser). Though she does a cursory examination of fiction’s generation of 
alternate worlds, or “heterocosms,” Patricia Waugh goes further in the development of the 
implications of metafictional texts’ creation of these and their truth status. 
 
1.2.4 Truth and representation 
Waugh’s study of metafiction establishes it as a post-modern practice of writing, and 
especially concentrates on the problem of fiction vs. reality, in reference to the formalist view 
that language can never be a complete representation of what is the actual world. Thus 
metafiction is again placed in opposition to realistic practices of writing. In Waugh’s case it is 
                                                 
2 Borges famously wrote an inverted detective story in “La muerte y la brújula” [Death and the Compass] where 
the detective, in an effort to see order where there is actually chaos, establishes a pattern from an initial crime to 
predict where the next murder takes place. The criminal, however, had learned of the detective’s willingness to 
see a pattern and so devises it for him; as the detective arrives at the scene of the final crime to avert it he finds 
out that the final victim is himself. 
3 This is not Todorov’s concept of the “fantastic” in literature, but of Fantasy as a genre. I consider it relevant 
because of the way in which “Tlön” creates an alternative world with its own ontology, akin to the definition of 
fantasy-literature provided. 
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the metafictional self-reflexive problematization of representation or unveiling of linguistic 
artifice, rather than the thematization or actualization of the reading process, as it is for 
Hutcheon. 
 Though Waugh’s study of metafiction parallels Hutcheon’s to a great degree, she also 
looks at metafiction’s exploration of the truth status of fictions. This is based partly on the 
previous dictum of realism that mirrors Plato’s claim of mimetic artefacts as being lesser than 
the actual world, and thus that fiction cannot make a claim on truth or relevance. The most 
interesting argument, and most relevant for this study, is the claim of fictional worlds as 
alternative worlds, which effectively is a closer study of Hutcheon’s concept of fictions as 
“heterocosms.” The “alternative world” thesis takes as its point of departure that  
 
[f]ictional statements exist and have their ‘truth’ within in the context of an ‘alternative world’ which 
they also create. Statements in the real world have their ‘truth’ in the context of a world which they help 
to construct. Fiction is merely a different set of ‘frames’, a different set of conventions and 
constructions. In this view, a fictional character is ‘unreal’ in one sense, but characters who are not 
persons are still ‘real’, still exist, within their particular worlds. (Waugh 1984: 100) 
 
The claim is that fiction has relevance despite their fictionality, both through fiction’s 
reference to actual-world circumstances, along with the use of actual-world language, both of 
which, while developing stories that must be considered strictly false if applied to events in 
the actual world, must be regarded as actual-world events in themselves. This serves two 
purposes, as metafiction also problematizes fiction’s truth-status; the self-consciousness of 
fiction as artifice functions to “reveal the ontological status of all literary fiction: its quasi-
referentiality, its indeterminacy, its existence as words and world.” (Waugh 1984: 101) 
Metafiction not only exposes its own devices, but also the inadequacies of realistic fiction in 
constructing a world that is similar to the actual one. Because of fiction’s necessary departure 
from the actual world, it also can never construct a “complete” world in the way we view the 
actual world, but a restricted one, what Umberto Eco calls the “small worlds” of fiction. 
(Doležel 1998: 15) 
 The questions the theory of fictions as alternate worlds raises have, however, been 
studied in detail in the literary theory of possible worlds, a field of study especially promoted 
by the theorists Lubomir Doležel, Thomas Pavel and Marie-Laure Ryan. 
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1.3 Fiction as possible worlds 
My main reference in the theory of possible worlds in literature are three books: Pavel’s 
Fictional Worlds (1986), Ryan’s Possible Worlds, Artificial Intelligence, and Narrative 
Theory (1991) and Doležel’s Heterocosmica (1998). 
 The theory of literature as possible worlds has its origins in the philosophical field of 
modal logic, which in the 1960s and ‘70s pronounced that statements that have no reference 
to the actual world can still have logical truth. This stance was pioneered by Saul Kripke, and 
was later developed especially by David Lewis. The theory of modal logic was developed 
because in logic, in the original Fregean sense, fictional statements, for example thought 
experiments, would have no truth-value because of their lacking reference to the actual world. 
Fiction, though often carrying reference to the actual world, will have imaginary constituents 
interacting with actual-world referents, thus disqualifying them from logical truth.  
 This position originates with the development of modern logic by Frege, who first 
considered the logical status of fiction. According to Frege’s position, there are three basic 
assumptions to decide whether a statement has logical truth: “(1) Reference can only be made 
to that which exists; (2) ‘To exist’ is synonymous with ‘to occur in the real world’; and (3) 
Only one world exists, the world we regard as real.” (Ryan 1991: 14) When writing or talking 
about fictional texts this stance is problematic. Due to fiction’s lack of actual-world reference, 
the consequence is that no logically true statements can be pronounced on them, even though 
these statements are intuitively true. For example, the statement “The narrator in ‘Tlön, 
Uqbar, Orbis Tertius’ discovers an erroneous encyclopaedia article,” would be logically false 
by default, since the text of “Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius” violates the three basic assumptions 
of Frege on truth-statements, even though, having read the story, the statement about it is 
intuitively true.  
 The theory of possible worlds logic has its distant origin in a Leibniz’s Theodicée 
(1710), who proposed a solution to the problem of evil by postulating that God had created 
the best among an infinity of possible worlds. However, the establishment of a logical 
semantics of possibility did not restrict itself just to the problem of evil or theology. Modal 
logic was established to explore scenarios with assumptions that had no reference to the actual 
world as logically feasible. Some literary theorists, inspired by the rise of analytical 
philosophy, applied the framework of modal logic to literary theory, to account for works of 
literary fiction. Although I will not go into the technicalities of logical semantics, some key 
terms are necessary regarding my interpretation of “Tlön” in a possible-worlds perspective.  
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1.3.1 Minimal departure 
One of these is what Ryan calls the law of minimal departure, which states that  
 
we reconstrue the central world of a textual universe in the same way we reconstrue the alternate 
possible worlds of nonfactual statements: as conforming as  far as possible to our representation of AW 
[Actual World]. We will project upon these worlds everything we know about reality, and we will make 
only the adjustments dictated by the text. (Ryan 1991: 51) 
 
This law is formulated due to the ontological status of fiction, which is separated from that of 
actual reality. Even though fiction as a possible world necessarily departs from actual reality, 
it is reference to actual reality that makes it intelligible and understandable. Thus, when 
fiction makes statements that are counterfactual in reference to the actual world, the logic of 
the fiction dictates that we refer to the actual world for its departure. When we read about an 
encyclopaedia in “Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius,” we can immediately be sure that it is similar to 
the encyclopaedias of the actual world, even if the encyclopaedia itself does not exist in the 
actual world. 
 Further possible worlds outside of a primary possible worlds are defined again by their 
departure; if one has a set of possible worlds, there becomes a hierarchy surrounding the 
actual world, where outer worlds would have the greatest degrees of departure. 
 
1.3.2 Accessibility 
In modal logic, a possible world is an accessible world if it is logically consistent and does not 
violate the laws of non-contradiction and of excluded middle. In the theory of possible worlds 
there is stipulated a “system of reality” where the actual world is at the centre, and possible 
worlds are categorised outside of it by degrees of departure. Thus, if there are two 
circumstances in the proposed world that are mutually exclusive, it is impossible, and 
therefore not accessible. Ryan provides an example:  
 
a world in which Napoleon dies on St. Helena and successfully escapes to New Orleans is not possible, 
since it entails ‘Napoleon did and did not die on St. Helena.’ But there is nothing inconsistent about 
either one of these facts taken individually, and both are verified in some logically possible world (Ryan 
1991: 31) 
 
Ryan establishes an (incomplete) set of properties in texts to establish their degree of 
possibility and fictionality, properties like the compatibility of inventory (as in the objects that 
constitute the textual world), chronology, logic, and so on. The fewer of these properties that 
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are in accordance with the fictional world, the less “possible” the fiction becomes; as such, 
genres like “Accurate non-fiction” or true fiction are the most possible; their departure from 
the actual world is the least and consequently most accessible. Sound poetry, however, 
frustrates the accessibility relations completely, and cannot be regarded as possible worlds as 
such. 
 Additionally, Umberto Eco, in the chapter “Lector in Fabula” from The Role of the 
Reader (Eco 1979), attributes accessibility to what he terms “trans-world identity,” in which 
an object’s continued identity between worlds depends on a their essential and supernumerary 
properties. What this means is that an object is defined by its essential properties, and that he 
supernumerary properties are not as important for the definition of the object. Thus, if one has 
an object that has the same essential properties between worlds, one can conclude that they 
are the same object across worlds, even if the object does not have the same supernumerary 
properties. 
 Regarding “Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius,” the concept of accessibility is particularly 
relevant because of its progressive departure that logically follows the previous. By this I 
mean that the initial textual world we read the story is a world of minimal departure; the 
world of Tlön is at a great departure, but the story effectively progresses toward it in a natural 
fashion. If the story had opened within the world of the postscript, for example, the 
accessibility of that possible world would have collapsed because of its lack of concordance 
with the actual world. The first two parts, however, act as a necessary and gradual preliminary 
explanation of what is to follow. 
 
1.3.3 Relevance 
Essentially, the possible worlds theory of fiction refutes the view that all fiction must be 
viewed as false, that fiction can have truth-claims within its own set of references. With the 
framework of logical modality there can thus be made claims about fictions that are logically 
true, while, with the concepts of departure and accessibility, the statements or worlds of the 
fiction can be deemed more or less relevant in respect to the actual world. This is not to say 
that all fiction, to be considered relevant, must have strict accessibility relations to be 
considered possible.  
 The power of good fiction is not necessarily judged by how probable or relevant the 
possible worlds depicted are, but rather the strength of the interpretations they engender. 
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However, in a story like “Tlön,” the theory of possible worlds in fiction gains a very literal 
interpretation; the possible world literally becomes the actual world. 
 
1.4 Metafiction and possible worlds in “Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius” 
How do these theories of literature relate to Borges’ short story “Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius”? 
First, it is notable how Borges is prominent in the discussion of both theories. Regarding 
metafiction, Barth’s essay, Scholes’, Hutcheon’s and Waugh’s books all make direct 
references to Borges in their discussion of metafiction, and “Tlön” is mentioned outright as an 
example for some of their points. None of the analyses, however, go in depth into the story. 
Typically, Borges’ literary oeuvre as a whole is considered metafictional, with especial 
weight upon his first collections of short stories, Ficciones and El aleph. Among possible 
worlds-theorists, Marie-Laure Ryan is especially interested in Borges, and devotes long 
passages of analysis to several of his short stories in her writings. Again, though, “Tlön, 
Uqbar, Orbis Tertius” is left out. Borges features several times in Pavel’s book, though he is 
completely left out of Doležel’s. There is, however, good grounds for examining “Tlön, 
Uqbar, Orbis Tertius” both as metafiction and within the framework of possible worlds 
theory. This, as a result of how it is composed, can be regarded in “Tlön” as a metafiction on 
reading: through the reading of an encyclopaedia, what is a possible world within its pages 
becomes an actualized world. Read as such, it can be seen as a self-conscious and self-
reflective examination into the nature of reading, where reading in the story actually leads to 
the possible world of the fiction within it. I will therefore discuss shortly some of the elements 
of metafiction and theory of possible worlds analysed in later chapters, as well as remarking 
upon some elements which are not included in these. 
 
1.4.1 Metafictional elements in “Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius” 
To take an example that I will come back to several times in my subsequent analyses: the 
opening paragraph describes a scenario of what Hutcheon would call (c)overt diegetic 
metafiction: the narrator and a friend are discussing how to compose a novel. This part is 
important for the story as a whole, for several reasons. Primarily, a first-person narrator4 of a 
literary text tells about discussing the creation of a problematic first-person narrator in a 
literary text. This marks, perhaps, that the story is not only about Uqbar, as the first sentence 
                                                 
4 Which, as I will show in the next chapter, is problematic, though not only in the sense that it might be intuited 
from the text. 
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tells us, but also about the process of creating. Self-referential details like this are scattered 
throughout the text, but, as my hypothesis states, the structure of the story as a whole is 
metafictional on several levels, which I will address by order of the following chapters:  
 
1) Narrative structure. The narrator of the story is, as mentioned, in first-person, and opens 
with an hypothesizing of how to create an unreliable narrator. As I will show in chapter 2, this 
unreliability is not mainly in the sense that Wayne C. Booth would later define it,5 as a 
narrator at odds with the ethics of the story (Booth), but instead that the continued identity of 
the narrator is a received literary assumption that can be questioned. This is especially evident 
in the third part of the story, the postscript, which self-consciously and self-reflexively 
reframes the preceding two parts. This reframe is due to its “post-dating”6 the postscript 
purportedly from 1947, while the previous parts were written in 1940 (While “Tlön,” was, of 
course, first published in 1940). This is an additional metafictional nod to the reader, as 
placing the story seven years in the future at the date of publishing clearly marks the story as 
fiction—rather than giving the reader a “sense of vertigo” from the implications of a “story 
from the future” as some critics have insinuated. From the author’s view this must therefore 
be read as a prediction—a possibility.  
 The postscript redefines the previous parts, as it concedes to having altered them—
though only slightly—which complicates the narrative structure, as the entire story cannot be 
considered as two separate articles published seven years apart, but a revision of an article 
with an added postscript, thus completely shifting the premise of what Wolfgang Iser calls the 
“implied reader” (Iser 1974). 
 
2) Philosophy of Tlön. The philosophies of Tlön that are discussed in the second part are all 
idealist, and all question the relation between reality and fiction. That a fictional text would 
have a discussion of whether reality is a construction is unquestionably self-reflexive (though 
not necessarily self-conscious). Though the discussed philosophies are fictions within the 
fiction, the narrator establishes their link to his (the textual) world, whereas I will make the 
effort to explain these philosophies and uncover discrepancies of the narrator’s explanation. 
Thus, through my analysis, I will establish a link between me and Tlön, through a story called 
                                                 
5 Booth’s definition is nebulous, and not very applicable in relation to “Tlön”; the narrator of “Tlön” might be 
unreliable, but not in Booth’s sense. 
6 The spanish word posdata means postscript, but can also be read as post-dating, giving an ironic meaning in 
relation to the original publication of the story. 
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“Tlön,” regarding philosophy that claims that all we experience is an illusion. This is, to me, 
far more dizzying in its implications than the postscript “added” in 1947. 
 Regarding metafiction, this echoes Waugh’s considerations of the unreality of fiction; 
the philosophical systems of Tlön explain that all experience are ultimately personal fictions. 
 
3) Duplication and mirroring. Central to the story is the motif of duplication and mirroring. 
This is, amongst other things, shown most clearly in the discussion of the hrön of Tlön: 
objects that duplicate themselves, with variations, manifested through the hope of their 
seekers to find them. However, as I will show in chapter 4, duplication is mirrored in the 
story’s structure on several levels, both in language and structure—as with Hutcheon’s 
division of diegetic and linguistic forms. This is coupled with the motif of the mirror, which 
itself is mirrored thematically and structurally in the story.  
 The opening sentence, “Debo a la conjunción de un espejo y de una enciclopedia el 
descubrimiento de Uqbar,”7 (OC 1: 431) immediately signals the theme of mirrors in the text, 
which, with the juxtaposition of the encyclopaedia, indicates its thematic function on several 
levels, not only an encyclopaedia’s function as a structural mirror of the world it describes, 
but also that the text, or rather the story can act as a mirror, both through what the author has 
put into it, but also how the reader interprets the story. This is in accord with Borges’ own 
poetics of reading, which we can find formulated in one of his essays, “El primer Wells” from 
Otras Inquisiciones: 
 
La obra que perdura es siempre capaz de una infinita y plástica ambigüedad ; es todo para todos, como 
el Apóstol ; es un espejo que declara los rasgos del lector y es también un mapa del mundo. Ello debe 
ocurrir, además, de un modo evanescente y modesto, casi a despecho del autor; éste debe aparecer 
ignorante de todo simbolismo.8 (OC2 : 76) 
 
Though the essay was written in 19469, six years after the publication of “Tlön,” it resonates 
with much of Borges’ earlier writings, especially the allusion to the First Epistle to the 
Corinthians. This call for ambiguity, that the work should reflect the reader and be a map of 
the world: this resonates deeply with regard to “Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius.” To Borges, 
ambiguity in literature is a virtue, because it leaves the text open for the readers to fill the gaps 
with themselves.  
                                                 
7 “I owe the discovery of Uqbar to the conjunction of a mirror and an encyclopedia,” (F: 7) 
8 “Work that endures is always capable of an infinite and plastic ambiguity; it is all things for all men, like the 
Apostle; it is a mirror that reflects the reader’s own traits and it is also a map of the world. And it must be 
ambiguous in an evanescent and modest way, almost in spite of the author; he must appear to be ignorant of all 
symbolism.” (Borges 1964: 87) 
9 Cf. “Bibliografía cronológica de Jorge Luis Borges” (Louis 1996) from the web-pages of the Borges Center of 
the University of Pittsburgh. 
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1.4.2 The possible worlds of “Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius” 
In connection with the observations of the previous section, the theory of possible worlds can 
be regarded as an extension of the theory of metafiction. The shifting of narrative frames as I 
have outlined above is also relevant in the frame of possible worlds theory, since the story, 
beginning in a textual world of very slight departure from the actual world, finally turns out to 
have a much greater degree of departure, though we, as readers, have been primed for the 
referential reality through the first two parts of the story’s discussion of the “imaginary” 
planet Tlön.  
 In effect, the story actualises the view of fiction as possible worlds, because it not only 
describes in detail this alternative possible world through a work of fiction, it also shows that 
this fiction comes to pass into actual reality. Through its play with narrative frames, the 
setting of the initial two parts in fact describes a world very close to our own to the reader. It 
opens in a world of minimal departure, but within the final logic of the story’s narrative 
frames, the world the reader initially identifies with actually becomes the most fictitious—the 
world of greatest departure. The thorough discussion of philosophy primes the reader, as it 
were, for this significant ontological shift in the story’s logic. 
 The narrative structure, is reflected in the duplications and internal mirrors. The reality 
described in the fiction is not a strange one, the story seems to describe a likely reality. Yet, as 
Evelyn Fishburn observes, “once we know [the hrönir] are there, we, like the archaeologists 
of Tlön, will find hrönir everywhere, as a constitutive part not only of reality but, pertinently, 
also of the narrative.” (Fishburn 2008: 57) When considering the hrönir as a structuring 
principle of the story, we are bound to find it, and, as Fishburn says, we will perhaps find it 
elsewhere. The hrön therefore becomes a poignant observation on how reality works, but 
reframed to become fantastic; as readers we observe that an aspect of the fantastic in literature 
has invaded our everyday environment. Perhaps this is metafiction in its purest form; to show 
and reframe the structuring fictions of our everyday lives.  
 
1.5 Conclusion 
For the purposes of this study, the theories of metafiction and possible worlds act as the 
interpretative framework, and the outline I have presented of the theories of metafiction and 
possible worlds has therefore not been overly technical. For this interpretation I will analyse 
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“Tlön” in three ways, in the manner shown in section 1.3.2: chapter 2 is an analysis of 
narrative structure and frames; chapter 3 is a study of the philosophies presented in part II, 
allusions to philosophies in general, and a comparison to actual-world referents; while chapter 
4 is a closer look into textual duplications, mirrorings, hrönir as a defining metaphor for the 
internal structure and mise en abyme as a structural element. This is to examine the working 
hypothesis of this study: that “Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius” is a metafictional work which 
examines the limits of narrative representation and the nature of fiction as a possible world.  
 This is not to say that my interpretation is intended as the definitive one. The divergent 
interpretations “Tlön” has received previously should be evidence enough of this; for 
example, it has been read as a tale in the utopic tradition (Irby 1971), as an effort to deal with 
the loss of Borges’ father (Friedman 1987), a parody on esoteric traditions (Jaén 1992) and as 
an inquiry into the difficulty of representing reality (Riberi 2007). None of these 
interpretations are wrong, of course, but as we are told of the people of Tlön, perhaps as a 
warning to the readers of the story: “Saben que un sistema no es otra cosa que la 
subordinación de todos los aspectos del universo a uno cualquiera de ellos.”10 (OC 1: 436) An 
interpretation cannot exhaust the original, for it depends on an aspect to structure its system. 
This study is no different, and though what I have written is at least four times as long as the 
story itself, I cannot hope to have exhausted its possibilities. 
 
                                                 
10 “They know that a system is naught but the subordination of all the aspects of the universe to one of those 
aspects—any one of them.” (F: 15) 
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Chapter 2: Narrator and narrative frames 
 
Allor Virgilio disse: “Dilli tosto:  Non son 
colui, non son colui che credi” 
 
— Dante Alighieri, Inferno, Canto XIX 
 
 
 
 
Placed precariously right at the start of “Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius” is a proposition for a way 
of writing a novel: 
 
Bioy Casares había cenado conmigo esa noche y nos demoró una vasta polémica sobre la ejecución de 
una novela en primera persona, cuyo narrador omitiere o desfigurara los hechos e incurriera en diversas 
contradicciones, que permitieran a unos pocos lectores –a muy pocos lectores– la adivinación de una 
realidad atroz o banal.11 (OC 1: 431)  
 
This “vast debate” is frequently taken as a key for how to read the story. Most critics focus on 
the “atrocious or banal truth” that supposedly is hidden—they aspire to be among the very 
few. However, the way their search is carried usually does not take into account the rest of the 
proposition: the unreliable narrator who, using contradictions and omissions, hides some more 
“real” truth underneath the visible story. This possible truth is not the focus for my study; 
rather, it is in my opinion that the emphasis given on an unreliable first-person narrator is a 
worthy area of examination. The narrator’s12 and Bioy Casares’ discussion appears to focus 
on this hidden truth depending directly upon the nature of the narrator and its reliability. 
However, on closer examination of the story I have come to the conclusion that this 
unreliability lies not only in the factual disclosures by the narrator; I have also discerned an 
unreliability in what seems to be a single voice within the story. 
 This chapter is therefore an analysis of the narrator, relating my findings to the 
theories of metafiction and possible-worlds theory. For the purpose of analysing the narrative 
voice I will look closely at the story’s narrative frames, which are more complicated than they 
seem at first glance. For this analysis I have included a thorough discussion of the 
                                                 
11 “Bioy Casares had come to dinner at my house that evening, and we had lost all track of time in a vast debate 
over the way one might go about composing a first-person novel whose narrator would omit or distort things and 
engage in all sorts of contradictions, so that a few of the book’s readers—a very few—might divine the atrocious 
or banal truth.” (F: 7, my italics: the original translation writes "horrible") 
Subsequent citations from the Spanish text will refer to this edition, unless otherwise noted. 
12 I will consequently refer to the narrator of the story either as “the narrator” or “it,” preferring the neutral 
gender, cf. Mieke Bal (1997), even though it is quite likely Borges intended the narrator to be a man (masculine), 
and even refers to the narrator as such in interviews. 
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relationships between the narrator, its relation to the implied author, and the necessity of 
distinguishing between the actual Borges and these structural elements. First, however, I will 
give an overview of previous critical treatment on the question of the narrator. 
  
2.1 Critical overview 
Given an examination of analyses of “Tlön,” especially having the problem of voice and 
narration in mind, one is struck by how uneven the critical literature regarding the narrator’s 
voice seems to be. Few have specifically analysed the narrator of the story (I have only found 
one article by René de Costa doing this, who studies several stories and only provides a 
cursory glance at “Tlön”), and while most analyses are concerned with themes relevant to the 
story—like idealist philosophy, mirroring or duplication of worlds and progressive 
fictionality—most, if not all, mention the narrator and comments on its somewhat unclear 
status. I have provided a chronological overview of central examples from the critical 
literature. 
 Ana María Barrenechea (1965) mentions the initial discussion between the narrator 
and Bioy Casares, noting that it “contains a conversation with Bioy Casares on a first-person 
story” (Barrenechea 1965: 74). Given that the sentence lacks a subject with whom Bioy 
Casares is actually discussing with, the implication is that Barrenechea, also, is equating the 
narrator with Borges, though this is not made explicit. Barrenechea does not distinguish 
between Borges and the narrator’s voice when she does a curt analysis of the story later in the 
monograph. There it is Borges, not the narrator,  who “offers a coherently and minutely 
organized universe; if he does not expose its complete structure,”  (123).  
James E. Irby (1971) examines Borges’ precursors to writing “Tlön,” in “Borges and 
the Idea of Utopia.” Though Irby mentions the narrator, he is not consistent in its 
identification. Initially it is equalled to Borges: “When Borges discovers the Eleventh 
Volume,” (Irby 1971: 41) but when discussing the story’s treatment elsewhere, “Borges” has 
become “the narrator,”  (43) though Irby here calls the narrator “he,” which can be interpreted 
as a reference to Borges, considering he has named Borges earlier. 
 In a short introduction to Ficciones, D. L. Shaw (1976) does not actually mention the 
narrator at all, but examines how “reality” and fictionality is mixed: “The opening of the tale 
illustrates […] Borges’ skill in creating an air of plausibility by deftly mixing together the real 
and the imaginary.” (Shaw 1976: 14) Shaw goes on to list the various actual persons and 
places mentioned in the story, which adds to the realistic feeling of the story’s setting. While 
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not actually referring to the narrator, Shaw consistently credits Borges personally with the 
opinions the narrator voices, implying that the narrator is equal to the actual Borges. It would 
seem that Borges’ deftness at mixing reality and fiction makes it hard to distinguish whose 
voice it is that we read in the story. 
 John Sturrock (1977) makes a distinction between Borges and the narrator, but comes 
off somewhat ambivalent to whether the distinction is necessary. First we read of “the narrator 
of the story,” (Sturrock 1977: 118) though the clear distinction loses ground when we later 
read “Borges, or […] the narrator,” (119) proceeding to change between the definite 
designation “Borges” and the more uncertain “the narrator.” The ultimate impression one is 
left with is that the narrator’s presumed identity is not one of the main concerns when reading 
of the story.  
 René de Costa (1978) writes on the narrative voice of Borges’ early fictions, and tells 
us that Borges’ use of narrative voice has gradually narrowed the distance between author and 
reader. Of “Tlön” Costa claims that the “narrative ‘I’ now belongs to someone very much like 
the signatory to the piece, Jorge Luis Borges,” adding, however, that “lest the average 
Argentine reader of 1940 confuse the fictional narrator (admirer of Tlön) with the real Borges 
(author of the artifice) and take the story for an essay, a significant postscript is added to the 
original publication in Sur” (Costa 1978: 195). In Costa’s view this leads the reader to (at 
least partially) equate the narrator with the actual Borges, though when the postscript 
recontextualises the preceding narrative, one is forced to think of the narrator in a different 
perspective: “Borges has dramatized himself.” (196). Again, the narrator of the story has 
become a fictional Borges, though the nuance is clearer in Costa’s reading: the narrator at first 
appears to be a close analogue to Borges, but turns out to be less so. Though Costa touches 
upon it, he does not fully account for the complex interaction between the story as it was 
printed and the article within the story, something I will examine more closely later. 
 Gene Bell-Villada (1981) asserts that it is “Borges” who narrates the story, placing 
Borges within quotation marks, giving this “Borges” some sort of fictional pseudo-existence 
(Bell-Villada 1981: 128). Designated thus, Bell-Villada creates the impression that the 
narrator actually names itself, and this is not the case—the narrator stays anonymous 
throughout the story, only referring to himself in the first person. Listing the various actual 
people in the story, Bell-Villada rounds it up: “and of course, Borges and Bioy Casares.” 
(132), definitely placing Borges in the story, though with a somewhat unclear status. 
Mary Lusky Friedman (1987) does not equate the narrator exactly with Borges, but 
rather relates them closely: “Borges elaborates this idea of irrevocable loss in such a way that 
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it seems to arise in the tale not out of a sense of grief, the narrator’s or Borges’ own, but rather 
out of a set of events that are quite depersonalized.”; “The speaker and his friend, a fictional 
Borges and Bioy Casares.” (Friedman 1987: 184) Although she acknowledges the fictional 
status of the narrator, she nonetheless asserts a tight bond between the actual author and the 
fictional narrator. This is not problematized, as the further analysis hinges on the relationship 
between the text and Borges’ personal biography. 
Didier Jaén (1992) writes: “the unidentified first person narrator (presumably Borges 
himself) and Borges’ friend and collaborator Bioy Casares.” (Jaén 1992: 183), identifying the 
narrator with the actual Borges. Jaén also examines the discussion between the narrator and 
Bioy Casares and its narratorial implications:  
 
In the development of the story one could surmise, at one level, that this narrator is Borges himself and 
the ‘novel’ is the story of his investigation about Uqbar and Tlön. At another level, since the story of 
Tlön and Uqbar turns out to be a parodic history of esoteric and metaphysical ideas, one could say that 
the narrator of this longer, more encompassing ‘novel’ is not Borges at all but a group of writers, 
scientists and philosophers who, unwittingly, have been creating the banal or atrocious reality of an 
idealist or conceptual world. The story also suggests that there is a hidden or invisible “narrator” behind 
these narrators, who directs them in their task. Finally, since this “secret society” turns out to be a real 
and very dynamic factor of cultural history, we could say that the deceiving author or narrator is culture 
itself, or some element of culture that persists in conveying a vision of reality different from the 
common everyday conception of it. (1992: 183-84) 
 
This analysis is somewhat confusing, and Jaén does not elaborate further upon it, although he 
touches upon the thought that the narrator of the story might not necessarily only be 
considered to be “Borges.” My approach, however, will be somewhat different. 
 Finally, Evelyn Fishburn (1998; 2008), who has written extensively on both Borges’ 
fiction in general and also on “Tlön,” frequently equates the narrator with Borges, albeit as a 
fictional variation describing the narrator as “‘Borges,’ the narrator” (Fishburn 1998: 56) or “a 
fictional or semi-fictional Borges,” corresponding this version of Borges with an equally 
“fictional or semi-fictional Bioy Casares.” (Fishburn 2008: 55). 
As a summary, we see that the central critical attention given to “Tlön” does not yield 
any clear answers as to the identity of the narrator. Most assume the narrator is a version of 
Borges, due to the frequent references to circumstances in Borges’ own biography. However, 
none of the readings seem to take into account that the postscript13 recontextualises the whole 
text—though the narrator, in the first two parts, seem to share personal circumstances with 
Borges himself, the postscript makes such changes to the origins of the text that it is worthy to 
                                                 
13 I will refer to it as the Posdata from now on, in reference to the Spanish original. 
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consider at least whether the narrator continues to be “Borges” in the postscript, or whether 
the circumstance of an article from the future changes this assumption.  
Given the varying and relatively unclear definitions of the narrator’s identity in 
“Tlön,” it seems to be clear that a more thorough analysis of the voice of the narrator will be 
of help—not only to see how the narrator functions, but also how it relates thematically to 
other motifs more frequently written on. Given the confusion in identifying the speaker, 
varying between a fictional Borges, the actual Borges and some unspecified narrator, a deeper 
analysis of the interactions in the text between the, as I will come to argue, different narrators 
and the relationships between each other and to Borges as actual author seems prudent. In an 
interview with Irby, Borges himself placed, if rather obliquely, the narrator as central to the 
understanding of the story:  “the subject is not Uqbar or Orbis Tertius but rather a man who is 
being drowned in a new and overwhelming world that he can hardly make out.” (Irby 1971: 
42-43) “Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius” is the narrator’s story; the fantastic worlds we read of, 
though interesting and rewarding to study, are a backdrop to the story of a more personal 
experience. 
Most of the critical literature I have reviewed simply designates the narrator as “first-
person,” referring, in some oblique manner, to Borges himself. However, the complexity of 
the internal textual relationships of the story makes it necessary to use more formal 
narratological terminology, helping us to make clearer and more precise distinctions. Gérard 
Genette remarks in Narrative Discourse that “The Borgesian fantastic […] does not accept 
person.” (Genette 1990: 247) While the remark is made upon the basis of the story “The 
Shape of the Sword,” in which the narrator, telling the story of a traitor, finally himself turns 
out to be the traitor he is telling a story about, Genette’s statement is perhaps just as true for 
“Tlön,” though not in the same way. In “Tlön” the assumption that a first-person narrator is 
static is toyed with, as I will try to show. I believe that the lack of consensus regarding the 
identity of the narrator motivates a closer analysis of the narrator in the story, and to find 
whether any findings are relevant in a metafictional perspective. 
 
 
2.2 Narration and its referents 
To appreciate these distinctions fully it is first necessary to identify the narrative levels or 
frames, since “Tlön” is not narrated in a straightforward fashion, but changes its own 
originary status recursively as the text progresses. Specifically, the Posdata, famously dated 
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in 1947—seven years after the story’s original publication in Sur and Antología de literatura 
fántastica, recontextualises the narrative frames. I will not dwell too much on the supposed 
“feeling of vertigo”14 this future dating supposedly induces in readers, but for the following 
discussion it is relevant to keep in mind that the Posdata in fact modifies the enunciating 
position of the two parts preceding it. To help the discussion of the frames, I will make an in-
depth summary of the story’s narrative progression, focussing on parts of the text that are 
relevant for the current analysis. 
2.2.1 Narrative progression of Parts I and II 
The story is divided into three separate parts, two of which are labelled with the Roman 
numeral I and II. The third part does not have a label as such, but interpolates “Posdata de 
1947” into the beginning of the text of that section. Regarding narrative progression, this 
section is relatively straight-forward: the first sentence, quoted above, is a short 
contextualisation of the textual present, providing a reason for the author’s intent for writing. 
Two separate scenes set a few days apart follow: first the situation in which the narrator first 
hears of the memorable aphorism of the heresiarch: “los espejos y la copula son abominables, 
porque multiplican el número de los hombres.”15 (OC 1: 443). Bioy Casares claims to have 
read the quote in a copy of The Anglo-American Cyclopaedia, a pirated edition of the 
Encyclopaedia Britannica, but the copy they find in the house does not include the article. 
Following this is the section where the narrator and Bioy Casares inspect Casares’ copy of the 
encyclopaedia, reading the article that is included there, and includes a short summary of the 
article on Uqbar that they find. Finally, the narrator mentions briefly that a friend, Carlos 
Mastronardi, had come upon another copy of the same encyclopaedia the following day—one 
without the article. The dates in the first part are internally relational, “El hecho se produjo 
hará unos cinco años,”16 (431) though we learn with the conclusion of part II that these two 
parts are written in 1940, forming a continuous narrative. This is sufficient to conclude that 
the events must have taken place around 1935. 
 The next part, bearing the heading “II,” is longer and introduces an additional level in 
the narrative frames. Since the sections are clearly demarcated, and the fact that we are 
separated both in time and place, we get a signal that we must also separate the narratives of 
parts I and II, even if they appear to be related; they are both nested within the larger one. The 
main body of text in this part is the narrator’s presentation of Tlön’s “concepto del 
                                                 
14 “sensación de vértigo” (Monegal 1985: 448) 
15 “Mirrors and copulation are hateful, for they multiply the number of mankind.” (F: 7) 
16 “The event took place about five years ago.” (F: 7) 
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universo.”17 At the start of part II we learn of Herbert Ashe, who was instrumental to the 
discovery of Tlön. Ashe was a family friend who is now dead. The narrator recalls a 
conversation they once had about duodecimals,18 before telling of how it discovered Ashe’s 
copy of A First Encyclopaedia of Tlön. Vol. XI. Hlaer to Jangr some months after Ashe’s 
death in September 1937. The narrator recalls: “Hacía dos años que yo había descubierto en 
un tomo de cierta enciclopedia pirática una somera descripción de un falso país.”19 (434) The 
discovery of the fantastical encyclopaedia ignites a public debate on where it comes from and 
who made it. The narrator mentions several known figures in the intellectual life of Buenos 
Aires partaking in the debate: Néstor Ibarra, Ezequiel Martínez Estrada, Drieu La Rochelle 
and Alfonso Reyes. Their debate and searches for companion volumes turn out to be fruitless; 
the origins of the rogue encyclopaedia remain a mystery. These events are overshadowed by 
the remaining text of part II: the explanation of Tlön’s “conception of the universe.” While I 
examine that section in detail in chapter 3, there is a story of significance embedded within 
the discussion of Tlön’s philosophies, placed almost precisely in the centre of the text in its 
entirety, what I will call the “sophism of the coins”: 
 
El martes, X atraviesa un camino desierto y pierde nueve monedas de cobre. El jueves, Y encuentra en 
el camino cuatro monedas, algo herrumbradas por la lluvia del miércoles. El viernes, Z descubre tres 
monedas en el camino. El viernes de mañana, X encuentra dos monedas en el corredor de su casa. El 
heresiarca quería deducir de esa historia la realidad —id est la continuidad— de las nueve monedas 
recuperadas. Es absurdo (afirmaba) imaginar que cuatro de las monedas no han existido entre el martes 
y el jueves, tres entre el martes y la tarde del viernes, dos entre el martes y la madrugada del viernes. 
Es lógico pensar que han existido —siquiera de algún modo secreto, de comprensión vedada a los 
hombres— en todos los momentos de esos tres plazos.20 (437) 
 
Though this structural centre of “Tlön” is important to the understanding of the story due to 
several aspects of it, the present focus is that of embedded narrative and its interaction with 
the surrounding text. It is notable that this story is set apart from the rest of the text by the use 
of cursive. This is especially significant considering that the narrator intervenes in the story, 
explaining the connection between the two parts of it, adding (somewhat inexplicably) 
                                                 
17 “conception of the universe.” 
18 Presumably this conversation took place even before Uqbar was discovered, though this numbering system, is 
obviously relevant to Tlön, as we come to learn of later. 
19 “Two years earlier, I had discovered in one of the volumes of a certain pirated encyclopedia a brief description 
of a false country;” (F: 11) 
20 “On Tuesday, X is walking along a deserted road an loses nine copper coins. On Thursday, Y finds four coins 
in the road, their luster somewhat dimmed by Wednesday’s rain. On Friday, Z discovers three coins in the road. 
Friday morning X finds two coins on the veranda of his house. From this story the heresiarch wished to deduce 
the reality—i.e., the continuity in time—of those nine recovered coins. It is absurd (he affirmed) to imagine that 
four of the coins did not exist from Tuesday to Thursday, three from Tuesday to Friday afternoon, two from 
Tuesday to Friday morning. It is logical to think that they in fact did exist—albeit in some secret way that we are 
forbidden to understand—at every moment of those three periods of time.” (F: 16, Due to some minor 
discrepancies between the formatting of the original and Hurley’s translation, I have modified the formatting to 
correspond more precisely with the Spanish original.)   
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“afirmaba.” I regard this as a distinction between narrative voices. It must be assumed that it 
is supposed to be a unique narrative voice for the sophism of the coins, given that it is the 
“most common” version. Hence, we can assume that the narrator is quoting from a source—
presumable the volume of the encyclopaedia—and that the interpolations act as a form of 
dialogue between texts. I analyse the significance of the sophism in chapter four, since I 
regard it as an example of mise en abyme, and as such it is also relevant for the discussion of 
narrative frames.   
 Concluding parts I and II is the paratext “Salto Oriental, 1940” marking place and date 
of the writing of the two first parts.  
 
2.2.2 Referents of parts I and II 
Parts I and II are riddled with references, places, and people of the actual world in the time the 
story was written. The narrator introduces the story with the discussion had with Adolfo Bioy-
Casares. There is the Anglo-American Cyclopaedia, a pirated edition of the Encyclopaedia 
Britannica that seems likely,21 the references to the Erdkunde and the atlases of Justus 
Perthes, both well-known and acknowledged reference-works. A reference to de Quincey is 
true enough,22 and the narrator mentions some books that, though obscure, seem plausible: 
History of the Land Called Uqbar; Lesbare und lesenswerthe Bemerkungen über das Land 
Ukkbar in Klein-Asien; A General History of Labyrinths. These are, however, apocryphal.23 
 Bioy-Casares and Mastronardi are real enough; the books, however, are not 
necessarily so. Andreä was an actual scholar, but the book referred to by him does not exist. 
The author Silas Haslam is also invented, though the name Haslam is Borges’ own 
grandmother’s maiden name. Ultimately though, the references in this part all seem plausible 
enough on reading. The only detail that arouses suspicion of fictitious aspects is the erroneous 
article on Uqbar found in the rogue copy of an encyclopaedia. Of course, if one digs deeper, 
one finds that even in this section that seemingly has mostly actual-world referents, one finds 
several departures from the actual world and into fiction. These discrepancies are mostly 
hidden, however; the setting seems familiar and true. 
                                                 
21 Alan White (2003) has identified the probable model for the encyclopaedia: the Anglo-American Encyclopedia 
(my underlining). 
22 The passage alluded to is also real. 
23 Borges would later relate in an interview about his practice of working in imaginary books in stories: “[It’s] a 
kind of stock joke we have of working in imaginary and real people in the same story. For example, if I quote an 
apocryphal book, then the next book to be quoted is a real one, or perhaps an imaginary one, by a real writer, 
no?” (Burgin 1969: 50) 
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 Similarly, the circumstances in part II all seem plausible, though here we encounter 
the Volume 11 of the First Encyclopaedia of Tlön, which undoubtedly appears to be more 
fictitious and takes more space than the circumstances leading to the exploration of it. The 
people referred to, however, are real; it also seems like the debate carried out in actual learned 
journals could possibly have happened, even if it did not. The referential basis of Parts I and II 
appear to anchor them in a fictional world of relatively minimal departure from the actual 
world. Additionally, as I explore more closely in chapter 3, the discussion on the philosophy 
of Tlön is continually connected to actual-world philosophical referents. Thus we have to 
make the inference that the fictional world that we infer from parts I and II are worlds of 
decidedly minimal departure, as the two main departures of this fictional world are a four-
page article in an encyclopaedia and a single volume of another encyclopaedia.  
 
2.2.3 Narrative progression of the Posdata de 1947 
Appearing immediately after “Salto Oriental, 1940” that concludes part II is the addition of a 
postscript which significantly destabilises the narrative frames of what we have read 
previously. Not placed as a heading as with parts I and II, “Posdata de 1947” (440) is 
interpolated into the text at the very beginning of the section. The explanation of the textual 
status that follows is significant to the status of the text as a whole, which I will return to after 
looking at the various narratives in this final section of “Tlön.” 
 First is an explanation for the nebulous origins of the Volume XI. A letter to the 
deceased Herbert Ashe found in a book describes a conspiracy to create a country by a group 
of idealist philosophers from the 15th century onwards, most prominent among them Bishop 
George Berkeley; upon moving to America the project is refocused to invent an entire planet, 
by a mysterious millionaire named Ezra Buckley24.  
 Finally, a complete set of A First Encyclopaedia of Tlön is discovered in a library in 
Memphis. After this, events follow rapidly: the narrator recalls the first manifestation of 
precursors to the final intrusion of Tlön upon the internal reality of the story. A compass 
engraved with letters from one of the alphabets of Tlön mysteriously arrives at the apartments 
of the princess Faucigny-Lucinge; the discovery of a mysterious conical object that is “muy 
chico y a la vez pesadísimo”25 (442). The narrator appears to be involved in both of these 
discoveries. Of the compass we are told: “Hacia 1942 arreciaron los hechos. Recuerdo con 
                                                 
24 It might also be significant that “Buckley” is nearly homophonous to “Berkeley.” 
25 “very small, yet extremely heavy” (F: 23). 
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singular nitidez uno de los primeros”26 (441, my italics), indicating that the event was 
personally experienced and thus remembered, unlike the first. Of the conical object we learn 
that “Un azar que me inquieta hizo que yo también fuera testigo de la segunda. Ocurrió unos 
meses después”27 (441, my italics). Curiously, the narrative segment that follows is proposed 
as something of a general, shared narrative, and in fact draws direct attention to the act of 
narration: “Aquí doy término a la parte personal de mi narración. Lo demás está en la 
memoria (cuando no en la esperanza o en el temor) de todos mis lectores.”28 (442) This 
section, which lies in “every reader’s memory,” is not very extensive, lasting from “Hacia 
1944” to “Casi inmediatamente, la realidad cedió en más de un punto.”29 (442) The following 
part growing, contrary to the narrator’s initial assertion, increasingly personal, before the story 
ends: 
 
El mundo será Tlön. Yo no hago caso, yo sigo revisando en los quietos días del hotel de Adrogué una 
indecisa traducción quevediana (que no pienso dar a la imprenta) del Urn Burial de Browne.30 (443) 
 
2.2.4 Referents of the Posdata 
With the Posdata, the tone becomes more urgent as the departure from the familiar world 
becomes more apparent. Characters introduced in this section, as the Princess Faucigny-
Lucinge, still refer to actual-world people, but the events described now have their reference 
in the fiction of the previous parts. Though the events leading up to the creation of the First 
Encyclopaedia of Tlön are described in detail, the originator of its source is a fictional 
referent. Whereas the origins of the original project—to create a fictional country—was 
undertaken by a veritable pantheon of actual-world idealist philosophers, the creation of the 
Encyclopaedia has its origin in a single, fictional man, Ezra Buckley. After getting to know of 
Buckley, we are not privy to knowledge of any further accomplices in the encyclopaedia’s 
creation, whereas prior to Buckley we know of several: Berkeley, Dalgarno, Andreä, and so 
on. Thus the creation of the encyclopaedia is marked by the entrance of a purely fictional 
man. 
                                                 
26 “In 1942, the plot thickened. I remember with singular clarity one of the first events.” (F: 22) 
27 “An unsettling coincidence made me a witness to the second intrusion as well. This event took place some 
months later,” (F: 22, my italics). It is perhaps noteworthy how the wording echoes the discovery of the Volume 
XI in part II. 
28 “Here I end the personal portion of my narration. The rest lies in every reader’s memory (if not his hope or 
fear).” (F: 23) 
29 “In 1944,”; “Almost immediately, reality ‘caved in’ at more than one point.” (F: 23-24) 
30 “The world will be Tlön. That makes very little difference to me; through my quiet days in this hotel in 
Adrogué, I go on revising (though I never intend to publish) an indecisive translation in the style of Quevedo of 
Sir Thomas Browne’s Urne Buriall.” (F: 25) 
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 Additionally, though the events take place in a world clearly similar to our own, the 
objects that begin to intrude upon the world (are they hrönir, perhaps?) all have direct 
reference to the First Encyclopaedia: the letters of the compass “correspondían a uno de los 
alfabetos de Tlön”31 (441); the impossibly heavy cone is an “imagen de la divinidad, en 
ciertas religiones de Tlön”32 (442). When it is explained that “Lo demás está en la memoria 
[…] de todos mis lectores,”33 (442) these have all originated in a work of fiction—within the 
work of fiction. Within the text’s chronology, the level of departure from the textual world of 
1940 seems to increase exponentially up to the time the Posdata is written in 1947. 
 
2.3 Narrative frames/Contextual play 
For my analysis of narrative frames I have used a graphical representation. This 
representation has its roots with Gérard Genette’s discussion of diegetic levels (Genette 
1988), where he provides a simple illustration of how one decides narrative levels: an narrator 
tells a story, within that story is another narrator telling a story, and so on. For a more 
complex narrative, however, a more distinguishing model is necessary, and I have used the 
model of “Chinese boxes” (Ryan 1991; Branigan 1992). In this model, narrative segments are 
arranged as boxes, where a box within another defines its position in the hierarchy of nested 
narratives. Two types of lines are employed: continuous lines, marking an ontological 
boundary between nested narratives, and dashed lines, which mark narrative episodes or 
segments.34  
 The manner in which “Tlön” is structured, we have to distinguish between three 
separate, consecutive narratives in the analysis of narrative frames: Part I, Part II and the 
Posdata. This can initially be represented by figure 2.1: 
                                                 
31 “belonged [corresponds] to one of the alphabets of Tlön.” (F: 22) 
32 “image of the deity in certain Tlönian religions.” (F: 23) 
33 “The rest lies in every reader’s memory,” (F: 23) 
34 The distinction between types of lines is proposed by Ryan as something of an ad hoc-solution (Ryan 1991: 
179), but it is nevertheless effective for my purposes. 
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figure 2.1 
 
 
This figure shows a naïve representation of the narrative structure. It is inadequate, since it 
does not show the complexity of narrative frames. We see, though, that the separate parts 
follow each other, and the outer frame shows the ontological boundary for the text as a whole, 
drawn with a solid line. This line is the boundary between the actual world and the textual 
world. Thus, the boxes marking the three parts of the story all take place within the textual 
world, separated from the actual world, with the arrows showing that the three parts of the 
text follow each other successively.  
In short, we can say that this is how the story is experienced at a cursory reading, but it 
is clearly not sufficient for the understanding of the intricacies of the narrative frames. I will 
therefore look more closely at the elements making the narrative frames more complex. 
 
2.3.1 Relations 
I will outline how the narrative levels relate to each other in “Tlön” as a whole. First, 
however, we have to consider what the addition of the Posdata does in relation to the previous 
parts, as I have mentioned earlier. 
 Considering the ontological status of the world-relationships, the Posdata is extremely 
important, because it is supposedly written in 1947. Since the story was published in 1940, the 
Posdata marks a very important boundary: “Tlön” cannot be understood properly if one does 
not consider the original publication of the story. Initially it appears that the Posdata is simply 
an addition to the other parts, added at a later date: “Reproduzco el artículo anterior tal como 
apareció en la Antología de la literatura fantástica, 1940” (440). However, the narrator 
”Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius” 
”I” ”II” Posdata 
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immediately admits that the reproduction is not exactly felicitous,35 adding “sin otra escisión 
que algunas metáforas y que una especie de resumen burlón que ahora resulta frívolo. Han 
ocurrido tantas cosas desde esa fecha…”36 (440) The former article from 1940 must therefore 
be considered to have been edited in light of later events. The narrator implicitly has done a 
value-judgment and deemed certain elements of the original inappropriate in the context it is 
printed in presently. Thus, the Posdata is not a separate narrative parallel to parts I and II, but 
an overarching, framing narrative that these are embedded into. This is not immediately 
apparent upon reading, and the textual markers that frame the narrative come very late into 
the story.  
 Between “Salto Oriental, 1940” and “Posdata de 1947”—in the blankness of the 
empty lines, so to speak—is a fictional ontological barrier. Before the Posdata, everything 
narrated could possibly have happened; with the Posdata, everything is inarguably a fiction, a 
pure fantasy.  
 The use of the first-person singular in the story is appropriate, especially in respect to 
one of “Tlön’s” main subject matters, that of subjective idealism—a topic I will return to in 
the chapter on philosophy. When it comes to the narrative, however, the use of a first-person 
narrator creates a distinct problem, since the narrator of “Tlön” does not identify itself 
conclusively, i.e. naming itself. Susan S. Lanser argues that one of the consequences of an 
unidentified first-person narrator is that the reader simply identifies the “I” of the narrator 
with the author of the text: “I-narrative taunts us with the possibility that the ‘I’ of the fiction 
has some relation to the author’s ‘I’ even when the I-character is not also a writer or does not 
share the author’s first name.” (Lanser 2005: 207) This is because the first-person singular is a 
relational term that always refers to the speaker. With an oral (as contrasted to a written) 
speech act of telling a story, there will invariably be a truth-claim to the validity of the story. 
Placing an “I” in the story thus invokes an evaluation of truth regarding the speaker’s 
enunciation of participation in the story. In other words, when speaking, the use of “I” is 
always self-referential. However, this is not the case for fiction, as fiction does not operate 
with the same philosophical criteria for truthful statements (cf. chapter 1). Consequently, the 
question whether it is true that the “I” of fiction refers to the actual author of the fiction is 
irrelevant—one must, in fiction, always distinguish between the narrator and the author. From 
                                                 
35 Much like how the Anglo-American Cyclopaedia is “una reimpresión literal, pero también morosa.” (431)  [“a 
literal (though also laggardly) reprint” (F: 7)] 
36 “I reproduce the article above exactly as it appeared in the Anthology of Fantastic Literature (1940), the only 
changes being editorial cuts of one or another metaphor and a tongue-in-cheek sort of summary that would now 
be considered flippant. So many things have happened since 1940…” (F: 20) 
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the reader’s standpoint, however, that the “I” refers to the author easily becomes the default 
assumption, and it can be a very strong belief regardless of whether the “I” of the fiction bears 
any resemblance to the actual author. 
 In “Tlön,” this assumption on identifying the “yo” of the story with the author of the 
story is toyed with, especially considering the internal dynamic of textual origin. Externally, 
to the readers, it is signposted as a fiction—it is the first story of a collection called 
Ficciones—and thus do not operate with the same criteria for truth. Internal to the textual 
world, however, it does, and it is here that the dynamic of the enunciating “yo” becomes 
interesting. There is the textual claim that parts I and II together form an article printed in 
either Sur 68 or Antología de literatura fantástica, depending on the version of the text we are 
reading; that it has been reprinted; that a Posdata has been added in 1947; and there is the 
claim that some parts of the “original” article have been edited out. The internal logic of the 
story dictates that we have to assume that these statements are all true. However, these (true) 
statements place it within a publishing history where some of the crucial paratextual 
information readers usually have access to is lost. Specifically, the identification of the 
“article’s” author is lacking; and additionally, we do not know whether it has been reproduced 
and edited with an additional postscript by the same author as the previous one. I will argue 
for the certainty that parts I and II do not have the same narrator as the Posdata. However, I 
will also open for the possibility that the author of the Posdata may not be the same.  
 
2.3.2 Extra-/intradiegesis and Homo-/heterodiegesis 
I use the terms coined by Gérard Genette, who differentiates narrators as being: homodiegetic 
and heterodiegetic, distinguishing respectively between whether the narrator includes itself in 
the text or not; and intradiegetic and extradiegetic, which places the narrator inside or outside 
of the text in relation to the narrative frame, or level, of which it relates to. The distinction 
between homo- and heterodiegetic narrators is directly connected to the relationship between 
the extra- and intradiegetic narrator. Genette explains that the homodiegetic narrator is 
distinguished by the fact that the narrator at the intradiegetic level self-identifies with the 
narrator at the extradiegetic level (Genette 1988: 85). To assert whether there is homo- or 
heterodiegesis should, superficially, be simple. As noted, most critics apply the term “first-
person” narrator, and as an analogue to homodiegetic this is true for most narrative levels. 
With “Tlön,” however, this impression is deceiving. In the story, the distinctions between 
 38
diegetic levels are particularly relevant for the distinction between actual-world authors, 
textual-world authors and narrators. 
Referring to Figure 2.1, the actual author, Borges, is outside of the outer boundary 
making him the definitive extradiegetic narrator. The figure, in its simplicity, shows the 
schematic for the assumption that the intradiegetic narrator is equal to Borges, which makes 
the narrator homodiegetic (i.e., equal to Borges). When previous critics assume that the 
narrator is Borges, or “Borges,” this is what the narrative schematic looks like. This 
interpretation would, perhaps, be more or less right, if it wasn’t for the addition of the Posdata 
that recontextualises origins and authorship. Essentially, the Posdata introduces two new 
narrative frames at once, as I will show. 
Since the textual claim is that we are reading an article, we also have to assume that 
the “I” of both parts I and II, and of the Posdata, refer to the authors of these respectively. 
The Posdata establishes that what we are reading is an entire article published in 1947. 
Additionally, it is established that the two previous parts were first published together in 
1940. Thus we can assume that the narrators of parts I and II are the same. However, the 
narrator of the Posdata  admits to have modified the anterior text. The narrator of the Posdata 
also admits to an ideological difference between itself and that of parts I and II. We read that 
some of the aspects of the previously published article were disagreeable in light of later 
events: “algunas metáforas y que una especie de resumen burlón que ahora resulta frívolo.”37 
(441) The narrator has therefore edited the text. Thus, even if it is possible that the authorial 
position might be the same, the consequence is inevitably that we cannot equal the narrators 
of parts I and II with the narrator of the Posdata.  
For two separate narratives to have the same narrator, I take the position that the 
narrator would need to be essentially unchanged in personality, judgment and ideology. The 
narrator of the Posdata’s ideological stance is different from that of the narrator of the 
previous parts; the emotional association has differed greatly; the style has changed from one 
of detached erudition to one of urgency. Thus, even if it were to be the same person—seven 
years later—there is the self-confessed evidence from the narrator of an inherent change. The 
supposed changes are imperceptible in the first two parts, however, since the evidence of a 
“frivolous” attitude has actually been removed from the text. As readers we are unable to 
distinguish this change in attitude, which also makes it difficult to distinguish the narrators 
                                                 
37 “one or another metaphor and a tongue-in-cheek sort of summary that would now appear somewhat flippant.” 
(F: 20) 
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from each other. But since the Posdata’s narrator clearly claims that the first two parts have 
been changed, we must similarly assume that the narrators are different.  
As for the appearance of the intra-homodiegetic narrator, this is mainly informed by 
the fact that there is a continual narrating subject calling itself “yo.” To expand on Lanser’s 
claim that an unidentified first-person narrator creates an identification between it and the 
author, the continual use of unidentified narrators creates the appearance of continuity of 
narrators between narrative segments. This appears to be an illusion. The lack of identification 
of narrators plays on the expectations of the reader—a closer reading disrupts the illusion. 
 
2.3.3 A return to narrative frames 
With the previous analysis we now have the information for a more nuanced representation of 
the narrative frames than in figure 2.1. Primarily we have to establish internal ontological 
frames, due to the text’s recursive ontological reframing, and the figure now looks like this: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
figure 2.2 
 
Figure 2.2 needs some further explanation, due to the addition of three frames that are 
ontological boundaries. First, I will just mention that the innermost frame, within “II,” is what 
I call the “sophism of the coins,” which I have marked (D). I will discuss (D) 
comprehensively in chapter 4; in this connection suffice it to remark briefly on why it is an 
ontological boundary and not a textual one. The reason is that (D) is a direct quote from a 
”Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius” (A) 
 
  1940 (B)              1947 (C) 
”II” (2) ”I” (1) ”Posdata” (3) 
Sophism 
(D) 
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work of fiction (the Encyclopaedia of Tlön) which later turns out to be the structuring 
principle for a new reality; it is a quote marks it as removed from the rest of the text of part II 
at a narrative level higher than its framing narrative. 
 Primarily in the figure, though, is the inclusion of two separate ontological boundaries 
marking narrative levels. Level (A) of the narrative includes the entire story; so does, in 
effect, level (C), due to its recursive domination of (1) and (2). However, (B) also has 
evidence of being a story told at a complete separation from (C), though the textual segments 
are within (C). The consequence would be that (C) would be an embedded narrative within 
(B); however, (C) dominates the previous (B) narrative, making it its own. For this reason, I 
have marked (B) as a frame both within and outside of (C); the part outside is marked with a 
dashed line, because it is not a true ontological barrier, yet it reaches illusorily outside of the 
dominance of (C). This is to indicate that it first reads as a frame at one removed from the 
outer frame of (A), but that this is a narrative illusion; (C) reclaims ontological supremacy, 
placing (B) at a higher narrative level than itself. This operation, the misleading of the reader, 
is achieved by suppressing facts at the appropriate places during reading.   
 
2.3.4 Author 
Within the story, there is an author—the implied author38— of the articles we are reading that 
has to be distinguished from the actual author Borges. However, the textual markers that are 
needed to identify the implied author are absent—there is no apparent signatory to the piece 
other than Borges himself. Thus we are left with a homodiegetic narrator that has an unknown 
implied author as referent, the consequence being that we continuously identify the various 
narrators as stemming from the same authorial source, even though this may prove to be 
erroneous. It is therefore necessary to identify whether the different parts can be assumed to 
have the same implied author, though set seven years apart in time. This will perhaps prove 
                                                 
38 Cf. Wayne C. Booth’s The Rhetoric of Fiction (1991). Booth’s original term was intended to signify a fictional 
model of the actual author—the author as the reader would discern him or her when reading a book. Booth’s 
term does not apply to an actual structural element within the story, but the abstract impression we get of the 
author from reading his work. “Tlön,” however, actually has an author within the story, who, though perhaps 
similar to Borges, must be considered to be a structurally separate and significant entity. However, since the term 
“implied author” is useful in distinguishing between the author presented within the text and Borges himself, I 
have decided to use it, rather than complicating the existing theoretical jargon. My use of the term is therefore 
closer to how Seymour Chatman uses it in Coming to Terms, where he comes to the conclusion that “the narrator 
[…] is the only subject, the only ‘voice’ of narrative discourse. The inventor of that speech […] is the implied 
author.” (Chatman 1990: 87); see also Shlomith Rimmon-Kenan’s Narrative Fiction (Rimmon-Kenan 2002: 88-
89) 
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difficult, partly due to the nature of fiction. As an example I will borrow from the 
philosophies of Tlön:  
 
... no conciben que lo especial perdure en el tiempo. La percepción de una humareda en el horizonte y 
después del campo incendiado y después del cigarro a medio apagar que produjo la quemazón es 
considerada un ejemplo de asociación de ideas.39 (436) 
 
Gabriel Josipovici notes regarding this passage: 
 
Not in the real world, we retort. But what of the world of fiction? After all, in that world there is no 
causality either, only the semblance of causality. For the smoke is not real smoke, the field not a real 
field and the cigarette not a real cigarette. The writer has put these three elements together in his mind 
and on paper and we read it as a story of how a fire was caused. (Josipovici 1998: 62-63) 
 
In the real world, the chain of events from cause to effect is vastly more complex and minute 
than what perception is capable of comprehending. Therefore, we generalize from experience, 
and fiction takes advantage of this, where setting three different details in sequence will be 
read as a chain of cause and effect. This is also how “Tlön” is constructed: part I and II and 
the Posdata appear to be connected first by the fact that they are placed in sequence, and we 
also thus infer that they are written by the same author. Additionally, there are a set of 
statements that appear to link the different parts with the previous ones through the narrator’s 
experience. In part II, we read: “Hacía dos años que yo había descubierto en un tomo de cierta 
enciclopedia pirática una somera descripción de un falso país,”40 (434) this sentence appears 
to relate to the scene in part I where the narrator and Bioy Casares discover the article on 
Uqbar. However, it is expressed ambiguously: two years ago (we do not know exactly when 
the narrator makes the discovery of the First Encyclopaedia); a certain pirated encyclopaedia 
(it is not identified as the Anglo-American Cyclopaedia; pirated encyclopaedias proliferated at 
the time); finally, the fact that there were two that discovered it, and that it was actually Bioy 
Casares who discovered it first. Although I am not saying that the narrator of part II is 
necessarily different from the one in part I, I stress that the main indicator of continuity within 
the text is this somewhat tenuous connection. This is in the nature of fiction, as sequence 
usually indicates contiguity.  
 Similarly, there is nothing internal to the text in the Posdata that affirms that there is a 
continued identification of the implied author of the narratives. The only indication we have is 
that the narrator at the end explains it remains with “los quietos días del hotel de Adrogué.” 
                                                 
39 “... space is not conceived of having duration in time. The perception of a cloud of smoke on the horizon and 
then the countryside on fire and the half-extinguished cigarette that produced the scorched earth is considered an 
example of the association of ideas.” (F: 14) 
40 “Two years earlier, I had discovered in one of the volumes of a certain pirated encyclopedia a brief description 
of a false country;” (F: 11) 
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The reader’s assumption being that the narrator must have returned to the hotel at Adrogué—
even though the previous parts were written in Salto Oriental, in Uruguay. That the narrator 
should be at the same place that the narrator of part II describes may be coincidence; we read 
it as continuity.  
 The final reason we continuously identify the different narrators with the same implied 
author has to do with what has been explained previously, that when there is a first-person 
narrator, there is a compulsion to identify it with the actual author of the text, even if there are 
indicators in the text saying otherwise. In “Tlön,” however, there are many personal details 
that can be directly connected with Borges: the many people mentioned in the story were 
friends or acquaintances of Borges, the setting in Buenos Aires, and then the hotel at Adrogué 
is recognisable to those familiar with Borges’ biography. This is the main reason why critics 
usually call the narrator “Borges” or “a fictional Borges,” as there appears to be a strong 
correlation with the narrator we are presented with and the actual Borges. Thus the positive 
identifications between the implied authors of part I and II and the Posdata is based on a false 
assumption: that the narrator, who maybe takes facts from the life of the actual author thus 
equals the implied authors within the text, even in spite of the impossibility of writing in the 
future. The implied authors may both be “fictionalised” Borgeses, but that does not mean that 
the implied author of parts I and II and the implied author of the Posdata are identical; rather, 
they both have their basis in the same person, but this person is outside of the fiction.  
However, this opens for the question of whether we can assume the implied author to 
be the same for all three parts. How are we to define an author in respect to the textual world? 
Internally in the fiction, the label “author” actually becomes misleading. With respect to 
Genette’s distinctions, we can establish that the implied authors of the different segments are 
equal to their extradiegetic narrators. Additionally, since the intradiegetic narrators are in 
first-person, they are also homodiegetic. This creates a problem when we consider that it is 
now established two distinct narrators—though one is suppressed by the other. Thus, the 
implied author/extradiegetic narrator of the Posdata is an individual placed in time in 1947, 
the other one in 1940. Yet, the 1947-narrator has intervened into the narrative of the first two 
parts for purpose of them to be in accord with its narrative. This leads to parts I and II having 
effectively two narrators at once: one who is the same as that of the Posdata, and another, a 
1940-narrator whose voice is suppressed by the future narrator’s recursive suppressions. The 
visible, apparent narrator of the first two parts is a palimpsest, written over the original 
narrative, suppressing its personal voice.  
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There must therefore be two implied authors/extradiegetic narrators of parts one and 
two: a homodiegetic narrator and a heterodiegetic narrator. The homodiegetic narrator 
corresponds to the extradiegetic author of 1940, the enunciating “yo.” The heterodiegetic 
narrator is the author from 1947, whose different ideology changes the text. In effect, the 
narrator from 1947 rewrites the text by removing from it. 
 
2.3.5 Reader 
Similar to the implied author is the implied reader: a model reader that presupposes perfect 
knowledge of all information that is relevant to the story (Chatman 1980; Rimmon-Kenan 
2002). As with the implied author, in “Tlön” the implied reader cannot be read in the 
traditional manner, due to the narrative frames’ frustration of a straight-forward reading. The 
normal way in which to use the implied reader is to place it as a fictional construction of the 
actual readers as a structural element within the story. However, due to the separation of the 
narrative frames, in “Tlön” there is explicitly implied a readership that is quite different from 
any actual readers of the story. 
 In order to explain, we have to distinguish between the implied readers of the story 
and the actual readers of the story. The implied readers of the story seemingly evolve 
throughout, and we are made to understand that the model reader of the story cannot equal 
any actual readers of it. Thus we have to distinguish between two ontological narrative 
frames; one of these frames at the outer extremity which is defined by the story’s actual 
publication in 1940. The (actual) audience of this narrative have no preconceptions of the 
internal textual world of the story; thus, the initial setting, with its actual-world referents 
seemingly index the actual world and give it a sense of minimum departure; the story reads, 
with the first part, as “realistic” with a minor departure: an erroneous encyclopaedia article on 
a country that may—or may not—be real.  
 The implied readers of the story however, are intended to read the story not as a story, 
but as an article recapitulating a series of events leading up to the current situation. This is 
indicated by some of the textual details of the Posdata: “I reproduce here” (F: 20) and “The 
rest lies in every reader’s memory” (F: 23). It is both clear and necessary that, within the 
textual world of “Tlön” the intended readers already know of a number of events leading to 
the ongoing “Tlönification” of the world. These events are, no doubt, common knowledge for 
the implied readers. Thus we have a second narrative frame within the outermost one that 
indicates the ontological boundary for the implied readers; it is also an indication that the 
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narrative framing figure that I have presented earlier is not sufficient to allow for the implied 
readers. The implied readers will read it merely as chronological and as a natural progression 
of the story.  
 
2.4 Consequences and conclusions. “Tlön” as metafiction 
As we see from the analysis of the narrative structure, the way the story is plotted goes against 
traditional framing narrative structure. The opening two parts are at a higher narrative level, 
but it is higher than we initially expect it to be, or how we would read it naïvely. In part, this 
is necessary, since what eventually turns out to be the more fundamental narrative frame—a 
world rapidly becoming more like the Tlön from a fictional encyclopaedia—is a textual world 
radically removed from the seemingly minimal departure we see in the opening parts. The 
narrative framing, as shown in figure 2.2 actually creates a narrative frame in which there is 
no actual text—there appears to be no visible textual agent, though it is here that we have to 
place the abstract construction of an implied author that narrates the embedded narratives.  
 Another result is that, in effect, we have two ontological models that are at the same 
time competing and complementary. Within the ontological perspective of the implied reader, 
the narrative thus would follow a relatively realistic, referential and straight-forward narrative. 
One part leads to the next chronologically and necessarily. However, as these implied readers 
must be considered fictitious constructs, we have to add ontological boundaries to indicate 
that the narrative frames are recontextualised progressively. This is made not only with the 
Posdata of 1947 but with indications of the previous parts as well. For example, there is 
mentioned the public debate about the Volume 11. However, this can be seen as an 
informative paragraph, and we have to assume that the story is supposed to reach a wider 
audience than the participants of that debate.  
 In a metafictional respect this is interesting, because in effect the text has two intended 
audiences: one, which has experienced the same massive events as the implied author, and 
therefore must read the story as a true article that is merely a lament over a lost way of life. 
The other audience, however, the actual readers, read the same lament, but, for the story to 
carry meaning, must involve themselves in a much greater degree of interpretative work to 
make any actual-world sense of the story. This duality in the narrative framing seems, in John 
Barth’s words, to be a step towards exhausting the possibilities of what is possible with the 
structure of narrative, because it thus frustrates the attempt from the reader to make a 
straightforward model of how the story is built up—and this is in spite of the fact that it reads 
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as a straight-forward narrative. The result is that, paradoxically, the narrative framing is 
complex, but completely intelligible at the same time. It invites to an analysis that is 
seemingly more complex than the story warrants, yet, if one is to propose a model of such 
simplicity, it would in fact banalize the implication of its deeper complexity.  
 Returning to the discussion of previous critical attention paid to the significance of the 
narrator in “Tlön,” it should now be clear that a positive identification of the narrator, and 
even the author, in the story with Borges is not valid. However, the discussion of the various 
referents to the actual world shows that it is, in respect to Borges’ personal biography, an 
identification that is intuitively correct to make. The referential basis being Borges, even the 
friendships of the narrator and the places it resides at, all seem to imply that the narrator also 
must be Borges. However, it must be emphasised that this is an authorial illusion, and the 
illusion is enforced by the ontological boundaries the narrative frames provide. The world we 
initially read in, and consequently make the identification of the narrator with the author 
Borges, finally turns out to be in narrative frame which is at a greater departure from the 
actual world than the narrative frame it is embedded in. Therefore, the identification of the 
narrator of parts I and II with Borges is a fiction. The belief in this fiction, however, proves to 
be very strong; the first impressions are the ones that last the longest, even if the text itself 
proves them to be wrong. 
 In a metafictional respect, this analysis is not what Hutcheon would call “overt” 
metafiction. However, it is a story that plays actively against stale suppositions of how story-
telling is supposed to be. It goes against conventions of how one relates narrators to authors, 
and plays directly on an important aspect of reading, the filling in of the blanks where the 
reader fills in elements in their imagination. In “Tlön” this does not only apply to narrated 
events of the story, but to elements, which when left blank are conventionally filled by 
previous experience of fiction: the unidentified author becomes Borges; the unidentified 
narrator becomes Borges; it is not made clear that there has been a change in authors or 
narrators, and therefore they must be the same. “Tlön,” using Barth’s term, exhausts the 
possibilities and assumptions of how a story is constructed.  
 In a possible-world perspective the sophism of the coins, which is removed at the 
upper level of narration, is significant because it is an example of ontological importance for 
the internal coherence of the world described within the Volume 11. For the world described 
within the volume, this sophism, though apparently innocuous, was a thought-experiment that 
challenged the prevailing world-view of Tlön. We can therefore say that, in a round-about 
way, the sophism of the coins actually presents a possible world within the possible world of 
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Tlön; a possible world that has been rejected. Therefore, the sophism of the coins is the 
precursor to an existential battle; a battle over prevailing ontologies. This battle leaks over 
into the textual actual world of “Tlön,” and the explanation of its importance must therefore 
be considered important for the story as a whole. The sophism of the coins is central to the 
story, both because it is a story of an impossible world, but because the story becomes 
impossible in the textual actual world as well. Its defeat crosses ontological boundaries. 
Because it is in a narrative frame that is the furthest removed from the textual actual world, 
the prevailing ontology of this little quote turns out to be of a world which is at the greatest 
departure from the outer framing narrative. Its referents are broken, because they have been 
severed through the explanations of the philosophies of Tlön. The referential basis for them 
are exclusively idealist philosophies, whereas, in the sophism of the coins, the description of 
materialism becomes the description of an impossible world. That this impossible world is the 
textual actual world, that it is a mirror to it, and that it is subsequently defeated, thus makes 
the progressive intrusion of Tlön upon the world inevitable. The fiction gains supremacy. The 
importance of the sophism of the coins will be discussed in greater depth in chapter 4. 
 To speculate on the origins, or motivation, for writing “Tlön,” we might say that it 
would not be “What would the story be if such and such happens,” but rather, “How would 
you write a story from the point of view where such and such has already happened, though 
hiding this fact, and making it progressively known? What assumptions do readers make 
about stories?” 
 In the context of the following chapters, especially of the philosophy of Tlön which I 
will explain in detail, I deem my findings and my interpretation of their relevance to be not 
only plausible, but probable. A proliferation of narrators and authors; in a footnote we read 
that all men, in the dizzying instant of copulation, are the same man. (438) “Tlön, Uqbar, 
Orbis Tertius” goes against preconceived suppositions of a continual identification of 
narrative agents; the effect is that, while the narrators may structurally be separate and unique, 
the impression is of a single one; the narrators in “Tlön” becomes the same one, an aspect I 
will study more closely in the next chapter. The world has become Tlön, and the narrator 
cannot escape, even in writing, the intrusion of Tlön upon the world.  
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Chapter 3: Philosophy in Tlön, Uqbar, and Orbis Tertius 
 
… all the choir of heaven and furniture of the 
earth, in a word all those bodies which compose 
the mighty frame of the world, have not any 
subsistence without a mind, that their being is 
to be perceived or known. 
 
—  George Berkeley, A Treatise Concerning 
the Principles of Human Knowledge (1710) 
 
 
 
Borges’ adaptation of philosophical idealism in fiction has been extensively examined and 
discussed ever since the inception of literary criticism on his work. Understanding ‘idealism’ 
as any doctrine holding that reality is fundamentally mental in nature, the tendency has in 
general been to relate philosophical ideas against broad themes from several of his fictions. 
As a result, many of these studies have combined aspects of ideas within fictions presenting 
disparate philosophies to fit them into a comprehensive evaluation of a single philosopher’s 
work, and not necessarily giving due attention to the philosophical views presented in stand-
alone fictions. “Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius” is no exception, and the philosophical allusions 
have been studied extensively, though often in contexts with other of Borges’ stories. This 
tendency is somewhat alleviated by Alejandro Riberi’s study Fictions as Cognitive Artefacts, 
which discusses the impact of the thinking of Hans Vaihinger, Alexius Meinong and Fritz 
Mauthner on the writing of “Tlön” into a systematic whole. The issue in this chapter is 
philosophic idealism in “Tlön”. I will discuss this by analysing the text with regard to the 
different aspects of the relevant idealistic philosophers.   
 Since critical inquiries into Borges and philosophy are numerous, I have decided not to 
delve too deeply into the philosophical mechanics of the various philosophers that are alluded 
to in the story. This list is extensive: Leibniz, Spinoza, Hume, Berkeley, Meinong, 
Schopenhauer and Russell are all mentioned, alluded to, or equated with one of Tlön’s 
eclectic mix of philosophies. Given that the philosophy of Tlön has been so thoroughly 
discussed, I will in this chapter not preoccupy myself too much with providing a systematic 
exposition of these philosophers, but rely mainly upon previous contributions. However,  
there is rarely given any direct textual evidence taken from “Tlön” in the discussion of the 
main philosophers of interest (Berkeley, Vaihinger and Meinong). I have found, at closer 
inspection, this to be of value to the study of the philosophies alluded to. The point of 
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departure for discussion on the philosophers is usually simply that they are mentioned, though 
rarely is the philosophical aspects the narrator tells of directly corresponded to the 
philosophers they supposedly derive from. On closer examination, I have found that the 
philosophical ideas presented do not always align completely with the philosophers the 
narrator contextualises them to. I have therefore examined closely the philosophies alluded to 
and compared with their corresponding passages, trying to sort out any eventual 
discrepancies, as well as finding out the significance of these. This may prove to bring some 
surprises, which relate to other aspects of the reading of “Tlön” than the understanding of the 
underlying philosophies. 
 In this analysis I have relied mainly upon previous critical efforts, though I have 
supplemented the existing critical works with various philosophical reference works. My aim 
is not to establish a congruent philosophy of Tlön, but rather investigate how this philosophy 
is directly evidenced in the text. I have examined this not only in regard to the narrator’s 
exposition of the Volume XI, but also within the other parts of the story. Hence, I will in the 
following section only summarise rather briefly the main philosophies of interest alluded to in 
“Tlön,” before studying more closely the impact these have had upon the actual text, and also 
whether the allusions to philosophers necessarily are correct. 
 
3.1 Philosophy 
Three circumstances in the text of “Tlön” have resulted in the critical literature giving 
prominence to a fundamental philosophical divide on reading it. First there is the pre-
eminence given in the second part to the philosophical mode of thought in the imagined planet 
of Tlön. Second, the structure of the story is divided symmetrically into three distinct parts, 
each—given a little imagination—with its dominant philosophy. Finally, though, is the 
assertion in the story itself that:  
 
Hume notó para siempre que los argumentos de Berkeley no admiten la menor réplica y no causan la 
menor convicción. Ese dictamen es del todo verídico en su aplicación a la tierra; del todo falso en Tlön. 
Las naciones de ese planeta son —congénitamente— idealistas.41 (OC 1: 435) 
 
Here we have the definitive assertion that Tlön is idealist—Berkeley is perhaps the supreme 
idealist philosopher—and while not explicit, the implication is that the (congenital) belief on 
Earth must be other than idealist. However, this vagueness has consequentially led the critical 
                                                 
41 “Hume declared for all time that while Berkeley’s arguments admit not the slightest refutation, they inspire not 
the slightest conviction. That pronouncement is entirely true with respect to the earth, entirely false with respect 
to Tlön. The nations of that planet are, congenitally, idealistic.” (F: 13). 
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literature to diverge in respect as to how it is other than idealist. A few examples: Ana María 
Barrenechea merely concludes that “he has inverted terrestrial mental attitudes” (Barrenechea 
1965: 88), though what this inversion entails is somewhat unclear. D.L. Shaw writes that by  
 
confronting our instinctively materialist account of the world with an equally congenital idealist one, 
which seems to be just as coherent or more so, Borges suggests the conclusion that the way we see 
things is determined not by the things themselves but by our mental categories.” (Shaw 1976: 13) 
 
Didier Jaén agrees with both Barrenechea and Shaw, writing that the “general tendency has 
been to read the story as a negative parody of our world, or of the version of our world 
produced by the intellectual linguistic bent of cultural accretion.” (Jaén 1992: 184) Jaén does 
not explicitly address the opposition between “our” world and Tlön however, bringing his 
discussion on to the similarities between Tlön’s idealism and the history of esoteric thought 
on Earth. As to more specific investigations into the oppositions of Tlön and the Earth, W.H. 
Bossart (2003) connects it to the classical nominalist/realist divide, whereas Alan White 
(2003) citing Borges’ frequent allusion to Coleridge’s maxim that “men are either born 
Platonists or Aristotelians,” reads the first part as Aristotelian realist, and the second as 
Platonist idealist—though, in truth, this is not the main argument of his essay. 
 
3.1.1 Doctrines and philosophers 
Central to the second part of “Tlön” is the narrator’s summary of the inhabitants of Tlön’s 
“conception of the universe,” as described by the Eleventh Volume. Jaén shows that the story 
gives a roughly chronological history of esoteric thought in the West, beginning in the first 
part with heretics, Gnosticism and secret societies, then over to modern philosophical 
idealism in the second part, with its numerous explicit references to idealist philosophers. 
What Jaén chiefly shows with this unravelling of philosophical allusions, is that even though 
the world-view of Tlön seems outlandish and fantastic, none of the ideas are original to the 
story. Indeed, these fantastic and perhaps somewhat alien ideas have been imagined by men 
of our own world, and they believed in them themselves. I will summarise below some of the 
ideas of the philosophers who are alluded to in the story. 
 As mentioned, the first part of the story alludes only somewhat vaguely to esoteric 
thought and doctrines, referencing heresy and Gnosticism with Casares’ quote that “los 
espejos y la cópula son abominables, porque multiplicand el número de los hombres.”42 (OC 
1: 431) Johannes Valentinus Andreä, the alleged inventor of the Rosicrucian society is also 
                                                 
42 “Mirrors and copulation are abominable, for they multiply the number of mankind.” (F: 7)  
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mentioned.43 The second part, however, is rife with direct reference to idealist philosophers 
from the seventeenth century and onwards. The narrator mentions not only David Hume and 
Bishop Berkeley, but also Gottfried Leibniz, Alexius Meinong, Hans Vaihinger and Arthur 
Schopenhauer. In a footnote he even manages to make Bertrand Russell into an idealist, by 
providing a quote out of context.44 The main philosophers, or rather philosophies, that can be 
traced in the story, are those of Berkeley, Vaihinger, Meinong and Fritz Mauthner, who, 
although not mentioned explicitly in the story, was a great influence upon Borges. 
 
3.1.1 Berkeley and the idealism of perception 
Most explicitly, in Tlön the idealist philosophy of Bishop Berkeley is taken to its logical 
extreme. To Berkeley, the world existed only through each individual’s perception of it—one 
only perceives the world through one’s individual sensations. Therefore, he concluded, no 
object can exist if it is not experienced through sensation from the faculties. The result is that 
the continued existence of the object is an assumption made from former experience, yet one 
can have no true knowledge of the world not directly perceived. This is summed up in the 
dictum “esse est percipi”—to be is to be perceived—and it follows that our knowledge of the 
world is only achieved through our sensations of it. Thus we can never achieve knowledge of 
the world as it actually is, because the qualities of objects are determined by the act of 
perceiving them—these qualities are not present when there is no perception of them. 
However, this creates the problem of objects’ continuing existence, which we normally 
assume because of our regular experience of their continued existence. According to 
Berkeley, however, this is not necessarily given, and there arose the problem of the 
discrepancy of experience of objects’ continuity and the philosophical conclusion that they 
did not necessarily have continued existence. To resolve this issue, Berkeley, who was a man 
of the cloth and later became a bishop, used this philosophical proposition as an argument for 
the existence of God: objects persist in experience because God perceives all at once, hence 
their continued existence. 
                                                 
43 The Rosicrucian order described by Andreä was, when he wrote about it, a pure invention. Andreä allegedly 
wrote Chymische Hochzeit Christiani Rosencreutz [Chemical Wedding of Christian Rosenkreutz], supposedly a 
founding text of the order. We learn in “Tlön” that it was “later founded, in imitation of his foredescription.” (F: 
10). However, Andreä never wrote a book called Lesbare und lesenwerthe Bemerkungen über das Land Ukkbar 
in Klein-Asien, cf. section 2.2.2.  
44 Russell writes, in Analysis of Mind, that “There is no logical impossibility in the hypothesis that the world 
sprang into being five minutes ago, exactly as it then was, with a population that "remembered" a wholly unreal 
past,” but goes on to write “I am not suggesting that the non-existence of the past should be entertained as a 
serious hypothesis. Like all sceptical hypotheses, it is logically tenable, but uninteresting.” (Russell 1921: 159-
60) In other words, Russell means that one does not need to believe in something just because it is logically true. 
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Although his system has proved incredible to virtually all subsequent philosophers, its importance lies 
in the challenge it offers to a common sense that vaguely hopes that these notions fit together in a 
satisfactory way. (Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, "Berkeley, George"  2008) 
 
In the paragraph quoted above that mentions both Hume and Berkeley, we are treated to two 
judgments on Hume’s claim about Berkeley’s arguments in relationship to the world: in “our” 
world the claim is entirely true; and in Tlön it is entirely false. However, the claim has two 
constituents: that Berkeley’s arguments inspire neither the slightest refutation nor the slightest 
conviction. Thus, if we are to take the last claim to its logical conclusion, Berkeley’s 
argument not only inspires total conviction in Tlön, but also the possibility of refutation. The 
statement that it does not admit refutation is, of course, in reference to the fact that Berkeley’s 
idealism is entirely subjective; one cannot make objective claims about it, and therefore not 
refute it. In this sense, that Berkeley’s arguments should admit refutation in Tlön appears to 
be somewhat strange in regards to a planet that is wholly idealist. However, I propose that this 
is not in reference to logical refutation, but rather that the proliferation of competing idealist 
views in Tlön act as a form of refutation; Berkeley’s idealism is not necessarily the correct 
idealism. But I will now examine Berkeley’s position, before looking at some of the 
consequences in the world of Tlön. 
 Though Berkeley used his philosophical doctrine as an argument for God’s existence, 
with the creation of Tlön God is completely removed from his philosophy. Ezra Buckley, the 
freethinking, fatalist backer to the enormous project of creating A First Encyclopaedia of 
Tlön, would only supply his resources on one condition:  
 
“La obra no pactará con el impostor Jesucristo.” Buckley descree de Dios, pero quiere demostrar al Dios 
no existente que los hombres mortales con capaces de concebir un mundo.45 (441) 
 
Though this might seem contradictory—to prove something to a non-existent God46—this 
explains some of the features of Tlön that are described in retrospect, features that are 
incongruous with Berkeley. Especially the last two sentences of part II come to mind. When 
things are forgotten or no-one sees them anymore, they quietly disappear:  
 
Las cosas se duplican en Tlön; propenden asimismo a borrarse y a perder los detalles cuando los olvida 
la gente. Es clásico el ejemplo de un umbral que perduró mientras lo visitaba un mendigo y que se 
perdió de vista a su muerte. A veces unos pájaros, un caballo, han salvado las ruinas de un anfiteatro.47 
(440) 
                                                 
45 “‘The work shall make no pact with the impostor Jesus Christ.’ Buckley did not believe in God, yet he wanted 
to prove to the nonexistent God that mortals could conceive and shape a world.” (F: 21). 
46 We might consider this in light of the theories of Meinong, though, as I will show later. 
47 “Things duplicate themselves on Tlön; they also tend to become erased and to lose detail when people forget 
them. The classic example is the doorway that continued to exist so long as a certain beggar frequented it, but 
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In an idealist world in the Berkeleyan sense, this would not come to pass, as everything is 
perceived by God. However, with God removed, the continued existence of objects relies 
upon them being perceived; with nobody to perceive them they effectively disappear (though 
this invites the question: how can one know something has disappeared, if it is not 
perceived?). 
 This “Buckleyan” idealism is not necessarily all-pervasive; for example, the 
production of hrönir and ur does not support it. How could one procure artefacts from 
archaeological digs, since those objects presumably had ceased to exist? The reason is that in 
the seemingly systematic world of Tlön there are competing philosophies. The philosophies of 
that world are no more or less true in that world than they are here, but provide alternative 
explanations—or interpretations—for phenomena. That philosophical explanations in Tlön 
are contradictory is merely further evidence that the understanding of how the world actually 
works is perhaps beyond our grasp, as we shall see with the philosophy of Hans Vaihinger. 
 
3.1.2 Vaihinger and the fictions of the world 
The reference to Vaihinger is slightly misleading: “El hecho de que toda filosofía sea de 
antemano un juego dialéctico, una Philosophie des Als Ob, ha contribuido a multiplicarlas.”48 
(436) Vaihinger is not mentioned outright, but Die Philosophie des Als Ob (1911) [The 
Philosohpy of As If] was his major philosophical work. The influence of Vaihinger upon 
Borges has been discussed previously by Carter Wheelock (1969), Floyd Merrell (1991) and 
Alejandro Riberi (2007); they all do it in spite of the explicit claim Borges made in an 
interview with Jean de Milleret that he had never read Vaihinger. However, there appears to 
be a copy of Die Philosophie des Als Ob in the library of Xul Solar—a friend of Borges’—
that may have belonged to Borges (Helft 2003, from Riberi 2007: 85n). This book was 
inscribed with Borges’ name, and it is therefore reason to believe he might also have read it. 
 Riberi writes that Vaihinger, a follower of Kant, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, found 
in Kant a general explanation for discursive thought, because although “Kant had denied 
epistemological value to metaphysical notions like the soul as a simple substance, he 
concluded that they served as a regulative idea: we must act as if the soul were indivisible.” 
                                                                                                                                                        
which was lost to sight when he died. Sometimes a few birds, a horse, have saved the ruins of an amphitheatre.” 
(F: 20). 
48 “the fact that every philosophy is by definition a dialectical game, a Philosophie des Als Ob, has allowed them 
to proliferate.” (F: 15) . 
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(Riberi 2007: 78)  Vaihinger believed this implied that everything outside of our perceptions 
is unknowable, and as a result that our beliefs regarding what lies outside of them are fictions, 
but useful fictions: although we cannot know if the world outside of our perceptions is real, 
we invariably have to act as if it is. Ontologically, this applies to all our conceptions of the 
world outside of our immediate perceptions. We see that the narrator’s reference to the 
Philosophie des Als Ob is, considering Vaihinger, a misunderstanding of what that philosophy 
implies; the “as if” is not a reference to “dialectical games,” to consider a philosophical 
system as if it were true. Rather, the philosophy of as if determines our fundamental 
interaction with the world; we cannot know it, but invariably have to act as if we do. The 
reference to dialectics might rather more precisely be to the philosophy of Hegel, who 
proposed in his Logic that, to push past apparent limits of reason as proposed by Kant, one 
should engage in a dialectic of aufhebung—or sublation—in which one proposes a thesis with 
an anti-thesis, in order to arrive at a synthesis. This is also reflected in the comment upon the 
philosophical works in Tlön, which “invariablamente contienen la tesis y la antítesis; el 
riguroso pro y el contra de una doctrina.”49 (439) 
 We also see, though, an explanation for how the world-concept of Tlön could enter 
actual reality in the final postscript. If, from an idealist standpoint, the essence of the world as 
such—what the world actually is—is inherently unknowable, the only way we can interact 
with it is through the fictions we create about it. The entrance of Tlön upon the world can, in 
one sense, be considered complete change in the fictions we use to interact with it. Thus, the 
entrance of Tlön upon the actual world does not consist of an actual change in the world 
(though some aspects of this change also imply it), but a fundamental change in the fictions 
constructed—it is the move from a material “fiction” to an ideal one.  
 In another respect, this has metafictional consequences. When reading a story, we have 
to act as if the information we are given is internally consistent; we cannot evaluate the story 
using criteria from the actual world. The story creates fictions and we have to read it as if they 
were true.  
 
3.1.3 Language idealism 
Idealism, as it appears in the languages of Tlön, relates to idealism based in sense-perception. 
Every perception of an object at any given moment is unique, making the possibility of 
generalisations impossible—in other words, there can be no nouns. Instead, “hay verbos 
                                                 
49 “invariably contain both the thesis and the antithesis, the rigorous pro and contra of every argument.” (F: 18) 
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impersonales, calificados por sufijos (o prefijos) monosilábicos de valor adverbial.”50 (435). 
This is described to be in the southern hemisphere of Tlön; for the northern hemisphere  
 
la célula primordial no es el verbo, sino el adjetivo monosilábico. El sustantivo se forma por 
acumulación de adjetivos. No se dice luna: se dice aéreo-claro sobre oscuro-redondo o anaranjado-
tenue-del cielo o cualquier otra agregación. En el caso elegido la masa de adjetivos corresponde a un 
objeto real; el hecho es puramente fortuito. En la literatura de este hemisferio (como en el mundo 
subsistente de Meinong) abundan los objetos ideales, convocados y disueltos en un momento, según las 
necesidades poéticas.51 (435) 
 
Alejandro Riberi relates this concept of language to the philosophy of Fritz Mauthner. In 
Beiträge zu einer Kritik der Sprache52 (1923) Mauthner proposed that language is filled with 
what he calls “word-superstitions,” which is the superstition that words have direct 
relationships to the world. The truth, he says, is that most words in subject-object syntaxes are 
metaphysical constructs—a noun does not directly relate to the object it signifies, because the 
qualities of the object are expressed through adjectives, and not through the noun itself. Thus, 
the syntactical elements that bear the most direct reference to the physical world are 
adjectives, because they have their base in sense-perceptions (Riberi 2007: 105).53  
 This way of viewing language is closely linked to the structure of the languages that 
we are introduced to in Tlön. Given that the languages of Tlön presuppose that all “nouns” are 
either verbally or adjectivally constructed in the instant, one of the inevitable results is the 
belief that physical objects do not have permanence in space, since their concept of objects 
bears directly to the possibility of representation through language.54 Another possible 
influence upon the invention of the languages of Tlön is Borges’ friend Xul Solar (Alejandro 
Schultz Solari), who was interested in and created his own artificial languages. Emir 
Rodriguez Monégal writes in his biography on Borges that “some aspects of the invented 
language of Tlön are similar to one of the two languages invented by Xul, the ‘neocriollo,’ or 
‘new native.’” (Monegal 1978: 217) The link to Xul Solar is preserved in the text when 
explaining the translation of the Tlönian phrase hlör u fang axaxaxas mlö:55 “(Xul Solar 
                                                 
50 “there are impersonal verbs, modified by monosyllabic suffixes (or prefixes) functioning as adverbs.” (F: 13) 
51 “the primary unit is not the verb but the monosyllabic adjective. Nouns are formed by stringing together 
adjectives. One does not say ‘moon’; one says ‘aerial-bright above dark-round’ or ‘soft-amberish-celestial’ or 
any other string. In this case, the complex of adjectives corresponds to a real object, but that is purely fortuitous. 
The literature of the northern hemisphere (as in Meinong’s subsisting world) is filled with ideal objects, called 
forth and dissolved in an instant, as the poetry requires.” (F: 13)  
52 The title translates as Contributions Toward a Critique of Languge. It has not been translated into English to 
my knowledge. 
53 This is similar to Saussure’s distinction between the signifier and the signified, though Saussure’s stance was 
not idealist. 
54 It is significant to note that this is a belief rather than an actual fact. 
55 “Axaxaxas mlö” is notably repeated in “La Biblioteca de Babel”; “Axaxaxas,” read aloud in Spanish, sounds 
like laughter. 
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traduce con brevedad: upa tras perfluyue lunó. Upward, behind the onstreaming it 
mooned.)”56 (435) 
 As previously mentioned, Alan White’s study of “Tlön” uses Borges’ frequent 
reference to Coleridge’s claim—that one is either born a Platonist or an Aristotelian—to 
divide parts I and II of the story into their respective philosophical worldviews. Accordingly, 
Part I is the world of Aristotelians, while Part II is the world of Platonists. Though this divide 
may not be this distinct and clear, it is useful as an explanation for why the idealism of Tlön is 
so foreign to our own world-view. One suspects that the language used in describing that 
world is insufficient to convey the meaning completely, just as the languages of Tlön were 
insufficient in describing the concept of materialism and the perpetuation of an object in time. 
If their idealist language cannot conceive of materialism except through convoluted 
philosophical explanation, by constructing a “sophism,” then how can our own language 
accurately describe their views? How we see the world is dictated by the language we use, 
and our own language presupposes materialism because it is based on the noun. The noun is a 
mental category; it is an abstraction of an object which is placed outside of perception. In a 
language without nouns we are at the mercy of our perceptions every time we encounter an 
object. This is, in effect, the reason why there in Tlön are no nouns, but simultaneously there 
is an infinity of them. Every time they use language in reference to an object they create 
“nouns” based on the perception they have of it. Thus an object cannot continue to exist; our 
perception of it invariably changes, creating the need for a new “noun” each time we describe 
it. A discussion of the philosophy of Alexius Meinong can explain this peculiarity further. 
. 
  
3.1.4 Meinong 
 
[Meinong] is one of the most misunderstood and reviled philosophers of recent times. According to a 
prevalent view, he was a spendthrift metaphysician who delighted in multiplying entities continuously 
and needlessly. (Grossmann 2005) 
 
The languages of Tlön have their literature; recalling the quotation in the last section on 
language idealism we read that “En la literatura de este hemisferio (como en el mundo 
subsistente de Meinong) abundan los objetos ideales, convocados y disueltos en un momento, 
según las necesidades poéticas.”57 (435) 
                                                 
56 “Xul Solar succinctly translates: Upward behind the onstreaming it mooned.” (F: 13) 
57 For a translation see the last sentence of note 51. 
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 Alexius von Meinong (1853-1920), an idealist by training under the supervision of 
Franz Brentano,58 distinguished between two modes of being: the first is existence; the 
second, subsistence.59 Finally, one can conceive of objects that are impossible. Because of 
their impossibility, they exist only in a sort of non-being, called auβersein, commonly 
translated as “absistence”. The most famous example Meinong gave of this type of object was 
the golden mountain which, because of its impossibility can have neither existence nor 
subsistence, but Meinong nevertheless maintained that its constituents (golden; mountain) did, 
as a consequence, absistent objects must actually be considered as a category of objects, 
despite their impossibility. Other examples of absistent objects are the square circle or 
wooden iron. While Meinong’s concept of auβersein is what made him most notorious as a 
philosopher, in “Tlön” the reference is to “the subsisting worlds of Meinong.” This can be 
explained thus: 
 
Objects, according to Meinong, are real if and only if they either exist or are such that, even though 
they do not exist, they could exist by their very nature. […] Ideal objects, by contrast, are entities which 
cannot be said to exist, even though they must be affirmed in some sense. Absence, limit, the past, etc. 
are claimed to be the traditional examples of what is non-real and, hence, ideal. Meinong adds a number 
of new examples to this list. He says that the similarity between a copy and the original, though it does 
not exist, must be affirmed. (Grossmann 1974: 69) 
 
This affinity with Meinong is slightly deceptive, however, as the ideal objects in Tlön are 
based on the conjunction of sensual perceptions as a result of their language. Conversely, 
Meinong’s ideal objects are not perceivable (Grossmann 1974: 70). In this sense, the ideal 
objects brought forth in the poetry of Tlön are based on the relationship between sense-
perceptions. This relationship cannot be perceived, but the adjectival conjunction creates a 
relational object. 
 There is an oversight here, due to the narrator’s limiting of Meinong’s theory of 
entities to subsistence. As such, the theory of subsistence is not as outstanding as that of 
auβersein; if the people of Tlön are interested in philosophy for its aesthetic merit Meinong’s 
absistent objects surely fit the bill precisely. And the oversight is perhaps merely the 
narrator’s; in fact it is dismissed as zoology and topography:  
 
                                                 
58 Franz Brentano (1838-1917) is considered one of the founders of modern phenomenology. Teaching at the 
University of Vienna, another of his students was Edmund Husserl who completely overshadows Meinong in 
importance, though his phenomenology shares similarities to Meinong’s philosophy. 
59 The existence-category “subsistence” is in philosophy associated with Meinong, and applies to abstract 
categories, rather than actual, individual objects.  
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Las revistas populares han divulgado, con perdonable exceso, la zoología y la topografía de Tlön; yo 
pienso que sus tigres transparentes y sus torres de sangre no merecen, tal vez, la continua atenión de 
todos los hombres.60 (435) 
 
The dismissal in effect grants them existence within the world of Tlön. This is perhaps 
misleading: the transparent tigers and towers of blood appear, in light of knowledge of 
Meinong’s concept of absistence, as prime examples of absistent objects—cf. their similarity 
to the famous example of the golden mountain. These entities, or objects, the tiger and the 
tower, have had an unsure history of interpretation, though Wheelock has convincingly 
argued for them as hypostatising, or myth-creating (Wheelock 1969: 92). If they are merely 
part of the zoology and topology of Tlön, however, this indicates an important consequence 
for the world when it becomes Tlön. The entrance of Tlön upon the world is perhaps most 
clearly signalled by the introduction of seemingly impossible objects, like the cone that is too 
heavy for its appearance. What was previously an absistent object in the actual world—the 
heaviness contradicts the laws of physics—is granted existence when Tlön makes its 
preliminary entrance.  
 
3.1.5 Leibniz, Schopenhauer, Spinoza 
Scattered around the text are minor references to philosophies and attributions to 
philosophers. Before we are treated to the summary of Tlön some speculations concerning the 
origins of the Vol. XI are mentioned:  
 
¿Quiénes inventaron a Tlön? El plural es inevitable, porque la hipótesis de un solo inventor —de un 
infinito Leibniz obrando en la tiniebla y en la modestia— ha sido descartada unánimemente.”61 (434) 
 
This “infinite Leibniz” is perhaps not so much an allusion to the philosopher and 
mathematician himself, as it is to his philosophy, specifically to that of monads.62 Without 
going too deeply into it, the concept of monads is that of a fundamental immaterial substance 
analogous to atoms, but in a metaphysical sense; the monads are infinite in number. Each 
monad reflects the whole of the universe, and Leibniz used his monadology to explain God: 
God is the primary monad all other monads reflect. Thus, the world of Tlön would be a 
                                                 
60 “Popular magazines have [divulged], with pardonable excess, the zoology and topography of Tlön. In my 
view, its transparent tigers and towers of blood do not perhaps merit the constant attention of all mankind,” (F: 
13, my correction). 
61 “Who, singular or plural, invented Tlön? The plural is, I suppose, inevitable, since the hypothesis of a single 
inventor—some infinite Leibniz working in obscurity and self-effacement—has been unanimously discarded.” 
(F: 12) 
62 The “infinite Leibniz” is perhaps also a reference to his invention of calculus, which uses infinitesimals to 
calculate the limit of a function. 
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reflection of some “infinite Leibniz” as its originator. Additionally, Leibniz proposed, in order 
to tackle the problem of evil, that the world we live in is the best of possible worlds. This 
assertion seems to be at direct odds with the concept of Tlön’s entrance upon the actual world;  
 Regarding Schopenhauer, a favourite of Borges, he is mentioned in the passage 
following the heresy of materialism, a passage that solves the problem by introducing 
idealistic pantheism: 
 
A los cien años de enunciado el problema, un pensador no menos brillante que el heresiarca pero de 
tradición ortodoxa, formuló una hipótesis muy audaz. Esa conjetura feliz afirma que hay un solo sujeto, 
que ese sujeto indivisible es cada uno de los seres del universo y que éstos son los órganos y máscaras 
de la divinidad […] El onceno tomo deja entender que tres razones capitales determinaron la victoria 
total de ese panteísmo idealista. La primera, el repudio del solipsismo; la segunda, la posibilidad de 
conservar la base psicológica de las ciencias; la tercera, la posibilidad de conservar el culto de los 
dioses. Schopenhauer (el apasionado y lúcido Schopenhauer) formula una doctrina muy parecida en el 
primer volumen de Parerga und Paralipomena.63 (438) 
 
This doctrine may well be “formulated” by Schopenhauer in Parerga und Paralipomena, but 
it does not, however, reflect his philosophical views. Much like the way the quote attributed 
to Bertrand Russell is actually taken out of its original context to make a point stating the 
opposite, Schopenhauer’s formulation on pantheism is made, not as a serious proposition, but 
in order to refute it. Schopenhauer was not a pantheist; and Schopenhauer reasoned against 
pantheism when he wrote on it. This form of pantheism is, rather, more akin to that of 
Spinoza’s, whom Schopenhauer objected to in the relevant passage of Parerga und 
Paralipomena. The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy states that Spinoza proposed the 
following: 
 
Substance being conceived as that which is self-dependent, there follows the ontological argument for 
the existence of God as the one necessary being, but not distinct from the world (for there is only one 
substance: any other substance would owe its existence to God, and therefore not be self-dependent). 
Rather God is immanent in the world, and individual things are themselves modes or modifications of 
God: the one reality is ‘God or nature’, deus sive natura. (Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy "Spinoza, 
Benedictus de"  2008)  
 
We see that this formulation is indeed very close to the “happy conjecture” of that nameless 
philosopher of Tlön. Even though Spinoza’s pantheism seems to coincide with that of Tlön, 
earlier we are told that  
 
                                                 
63 “A hundred years after the problem had first been posed, a thinker no less brilliant than the heresiarch, but of 
the orthodox tradition, formulated a most daring hypothesis. His happy conjecture was that there is but a single 
subject; that indivisible subject is every being in the universe, and the beings of the universe are the organs and 
masks of the deity. […] Volume Eleven suggests that this idealistic pantheism triumphed over all other schools 
of thought for three primary reasons: first, because it repudiated solipsism; second, because it left intact the 
psychological foundation of the sciences; and third, because it preserved the possibility of religion. 
Schopenhauer (passionate yet lucid Schopenhauer) formulates a very similar doctrine in the first volume of his 
Parerga und Paralipomena.” (F: 17-18). 
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Spinoza atribuya a su inagotable divinidad los atributos de la extensión y del pensamiento; nadie 
comprendería en Tlön la yuxtaposición del primero (que sólo es típico de ciertos estados) y del segundo 
—que es un sinónimo perfecto del cosmos—.64 (436) 
 
This is not exactly a repudiation of Spinoza’s pantheism, but rather a modification of it; in 
essence, infinite thought as a synonym of the cosmos would be a variation upon pantheism. 
Therefore, if there is spatial extension, it must be contained as an idealism of the infinite 
thought the cosmos is considered to be.  
 
3.2 Idealism, metafiction, and possible worlds 
As we now understand, the diverse idealist philosophies alluded to in the story all hinge on 
the uncertainty of subjective experience: the world exists only in perception (Berkeley); our 
language does not necessarily bear direct reference to the world we perceive (Mauthner); our 
conception of the world is a fiction (Vaihinger); our mind can create objects or entities that 
have no being (Meinong); and finally, we are all subjects of the same, infinite subject that is 
equal to God (Spinoza).  
 Put together, these idealist philosophies also undermine the value of the individual; as 
part of a pantheist whole, all individuals are parts of the same, infinite individual; this 
effectively dissolves personal identity, which was also a theme Borges explored from an early 
point in his literary career. In “La nadería de la personalidad” [The nothingness of 
personality], from Inquisiciones (1925), he argues that personality is an illusion, and that the 
self is not possible to determine from its possible constituents: 
 
Yo, por ejemplo, no soy la realidad visual que mis ojos abarcan, pues de serlo me mataría toda 
obscuridad y no quedaría nada en mí para desear el espectáculo del mundo ni siquiera para olvidarlo. 
Tampoco soy las audiciones que escucho pues en tal caso debería borrarme el silencio y pasaría de 
sonido en sonido., sin memoria del anterior. Idéntica argumentación se endereza después a lo olfativo, 
lo gustable y lo táctil y se prueba con ello, no solamente que no soy el mundo aparencial —cosa notoria 
y sin disputa— sino que las apercepciones que lo señalan tampoco son mi yo. Esto es, no soy mi 
actividad de ver de oír, de oler, de gustar, de palpar. Tampoco soy mi cuerpo, que es fenómeno entre los 
otros. Hasta ese punto el argumento es baladí, Sileno lo insigne su aplicación a lo espiritual. ¿Son el 
deseo, el pensamiento, la dicha y la congoja mi verdadero yo? La respuesta, de acuerdo con el canon, es 
claramente negativa, ya que estas afecciones caducan sin anonadarme con ellas. La conciencia —último 
escondrijo posible para el emplazamiento del yo— se manifiesta inhábil. Ya descartados los afectos, las 
percepciones forasteras y hasta el cambiadizo pensar, la conciencia es cosa baldía, sin apariencia alguna 
que la exista reflejándose en ella.65 (Borges 1994: 103-04) 
                                                 
64 “Spinoza endows his inexhaustible deity with the attributes of spatial extension and of thought; no one in Tlön 
would understand the juxtaposition of the first, which is typical only of certain states, and the second—which is 
a perfect synonym for the cosmos.” (F: 14). 
65 “I, for example, am not the visual reality that my eyes encompass, for if I were, darkness would kill me and 
nothing would remain in me to desire the spectacle of the world, or even to forget it. Nor am I the audible world 
that I hear, for in that case silence would erase me and I would pass from sound to sound without memory of the 
precious one. Subsequent identical lines of argument can be directed toward the senses of smell, taste, and touch, 
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In the essay, Borges argues that even though we all have a strong conscious feeling of 
individual personality, this feeling is shared by all. Our perceptions and emotions are shared, 
and can thus not be thought to be individual, even though that is how we experience it. This 
sentiment is echoed in the philosophies of Tlön.  
 
3.2.1 Unreality and metafiction 
In section 1.3.1 of chapter 1, I wrote that the philosophical discussion in Part II of “Tlön” 
could be viewed in light of Patricia Waugh’s claim that metafiction, in part, explores the 
connection between reality and unreality in fiction. From my discussion of idealist 
philosophies we see that one of the main focuses of these philosophies, as they are applied to 
Tlön, is the focus on the loss of individuality, and the introduction of shared experience. 
 In reference to the previous chapter, we can say it contributes to structure the way 
“Tlön” is narrated. There I argue that the way the continual use of a narrative “yo” without a 
clearer supporting set of paratextual references to distinguish that there are in effect different 
narrators writing, effectually establishes the illusion that there is a continuous, single voice 
speaking. I make the argument that there are in fact different implied authors and narrators 
writing across narrative frames.  
 This reading is also supported by the philosophical world-view presented in Tlön. As 
the narrative levels are recursively adjusted into the story, it is also natural to conclude that 
the entrance of Tlön upon the actual world will have consequences for the reprinting of an 
article. We are told that in Tlön “todas las obras son obra de un solo autor, que es intemporal 
y es anónimo.” 66 (439) This literary version of pantheism is also reflected in how the story is 
constructed at a narrative level; in effect, all story’s implied authors have become the same 
author. This loss of individual personality is contrasted with the narrator of the postscript’s 
lament on the intrusion of Tlön upon the world. However, the narrator seemingly cannot 
escape, as the diverse yet anonymous narrators are proof to (cf. chapter 2). Finally, the 
                                                                                                                                                        
probing not only that I am not the world of appearances—a thing generally known and undisputed—but that the 
apperceptions that indicate that world are not my self either. That is, I am not my own activity of seeing, hearing, 
smelling, tasting, touching. Nor am I my body, which is a phenomenon among others. Up to this point the 
argument is banal; its distinction lies in its application to spiritual matters. Are desire, thought, happiness, and 
distress my true self? The answer, in accordance with the precept, is clearly in the negative, since those 
conditions expire without annulling me with them. Consciousness—the final hideout where we might track down 
the self—also proves unqualified. Once the motions, the extraneous perceptions, and even ever-shifting thought 
are dismissed, consciousness is a barren thing, without any appearance reflected in it to make it exist.” (Borges 
2001: 8-9). 
66 “all books are the work of a single author who is timeless and anonymous.” (F: 18) 
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narrator confesses to an attempt at a seemingly futile activity; an attempt of Thomas Browne’s 
Urne Buriall in the style of Quevedo. This action can in itself be interpreted as evidence of 
the loss of identity that is coming. Translation is rewriting in another language, where the 
mark of the individual is created through the style one writes in; the narrator chooses to use 
that of Quevedo, and as a consequence erases the individual in the process. As I have implied, 
the persistent inaccuracy regarding philosophers and their respective philosophies may also be 
related to this. 
 How are we to understand this in a metafictional view? We can assume that a fiction 
which explicitly questions the reality of world must refer to itself—simply because it is a 
fiction. It is a construction, inherently not real by its very nature, and thus, proposing that the 
fictional world is indeed a fiction, an act of self-reflection and lucidity. Similarly, the 
pantheistic claim that all men are one man is, perhaps, motivated when we think of the nature 
of fiction—a single author is the origin of the experience of several characters; a myriad of 
readers share these characters as an individual experience. The creation and reading of 
fictions are always acts of the individual, and though the experience may be shared, in the act 
of reading the reader is alone. The idealist philosophies are perhaps so alluring to the textual 
world of “Tlön” because, within that world the most fundamental ontological reality is that of 
the text itself. It should therefore be no surprise that the people of Tlön value philosophical 
systems on their aesthetic merits; the world of Tlön is an aesthetic construction. One would 
assume, that in such an aesthetic world, philosophies that make aesthetic explanations of it are 
valued most highly; in their view “metaphysics is a branch of the literature of fantasy.” (F: 15) 
Within the story, the intrusion of Tlön upon the world is inevitable, simply because, in a 
fictional ontology, the world-view of Tlön is a more precise one.  
 The ontology of “Tlön” seems inherently to be a navel-gazing view of fiction from 
within. As Linda Hutcheon tells us, metafictional writing is inherently narcissistic, but the 
narcissism does not mean that it is not relevant, because fiction presents possibilities: possible 
worlds. 
 
3.3 Unreliable claims/possible worlds 
Claiming from within a fiction that reality is not what it would appear to be might be a 
simplistic claim, but in this case it becomes powerful through the way “Tlön.” is constructed. 
In a narratological view, the structure of the narrative upsets the boundaries between 
ontologies of different worlds, something I have looked at in chapter 2 and will also touch 
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upon in chapter 4. Relating to philosophy, however, the exploration of possible worlds is 
relevant as well, especially considering the broad range of philosophical references from 
philosophy of the actual world. 
 Monistic pantheism, subjective idealism: the philosophies of Tlön are intuitively in 
contrast to how one normally perceives the world. This constellation of philosophical beliefs 
all undermine our physical experience of reality; if one is inclined to believe in them, like the 
people of Tlön are, then the experience of what is real is subject to change, which is exactly 
what happens in the story with the entry of Tlön upon the actual world. 
 The above analysis shows how idealist philosophers of our actual world are 
thoroughly represented in the various philosophies of Tlön. However, their philosophies are 
not necessarily referred to precisely, and additionally they may be in contradiction to each 
other. I will therefore examine the consequences of this. Recalling the discussion had by the 
narrator and Casares in the first paragraph of the story, theorising about an unreliable narrator, 
we can perhaps say that this unreliability is not so much in the sense of Booth’s concept of an 
unreliable narrator—a narrator at odds with the ethics of the story told (cf. The Rhetoric of 
Fiction), but an unreliability when it comes to the narrator’s apparent knowledge of 
philosophy. But it is relevant to question whether this unreliability is a result of the narrator’s 
knowledge, or that there are alternative explanations. 
 
3.3.1 Reliability and accessibility 
As I have shown, many, if not all of the allusions to philosophers and philosophies are, at 
least in part, misleading. Several of the references are correct, but affirm the opposite of the 
argument actually stated in the original work, as with Schopenhauer and Russell. Others are 
misattributions, even though the philosophy of the attribution may be relevant to other aspects 
of Tlön, as with Vaihinger. Finally there is the partial attribution, as with Meinong, where 
only part of the philosophy is mentioned, while more comprehensive knowledge of it is 
actually motivated. 
 This pervasive unreliability is somewhat unsettling; we observe the contradictions, but 
we also observe that the philosophies that are subject to fault are relevant in other places. In 
all, the narrator appears to be, and must be, highly knowledgeable about philosophy, and 
idealism especially, both to be able to identify correlations to philosophical systems and to 
name so many significant philosophers. The errors, however, creates some puzzlement. Are 
we to understand that the narrator consequently misappropriates philosophies? Is the narrator 
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intentionally misleading us? Unless we scour the sources, as above, this does not seem likely, 
as the narrator appears to be sincere in the references. But in the textual world of “Tlön” there 
exists numerous books that do not exist in the actual world; there are people, like Herbert 
Ashe, who are fictional constructs; there is an encyclopaedia article on Uqbar, and an entire 
volume of another encyclopaedia about a fictional planet. The discrepancies of the referents 
are, perhaps, minor but self-conscious departures from the actual world. We may understand 
that, within the ontology of “Tlön,” Schopenhauer actually was a pantheist; Russell an 
idealist. In an alternative world this is possible. Yet at the same time, the references to Russell 
and Schopenhauer are correct, since they actually wrote what is referred. If these passages 
were all one had read of them, one might conclude that they were adherents of these ideas, 
and not opposed to them, as they actually were. Truth lies in the mind of the reader—it is 
individuality expressed again, and here the dynamic between the possible and the actual world 
presents itself.  
 Brian McHale writes that “the only ontological difference that the heterocosm 
approach admits is the opposition between fictional and real. This does not mean, however, 
that no relationship exists between the fictional heterocosm and the real world.” (McHale 
1987: 28) In his study Postmodernist Fiction he briefly mentions the accessibility to the 
ontology of Tlön in a chapter discussing possible worlds. There, it is argued that a possible 
world is accessible through its conceivability,67 and this is exemplified by “Tlön” because  
 
the encyclopedists who invented [Tlön] obviously generated their ideal world by manipulating 
structures of the real world, ‘projecting a world which would not be too incompatible with the real 
world.’ But Tlön is also a conceivable world—self-evidently, since its fictive inventors the 
encyclopedists, and its real author Borges, as well as we the readers have all been able to conceive it. 
(McHale 1987: 35) 
 
Thus, the ontology of Tlön is accessed across the actual world and the possible worlds due to 
its conceivability.  
 Additionally, recalling Eco’s writing on accessibility across worlds, it is relevant to 
recall Tlön’s lacking focus on individuality. In Tlön the origin of ideas are not essential 
properties68 to them—whether pantheism is attributed to Schopenhauer or Spinoza becomes 
an accidental property. Thus, the philosophies of Tlön are accessed across worlds, regardless 
of the philosophical systems in which they appear or who is their originator. We gain access 
to these ideas because, firstly, they are actually conceived in this, the actual, world; and 
                                                 
67 McHale takes the notion of conceivability from Umberto Eco’s article “Lector in Fabula.” (1979) 
68 If we are to call ideas objects, they would be objects in the sense of Meinong’s subsistent objects—
abstractions, and not physical objects. 
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secondly, because the mediator for the ideas to the reader, the narrator, parses them into a 
referential basis that is relatively well-known, or at least possible to refer to oneself. Despite 
the discrepancies, the ideas are conceived of and thus accessible to us—the philosophy of 
Tlön is the philosophy of the actual world, but restructured.  
 It is not the properties of the textual world who are the main referents when 
considering accessibility across worlds. At the centre of “Tlön” is a lengthy discussion of 
philosophy—and it is the philosophy that is arguably the most important aspect of the 
contents of Tlön. All narrative action is centred around the dissemination of philosophical 
ideas, and the resulting takeover from the Tlönian world-view is a direct result of this 
dissemination. 
 Towards the end, the narrator warns of the imposition of a system on the world, and 
thus the fictional ontology is made relevant across ontological boundaries:  
 
Hace diez años bastaba cualquir simetría con apariencia de orden —el materialismo dialéctico, el 
antisemitismo, el nazismo— para embelesar a los hombres. ¿Cómo no someterse a Tlön, a la minuciosa 
y vasta evidencia de un planeta ordenado? Inútil responder que la realidad también está ordenada.69 (OC 
1: 442-43) 
 
Within the textual world’s ontology, the intrusion of Tlön is inevitable. But it also implies that 
in the actual world, systems of thought that attempt to describe the world are actually fictional 
as well; Borges remarks in an essay that “[i]t is hazardous to think that a coordination of 
words (philosophies are nothing else) can have much resemblance to the universe.” 
Philosophies are words, and words are not the world, they refer to it. We should therefore be 
wary of any system’s claim to truth. Yet, as he continues, “[i]t is also hazardous to think that 
one of those famous coordinations does not resemble it a little more than others, even in an 
infinitesimal way.” (Borges 1964: 114) 
 
3.4 Conclusion 
Understanding philosophy, and especially subjective idealism, is central to understanding 
Tlön, since the discussion of Tlön’s idealist philosophy by itself covers the largest 
consecutive piece of text within the story as a whole. In this chapter I have attempted a 
systematic approach to the philosophical allusions in “Tlön,” while contextualising them to 
actual philosophies, while also showing any discrepancies between the allusions in the text 
                                                 
69 “Ten years ago, any symmetry, any system with an appearance of order—dialectical materialism, anti-
Semitism, Nazism—could spellbind and hypnotize mankind. How could the world not fall under the sway of 
Tlön, how could it not yield to the vast and minutely detailed evidence of an orderly planet?” (F: 24) 
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and actual references. Additionally I have interpreted the philosophies in a metafictional 
perspective, showing that the system of philosophy can be understood as essential to 
understanding the fictional ontology of not only Tlön, but of fiction in general. The 
philosophies explored in Tlön are highly self-referential to the story itself and its status as a 
fiction, revealing a level of self-reflection that thematizes the artifice of the fictional world. 
The philosophies thus become the most basic ontology to the inhabitants of the textual 
world—it is inevitable that they appropriate a system of thought that explains the internal 
textual reality perfectly. However, through the theory of possible worlds, I have attempted to 
show that Tlön tries to erase the boundaries between fiction and reality, thus providing both 
an insight and a warning to how we regard systems of the world. 
 
 66
Chapter 4: Duplications and self-reflections 
 
For now we see through a glass, darkly. 
 
— 1Corinthians: 13 
 
 
 
 
Aside from the labyrinth—a metaphor of ordered space—the mirror is one of the most 
prominent symbols of Borges’ works. Borges once wrote that the true mark of an enduring 
author was whether he had produced one or two symbols to remember his works by. To this 
end, Borges consistently used these two symbols, to the point that we instinctively associate 
them with him. In “Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius,” we encounter the mirror already in the 
famous first sentence, effectively setting up a theme running throughout the story.  
The mirror as an actual physical object does not itself feature prominently within the 
story outside of the first couple of sentences, but thematically it is more significant: “Debo a 
la conjunción de un espejo y de una encliclopedia [sic] el descubrimiento de Uqbar.”70 (OC 1: 
431) In this sentence we have the explicit juxtaposition of two objects that double the world: 
the mirror doubling the visible world, and the encyclopaedia, with its ordered representation 
of knowledge, doubles the conceptual world. While neither of them is complete in this 
function—the mirror is limited by the area that it reflects light from, the encyclopaedia by its 
choice of subjects and its scope—they both can give the illusion that they do. In concert, 
setting the physical mirror to face the conceptual, one can only wonder if the infinite is 
discernible between them. 
 In the story, duplication returns thematically in several iterations. I will specifically 
look at encyclopaedias, the use of quotes and the motif of the hrönir to explore the theme. 
How this is done can be viewed as a way of circling in towards a centre in the story itself: in 
the case of encyclopaedias, the duplication-theme reaches far outside of the story itself, with 
the story of the encyclopaedia spanning that of western civilisation, while the project as such 
has remained the same: to represent the sum of human knowledge. The quoting, as I have 
explored it, reaches both outside of the story itself and within it, but the quotes I look at are 
specifically related to Borges’ own works, and represents duplications and variations of what 
                                                 
70 “I owe the discovery of Uqbar to the conjunction of a mirror and an encyclopedia,” (F: 7) 
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he himself wrote both earlier and later than in “Tlön.” Finally, the hrönir as a concept exists 
only within this story, but they are in themselves objects of duplication and variation, a type 
of objects found in Tlön that are imperfect copies of other objects, and come into existence 
from expectation rather than physical creation. While the creation of the hrönir was inspired 
by other factors, the hrönir have by themselves no direct point of references, and are perhaps 
the most truly original thing Borges created with the story.  
 The duplications and their variations seem to be a dramatization of one of the most 
startling aspects of Tlön, the hrönir; we can say that the hrönir come to mirror several aspects 
of the story as a whole, structuring it. Theoretically this self-mirroring of the narrative 
structure is called mise en abyme. Linda Hutcheon calls this device “one of the major modes 
of textual narcissism,” (Hutcheon 1984: 4) meaning that the mise en abyme is a metafictional 
device that in a text thematizes the text itself. Before analysing the occurrences of it in 
“Tlön,” I will discuss the theoretical basis for mise en abyme. 
 
4.1 Mise en abyme and its origins 
In his journal from 1893, André Gide wrote of a motif in literature and art which he 
considered pleasing and representative for the work as a whole: 
 
In a work of art, I rather like to find thus transposed, at the level of the characters, the subject of the 
work itself. Nothing sheds more light on the work or displays the proportions of the whole work more 
accurately. […] What would be more accurate, and what would explain better what I’d wanted to do in 
my Cahiers, in Narcisse and in La Tentative, would be a comparison with the device from heraldry that 
involves putting a second representation of the original shield ‘en abyme’ within it. (Gide 1948: 41, 
quoted in Dällenbach 1989: 7) 
 
Though this device was well-known and had been—and was to be—extensively used in 
literature, Gide’s evocative comparison was to inspire much theoretical discourse on the 
subject. Though Gide’s meaning was in reference to a technical term from heraldry, to place a 
shield motive en abyme [lit. “in the abyss”] in the middle of the shield, the connotations to the 
abyss has come to cement the term’s enduring status. Strictly speaking, Gide was not the first 
to term it mise en abyme, it was C. E. Magny who introduced it in 1918, in reference to Gide’s 
entry, and there have been various terms employed from early on, notably composition and 
construction en abyme, originating with P. Lafille (Dällenbach 1989: 20), and structure en 
abyme (Genette 1990: 233). Mieke Bal attempts to do away with the connotations of abyme, 
opting to term it “mirror-text” (Bal 1997: 58). However, mise en abyme has become such an 
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established term for the device that I do not consider it relevant to use another term than the 
dominant one. 
 
4.1.1 Types of mise en abyme 
The most thorough theoretical study on the device is Lucien Dällenbach’s seminal book Le 
récit spéculaire from 1977.71 In it, Dällenbach studies first the critical history of the term’s 
usage, and, based on the varying uses of it, creates a structural typology to define the various 
iterations that had been proposed earlier. Dällenbach establishes three elementary types of 
mise en abyme: 
 
a ‘mise en abyme’ is any internal mirror that reflects the whole of the narrative by simple, repeated or 
‘specious’ (or paradoxical) duplication. (Dällenbach 1989: 46) 
 
This three-fold definition springs from the vagueness of Gide’s original statement. Since they 
have later been interpreted in different ways by different theorists, Dällenbach’s definition 
unites them to establish a higher degree of precision in the term, arguing that each definition 
accurately portrays Gide’s original description. That he names mise en abyme as a mirror is 
due to the device’s reflexive nature; a mise en abyme is an internal textual representation of 
the text itself, thus making the mirror an apt metaphor. 
 Dällenbach’s initial definition ties directly to the type of mirror employed in the text, 
and the explication of each type is relatively simple: a simple duplication indicates that the 
text gives a single duplication, but not of the text itself, but of a similar work (thus avoiding 
infinite regression); the multiple or infinite duplication contains the text itself, and implies 
that the duplicate of the text includes the duplication of the text, and therefore also regressing 
into infinity; the last definition, the specious or paradoxical duplication, refers to when the 
duplicate text actually is identical to its origin, to the text itself. This is paradoxical for two 
reasons: the perfect duplication must also include itself, and therefore constitutes an infinite 
regression (as with the preceding type of multiple duplications); however, this also confuses 
the point of origin of the text, making it uncertain what is the cause and effect of duplication. 
An apt metaphor to signify the last form of duplication would be the ouroboros, the snake 
biting its own tail, where the end is also equal to the origin, ad infinitum. 
 
                                                 
71 I have consulted the English translation The Mirror in the Text from 1989. 
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4.1.2 Levels of mise en abyme 
As noted, the previous definition relates to the type of reflexion, but Dällenbach also creates 
further distinctions on another axis, namely, on what textual level the reflexion functions. 
Here he bases the analysis on Roman Jakobson’s linguistic communication model, dividing 
the functions into those of the utterance, the enunciation and the code. First, however, it is 
made clear that all textual reflexions relate to the narrative—the diegesis—at an intra- or 
metadiegetic level—across narrative frames—implying that authorial proclamations or textual 
marks set outside of the narrative frame cannot be considered as reflective of it. As a 
consequence, a mise en abyme must be an utterance in a narrative frame that is set within 
another frame. A consequence of this is that for something to be considered a mise en abyme, 
it has to be more compressed than what it reflects. A mise en abyme compresses the aspects of 
the reflection that are relevant, functionally to what it is informing the reader about. Mieke 
Bal notes that “La mise en abyme sera de ce fait toujours interruption, de la narration relayée 
au personnage.”72 (Bal 1978: 119) Thus the uniting characteristic of the mises en abyme is 
that they are made intra- or metadiegetically in relation to what they reflect. What 
characterises the different mises en abyme is that they are made at either the level of the 
utterance, the enunciation or the code. 
 Dällenbach names the mise en abyme of the utterance the “fictional mise en abyme” 
(55). The function of this form is to provide the narrative a self-conscious way to grant both 
the readers of the story, and, depending on how it is constructed, the characters within it 
awareness of the story’s structure. Thus the fictional mise en abyme is a reflection of narrative 
events. Depending on whether it is placed at the beginning, the middle or the end of the story, 
it can influence the reading and the action in various ways. Because it has to be restrained, the 
reflection simplifies and abstracts the narrative action, and it therefore follows that, in Gide’s 
words, “‘nothing sheds more light on’ a narrative than its mise en abyme.” (55)  
 Most relevant to the following analysis is when the reflection is placed at the start or in 
the middle of the story. Dällenbach concludes that the fictional mise en abyme placed at the 
beginning (prospectively) “cannot help influencing how the book itself will be interpreted” 
(61); since the events that take place within the narrative are essentially known from an early 
stage, later narrative action must be interpreted in relation to this knowledge. Beatriz Urraca 
comments, in reference to “Tlön,” that this technique “‘programs’ the way in which the story 
is read and interpreted by the reader, and affords the author the utmost control.” (Urraca 1992: 
                                                 
72 “In this way, the Mise en abyme will always be an interruption of the narrative relayed by the character.” (My 
translation) 
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157) This narrative control does not necessarily mean that the reflexion needs to be accurate; 
if the events eventually do not unfold as implied in the mise en abyme there is an ironic effect 
in the reading—though of course this is also anticipated by the device’s control of the reading. 
The reflection placed at the middle reinforces the control, because part of it gives an accurate 
reproduction of previous narration, and thus it will be presumed that the remainder of the 
reflection correlates to the rest of the story accordingly. Dällenbach quotes Flaubert regarding 
this central structuring: “‘Every work of art’, wrote Flaubert, ‘must have a point, a summit, a 
peak to the pyramid, or at least the light must strike one point of the sphere. There is nothing 
of this sort in life: but Art is different from Nature!’” (Dällenbach 1989: 70) This remark, as 
we will see later, has a specific relevance to the use of mise en abyme in “Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis 
Tertius,” and also implies that it has an aesthetic function. Dällenbach notes that since placing 
this “pivotal” mise en abyme may seem artificial in the composition, it is often skewed to be 
placed either slightly before or after the centre of the text. 
 Since the “enunciative,” or narrative, mise en abyme is not directly relevant for my 
analysis, I will not elaborate further upon it beyond the fact that it relates to the act of 
narration: the narrative mise en abyme works in three ways, by ‘making present’ the producer 
or receiver of the narrative in the diegesis; it reveals the production or reception of it; or it 
explicates upon the context determining production and reception. In effect, using the device 
in any of these ways is an attempt in fiction of making what is invisible—what is outside of 
the text—visible internal to the text (75).  
 Dällenbach identifies three further levels of mise en abyme, all relating to the code: the 
textual, the metatextual and the transcendental. The textual mise en abyme is a thematic 
reflection of the text, which, while similar to the fictional mise en abyme, is always also a 
mise en abyme of the code (98), thus encompassing two separate levels. At the level of the 
code we also have the metatextual and the transcendental mises en abyme. The metatextual 
mise en abyme works by revealing how the text works, revealing the structure of the entire 
work, and thus also providing a plan to how one understands and reads it. The transcendental, 
while also being at the level of the code, points to the point of origin for the structure, 
revealing metaphorically the origin of how the text has been structured (98-103). 
 
4.1.3 Summary of the theory of mise en abyme 
To summarize: Dällenbach proposes a typology of mises en abyme divided into three 
elementary types: the simple, the multiple and the paradoxical. These types are further 
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specified as being created at different levels of the text: on the level of the utterance is the 
fictional mise en abyme, on the level of enunciation is the narrative, and on the level of the 
code is the metatextual and the transcendental. Additionally, the textual mise en abyme works 
on the level of the utterance and the code at the same time. Dällenbach stresses, though, that 
this strict taxonomy can be deceptive because mises en abyme often appear in combination, 
and thus that the governing mise en abyme is accompanied by another or several other forms 
on other levels. Thus, the narrative mise en abyme is usually a doubling of the utterance; the 
metatextual combines the mise en abyme of the code with that of the utterance to produce a 
“code of codes” (106).  
 Having established the theoretical foundations and limitations for mises en abyme, I 
will now specify the instances in “Tlön” where this narrative device is employed, and identify 
why these instances are, indeed, examples of mise en abyme. Before I analyse the mise en 
abyme, I will set them in connection with the duplicating objects in the story, the hrönir. 
 
4.2 Duplications in Tlön 
Initially there seems to be a proliferation of textual mirrors in “Tlön,” given how it explicitly 
thematises both the mirror as a symbol and the encyclopaedia as a metaphor for how a mirror 
functions. However, with the stricter theoretical delimitations put forth by Dällenbach, there 
are two specific segments of the narrative that stand out as especially relevant for the 
understanding of the story, as narrative segments that reveal closer how the story functions. 
First, there is the discussion of a novel at the beginning of the story, and second, the “sophism 
of the coins” taken from the First Encyclopaedia of Tlön. Though I have studied these in other 
chapters, the following analysis of these segments analyses why they can be considered mises 
en abyme and how they reflect the narrative text. What this then implies for the interpretation 
will be examined more closely following the analysis. First, however, I will study an aspect 
from the First Encyclopaedia of Tlön that is, perhaps, not strictly a mise en abyme as it has 
been defined by Dällenbach, but that nonetheless carries resonance throughout the text as a 
whole: the hrönir. The hrönir are closely related to the two specific instances of mise en 
abyme that I analyse, but are also relevant to other instances of “reflection,” or duplication. 
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4.2.1 Hrönir 
Evelyn Fishburn takes the previously discussed sentences as examples of hrönir in her essay 
“Digging for hrönir: a second reading of ‘Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius’”73. The essay, as the 
title suggests, goes in search for examples of the hrönir in the story, treating them as a 
structuring principle for it, and, if one is so inclined, our general perception of reality. The 
hrönir are described in the following passage:  
 
Dos personas buscan un lápiz; la primera lo encuentra y no dice nada; la segunda encuentra un Segundo 
lápiz no menos real, pero más ajustado a su expectativa. Esos objetos secundarios se llaman hrönir y 
son, aunque de forma desairada, un poco más largos.74  (439) 
 
This object, borne out of expectation, can again bear forth new hrönir; hrönir from another 
hrönir, although their physical characteristics do not follow the same scheme for replication:  
 
Hecho curioso: los hrönir de segundo y de tercer grado –los hrönir derivados de otro hrön, los hrönir 
derivados del hrön de un hrön– exageran las aberraciones del inicial; los de quinto son casi uniformes; 
los de noveno se confunden con los de segundo; en los de undécimo hay una pureza de líneas que los 
originales no tienen. El proceso es periódico: el hrön de duodécimo grado ya empieza a decaer.75 (440) 
 
Each hrön bears relation to the original object, determined by a predictable pattern according 
to where in the line of hrönir they stand, while the series is predicated on the duodecimal 
system of numbers that is prevalent in Tlön—the twelfth hrön begins to degenerate. Whether 
this degeneration is in reference to the original object or to the eleventh, with its “purity of 
line,” is uncertain. However, as the process is periodic, it is safe to say that the series should 
continue to generate new hrönir in a similar pattern indefinitely. It is also stated that hrönir 
have been produced systematically, but only for the last hundred years. For some reason the 
narrator deems this hard to believe, not because of the unlikelihood of producing these 
objects, but that it has only been going on for only a hundred years. The circumstances for 
producing hrönir are apparently heavily influenced by awareness and state of mind: “Ese 
primer intento probó que la esperanza y la avidez pueden inhibir,”76 (439) and furthermore; 
 
                                                 
73 From Variaciones Borges, issue 25, 2008. 
74 “Two persons are looking for a pencil; the first person finds it, but says nothing; the second finds a second 
pencil, no less real, bur more in keeping with his expectations. Theses secondary objects are called hrönir, and 
they are, though awkwardly so, slightly longer.” (F: 19) 
75 “A curious bit of information: hrönir of the second and third remove—hrönir derived from another hrön, and 
hrönir derived from the hrön of a hrön—exaggerate the aberrations of the first; those of the fifth remove are 
almost identical; those of the ninth can be confused with those of the second; and those of the eleventh remove 
exhibit a purity of line that even the originals do not exhibit. The process is periodic: The hrönir of the twelfth 
remove begin to degenerate.” (F: 20) A note of interest: the Spanish word for “twelfth,” duodécimo, can also be 
translated as “duodecimal.” 
76 “That first attempt proved that hope and greed can be inhibiting.” (F: 19) 
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Así se descubrió la improcedencia de testigos que conocieran la naturaleza experimental de la busca… 
Las investigaciones en masa producen objetos contradictorios; ahora se prefiere los trabajos 
individuales y casi improvisados.77 (439-40) 
 
Finally, it is worth mentioning that those who were set to find hrönir were first primed with 
expectations as to what they were going to find, having been told that they were likely to find 
artefacts and shown photographs of the type of objects they might find. 
 James E. Irby, in his essay “Borges and the Idea of Utopia” considers the hrönir as “an 
extended metaphor of the processes of memory, as well as of historiography,” (Irby 1971: 38) 
because of the section’s interrelating descriptions of first proliferation (the doubling of hrönir) 
and then loss (the disappearance of objects when not observed). He also connects this with a 
story Borges tells of his father to Richard Burgin, in Conversations with Jorge Luis Borges:  
 
I remember my father said to me something about memory, a very saddening thing. He said, ‘I thought I 
could recall my childhood when we first came to Buenos Aires, but now I know that I can’t.’ I said, 
‘Why?’ He said, ‘Because […] I think that if I recall something, for example, if today I look back on 
this morning, then I get an image of what I saw this morning. But if tonight, I’m thinking back on this 
morning, then what I’m really recalling is not the first image, but the first image in memory. (Burgin 
1969: 10) 
 
Irby merely notes the affiliation with this notion of memory and the hrönir in “Tlön,” but in 
The Emperor’s Kites, a psycho-analytical approach to Borges’ work, Mary Luskin Friedman, 
citing Irby, explores the connection between this story and the hrönir found in Tlön. Her 
conclusion is that “Tlön” as a whole is a work borne out of mourning, and that the hrönir was 
a way of working in therapy, a process of remembrance: 
 
We may wonder, as well, whether the paradox of the nine coins that Borges’ speaker uses to illustrate 
Tlön’s idealist philosophies may derive from the same source in Borges’ mental life. I have speculated 
that the question of whether hrönir can retrieve a satisfactory image of something lost may have had 
special urgency for Borges at a time when he strove to retain through memory—and thereby literally to 
invest with being—an image of his father. (Friedman 1987: 186) 
 
Notably, Friedman distinguishes the two episodes—that of the coins and that of the hrönir—
but cites them both as a way of “coming to grips with the fact that his father existed no longer 
in his own right but as a function of the memories of others.” (Friedman  187), arguing that 
both of them are indirectly about the motif of losing and finding. 
 Fishburn, however, goes deeper into the nature of hrönir in exploring them as not 
merely objects, but as a structuring concept. In a reference to one of the story’s footnotes,78 
                                                 
77 “Thus it was discovered that no witnesses who were aware of the experimental nature of the search could be 
allowed near the site....Group research projects produce conflicting finds; now individual, virtually spur-of-the-
moment projects are preferred.” (F: 19) 
78 From the Posdata, after mysterious objects have begun intruding upon our world: “Queda, naturalmente, el 
problema de la materia de algunos objetos.” (442n) [“There is still, of course, the problem of the material from 
which some objects are made. (F: 24)] 
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Fishburn maintains that “the mystery of their materiality remains unexplained in a footnote, a 
space in the margins where it sits, threatening the text.” (Fishburn 2008: 56) and also that the 
definition giving for the variation of hrön called Ur, “la cosa producida por sugestión, el 
objeto educido por la esperanza,”79 (440) applies to hrön, hrönir and Ur (pointing out that 
hrönir is the probable plural of hrön). Hrönir are thus “slightly, or lightly, deviating 
duplications of an unspecified original.” (56) One of Fishburn’s arguments is that the original 
is unspecified, meaning that it can be literally anything, leading of course to the result that 
“once we know they are there, we, like the archaeologists of Tlön, will find hrönir 
everywhere, as a constitutive part not only of reality but, pertinently, also of the narrative.” 
(57) Fishburn generalises hrönir from what is described in the story as the proliferation and 
duplication of ideal physical objects to the proliferation and duplication of concepts (no less 
ideal), and cites the following as examples in the story: the mirror and encyclopaedia of the 
opening line, the heresiarch quote, the apocryphal references, the mentioning of the impostor 
Smerdis in the entry on Uqbar in the Anglo-American Cyclopaedia. Most notably, perhaps, is 
the sophism of the coins, since Fishburn shows that the story actually bears a direct link to the 
hrönir as they are presented in the story as physical objects.  
 
4.2.2 Encyclopaedias 
The various encyclopaedias encountered in “Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius” are used as the main 
device in presenting the plot. The encyclopaedia—together with the mirror—opens the story, 
and various encyclopaedias continue to provide information, first on Uqbar, then on the 
fantastic planet Tlön. Other forms of encyclopaedic reference works are also mentioned or 
alluded to, and the list of encyclopaedic works that figure in the story includes the following: 
The Anglo-American Cyclopedia; Encyclopædia Britannica; the atlases of Justhus Perthes; 
Die Erdkunde by Carl Ritter; A First Encyclopedia of Tlön; and the projected Second 
Encyclopedia of Tlön. The encyclopaedia is among the most important symbols of the story, 
as it ties together several of the themes explored: representation, utopianism and duplication.  
 While the encyclopaedia that initially introduces Uqbar is most definitely apocryphal, 
Alan White, in his article “A Horrible or Banal Truth,” (2003) uncovers an encyclopaedia in 
the Library of Congress called the Anglo-American Encyclopedia (my added emphasis), 
which seems to correspond perfectly with the description of the Cyclopaedia. White 
concludes that Borges consulted both the Anglo-American Encyclopedia and the eleventh 
                                                 
79 “the thing produced by suggestion, the object brought forth by hope” (F: 20) 
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edition of Encyclopædia Britannica when writing “Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius” (White 2003: 
53). Borges’ title (and that of the encyclopaedia White found) reflects that the tenth edition in 
effect was “Anglo-American,” as ownership changed from British hands after the publication 
of the ninth, and the additional volumes of the tenth was under American editorship. The 
Anglo-American Encyclopedia, is exactly that, a piratical reprint of the Britannica, and also in 
a sense “laggardly,” as at the time of its production the Encyclopædia Britannica was already 
in a popular new edition the eleventh.  
Evelyn Fishburn, however, agreeing with Nicolás Helft, concludes that Borges was 
actually thinking of the eleventh edition of the Britannica in some convoluted way80—even 
though he in private conversation with her had stated that he owned a copy of the Anglo-
American Cyclopaedia (Fishburn 2008: 58). There is at any rate no doubt that Borges owned 
and regularly consulted the eleventh edition of the Britannica. This is a digression, however, 
since the main point is the doublings of the encyclopaedias in the story itself. 
 The encyclopaedias we encounter in “Tlön” are certainly not fixed entities. From the 
outset, the Anglo-American Cyclopaedia is described with the adjective “falazmente” 
[deceitful], a reprint of the Britannica, and also exhibits variances between copies. Casares 
remembers reading an article on Uqbar, yet the copy they first examine does not have it. After 
examining his own copy at home he finds the article, but when the narrator’s friend, Carlos 
Mastronardi, encounters another copy of the set, the article is once again omitted. Of course, it 
is the inclusion of Uqbar in the one set, and not the omission of it in the others that is 
erroneous; the alphabetical key indicates articles between Tor-Ups, and the narrator notes that 
“Uqbar” is “no previsto (como habrá advertido el lector) por la indicación alfabética.”81 (432) 
 The Anglo-American Cyclopaedia is quickly forgotten by the narrator after the 
introduction of A First Encyclopaedia of Tlön, discovered by mere happenstance after a friend 
of the narrator’s father had died, who left a volume of this apparently exhaustive work behind: 
Vol. XI. Hlaer to Jangr. This volume is the sole basis for the second part’s elucidation upon 
the philosophy of Tlön. The postscript tells of the discovery of a letter that explains the 
mystery: The First Encyclopaedia of Tlön was commissioned by an eccentric millionaire and 
created by a secret society of man of letters, finishing an entire 40 volumes in 1914. The 
discovery of the letter is succeeded by the discovery of the entire set of 40 volumes in a 
library. However, this set differs slightly from the previous discovery: “Algunos rasgos 
                                                 
80 The argument being that by the publishing date (1917) it would be more likely to make a reprint of the 
eleventh edition from 1911. However, as I pointed out, Borges explicitly addresses this point, calling it “morosa” 
[late/laggardly]. 
81 “an article not contemplated (as the reader will have noted) by the alphabetical key.” (F:  8) 
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increíbles del Onceno Tomo (verbigracia, la multiplicación de los hrönir) han sido eliminados 
o atenuados en el ejemplar de Memphis”82 (442). In addition, we learn of the project to create 
a new dictionary of Tlön, the elusive Orbis Tertius, written in one of the languages of Tlön. 
Finally, the narrator predicts the discovery of The Second Encyclopaedia of Tlön, a hundred 
years from when he is writing. 
As we can see, not only are the encyclopaedias encountered in “Tlön” numerous, they 
are also continually changing, mutating, incorrectly reproduced and doubled. They are mirrors 
of the world, but there are mirrors working on them as well, unfaithfully reproducing their 
contents—by which I mean our narrator’s examination of the philosophies of Tlön. Within the 
story it is not a stretch to consider the proliferation of encyclopaedias as examples of hrönir.  
 
4.2.3 Quoting 
The first part of the story contains two intellectual propositions that in my opinion are central 
to the understanding of the story as a whole, both presented in the second paragraph. The first 
is the subject of how to compose a “first-person novel whose narrator would omit or distort 
things and engage in all sorts of contradictions, so that a few of the book’s readers—a very 
few—might divine the horrifying or banal truth.” (F: 7) The second is the quote attributed to 
an heresiarch of Uqbar: “Mirrors and copulation are abominable, for they multiply the number 
of mankind.” (F: 7) Both these ideas are interesting for two reasons: a) their importance for 
the theme and reading of the rest of the story, and b) Neither of them are original ideas to the 
story, as Borges included or discussed them in earlier writing. Indeed, neither of them is 
presented as original: the discussion of the novel is about how to compose it rather than 
actually proposing to write one, indicating that the proposition might have been made before; 
the quote on the heresiarch is supposedly taken from an encyclopaedia. 
 While the these propositions merit a discussion of their content, it is also interesting to 
note where these ideas come from and how they change in different texts by Borges. This 
might not be an exhaustive tracing of the diverse iterations of these quotes; with a writer as 
self-referential as Borges the uncovering of textual copies is a daunting and exhausting task. 
The purpose here is mainly showing that it takes place, not uncovering all eventual copies. 
 
                                                 
82 “Some of the unbelievable features of Volume Eleven (the multiplication of hrönir, for example) have been 
eliminated or muted in the Memphis copy.” (F:  23) 
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4.2.4 Mirrors and fatherhood 
The quote that initiates the narrator’s and Bioy Casares' enlightenment about Tlön and Uqbar 
in Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius is this: “Espejos y la cópula son abominables, porque 
multiplican el número de los hombres.”83 (OC 1: 431) This is Bioy Casares' recollection of 
what he has read in The Anglo-American Cyclopaedia, a pirated version of the Britannica. As 
they without luck try to find the entry on Uqbar in the encyclopaedia, the narrator discards 
Casares' attribution of it to an encyclopedia as false modesty. However, some days later 
Casares calls from Buenos Aires and recites from his copy the following. 
 
Para uno de esos gnósticos, el visible universo era una ilusión o (más precisamente) un sofisma. Los 
espejos y la paternidad son abominables (mirrors and fatherhood are hateful), porque lo multiplican y 
lo divulgan.84 (432) 
 
This quote and its relation to how it is revealed in the story is quite interesting. Of course, at 
the basic level it seems Borges attributes the quote at first as an invention of Casares', then to 
the unnamed gnostic of Uqbar. Critics have pointed out that the quote is probably original to 
Borges, but also that it is not original, at least not in the sense that it is original to “Tlön.” As 
several critics note (Jaén 1992, Fishburn 1990, 2008), the quote is itself a modified quote 
from one of Borges' earlier stories (or biographies). In Historia universal de la infámia, we 
read the following, in “El tintotero enmascarado Hakim de Merv”85:  
 
La tierra que habitamos es un error, una incompetente parodia. Los espejos y la paternidad son 
abominables, porque la multiplican y afirman.86 (327)  
 
We see that the quote is slightly different: in the original story the last of the accompanying 
verbs is not “divulgan”, but “afirman”; the accompanying article is also repeated before each 
verb in the version taken from “Tlön”. 
Concerning this quote, the textual irregularities from copying and reproducing are 
even more apparent within the story itself. Quoting the article on Uqbar from memory, the 
original term Bioy Casares uses is “heresiarca”—or heresiarch—yet this turns out to be an 
artefact of his memory, as the real quotation reads “gnostic”. While it is understandable that 
                                                 
83 “Mirrors and copulation are abominable, for they multiply the number of mankind.” (F: 7) 
84 “For one of these gnostics, the visible universe was an illusion or, more precisely, a sophism. Mirrors and 
fatherhood are hateful because they multiply and proclaim it.” (F: 8) The translation loses part of the complexity 
of the original text, for the quote there is set in cursive, but the original wording “mirrors and fatherhood are 
hateful) is not, a detail the translation loses. The significance of this is that it shows an apparent inconsequential 
practice for direct quotations within the story. 
85 The title does not mention that Hakim, or al-Muqanna as he was known, was an heretical Muslim in the 
ancient Persian region of Khorasan; Khorasan being one of the areas mentioned in connection with Uqbar. 
86 “The earth we live in is an error, an incompetent parody. Mirrors and fatherhood are abominable, because they 
multiply and affirm it.” (My translation) 
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the terms could get muddled in recollection, there is a relatively clear distinction between 
them. The early Christian Gnostics are seen as heretics by the Church, and one of their leaders 
would be considered a heresiarch. However, being a “gnostic” is also a reference to having a 
certain belief or world view, rather than “heresiarch,” which is in general a term describing 
someone leading a school of thought going against orthodox beliefs, more specifically 
Christian Orthodox belief.87 Therefore, while there is a certain overlap of the terms, each of 
them carries specific meaning. There is not, from the information provided on Uqbar, any 
evidence that the gnostic in question was, in fact, a heretic—the gnostics found there might 
just as well support the orthodox mystical beliefs of Uqbar. 
 While the first sentence from the original quote in “El tintotero” is not repeated in 
“Tlön,” the second quoted sentence is essentially the same as the one Bioy remembers from 
the encyclopaedia. However, this sentence comes in several variations. At first mention it 
goes like this: “Entonces Bioy Casares recordó que uno de los heresiarcas de Uqbar había 
declarado que los espejos y la cópula son abominables, porque multiplican el número de los 
hombres.”88 (431) As we see, the first time we do not have a quote, but rather the narrator’s 
recollection of it. The second time is more specific, as the narrator is pointing out the 
difference of Casares’ quote and the actual quote in the encyclopaedia; preceding Casares’ 
recitation, the narrator informs us:  
 
Él había recordado: Copulation and mirrors are abominable. El texto de la Enciclopedia decía: Para 
uno de esos gnósticos, el visible universo era una ilusión o (más precisamente) un sofisma. Los espejos 
y la paternidad son abominables (mirrors and fatherhood are hateful), porque lo multiplican y lo 
divulgan. (431-32) 
 
Thus we see that the original text from the encyclopaedia is actually never properly quoted. It 
is presented as the text of the encyclopaedia, but written down in Spanish interspersed with 
English regarding the central (surprising) statement. Thus we actually have four different 
versions of it: “los espejos y la copula son abominables”; “Copulation and mirrors are 
abominable”; “Los espejos y la paternidad son abominables”; “mirrors and fatherhood are 
hateful”. We see that the only element of the statement actually faithful to all versions is the 
mirror [espejo]. This can therefore, amongst other things, be interpreted as an episode on the 
veracity of a quote, of finding the original quote, yet it does not actually provide the full quote 
in question. We understand the theme of the quote, but as a scrupulous scholar the narrator 
                                                 
87 And, in keeping with the Greek etymology, this belief would be considered para doxa, or paradox, i.e. 
contrary to popular belief—a term popular with Borges in all of its meanings. 
88 “That was when Bioy Casares remembered a saying by one of the heresiarchs of Uqbar: Mirrors and 
copulation are  abominable, for they multiply the number of mankind.” (F: 7) 
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undermines himself. Perhaps as a wink to the reader that we should not trust the narrator too 
much, the paragraph continues: “Lo cual me sorprendió, porque los escrupulosos indices 
cartográficos de la Erdkunde de Ritter ignoraban con plenitud el nombre de Uqbar.”89 (432) 
Alan White, in his article “An Appalling or Banal Reality” notes that while the narrator 
seemingly shows a serious interest and exhibits scrupulous erudition,  
 
he cannot have examined relevant indices in the Erdkunde, for the simple reason that that work has no 
such indices: it has no cartographic indices (or, for that matter, maps), and no index at all for its two 
volumes on Asia. (White 2003: 49)  
 
White then points out that the geographical region, in Iraq or Asia Minor, was never covered 
by Ritter before his death.90  
I have commented upon apparent incongruities between the referents in the textual 
world and the actual world in greater depth in chapter 3, but there is another possible 
interpretation worth mentioning. It seems that these incongruent quotes and the fallacious 
statement about erudition is actually the result of artefacts of memory. It is stated early in the 
story: “El hecho se produjo hará unos cinco años.”91 (431) The entire story is set in past tense, 
and at the time of writing it has occurred five years previously. It is not an overstatement to 
suggest that the details would have become muddled after such a time-span. In this first part 
we see two ideas that are central to the understanding of the rest of the story, and the nature of 
these ideas is presented in a way that directly relates thematically to the story as a whole: that 
memory is imperfect, that wording changes along with meaning. We are presented with some 
facts, but whose details have become slightly muddled or modified during the course of time, 
presented as true at the time of writing.  
 
4.3 Reflections in Tlön 
The previous examples show how hrönir is dramatized in the structure of “Tlön.” However, 
some of the textual hrönir are doubly duplications, because they also act as mirrors of the text 
itself. These mises en abyme are the discussion of a novel from the beginning of the story, and 
                                                 
89 “This surprised me, as the scrupulous indices of Ritter’s Erdkunde were completely ignorant of the name of 
Uqbar.” (My translation) - Alejandro Riberi gives a closer description of Ritter’s Erdkunde in his book on Tlön, 
Fictions as Cognitive Artefacts (2007), noting amongst other things that “Ritter’s work was intended to be a 
complete geography of the world. Published in 19 volumes—which appeared between 1817 and 1859—it was 
never completed on account of Ritter’s death.” (Riberi 2007: 23) 
90 Riberi, however, states that Ritter actually wrote about the area: “On the region of Asia Minor [… ], he hoped 
to complete three volumes, but only two appeared.” (Riberi 2007: 24) 
91 “The event took place about five years ago.” (F: 7) 
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the “sophism of the coins” at the centre of the story, within the discussion of philosophy in 
part II. 
 
4.3.1 A novel proposal 
The first example of the story relevant to mise en abyme is the discussion mentioned at the 
very beginning between the narrator and Bioy Casares. I have discussed this part briefly in 
chapter 2, establishing it as a reason for initiating the analysis I do there. Here I will go in 
greater depth to why the analysis is motivated. The text reads:  
 
Bioy Casares había cenado conmigo esa noche y nos demoró una vasta polémica sobra la ejecución de 
una novela en primera persona, cuyo narrador omitiera o desfigurara los hechos e incurriera en diversas 
contradicciones, que permitieran a unos pocos lectores —a muy pocos lectores— la adivinación de una 
realidad atroz o banal.92 (OC 1: 431) 
 
Even intuitively this passage seems to be self-reflexive of the story as a whole, and 
considerable research has therefore been conducted to find out exactly what this atrocious or 
banal truth may be (if that is indeed the case). It is not given, however, that the passage is an 
example of mise en abyme; for example, the self-referentiality is partially broken, considering 
they are discussing a novela—and we are not, strictly speaking, reading a novel. But there are 
other clues that it really is: the mirror itself. 
 The mirror is one of Borges’ most persistent symbols, and his use of it is tied as 
strongly to his personality93 as it is to the possibilities for interpretation that it opens for. In 
“Tlön” the mirror has already from the first sentence been tied closely to the encyclopaedia, 
establishing the similarity between them and how they aim at being reflections of the world.94 
Furthermore, in the words of the heresiarch contained in the article on Uqbar, mirrors 
“divulge” the world. Given the link between mirrors and encyclopaedias, this is worth 
keeping in mind. But where the encyclopaedia has a presence throughout the story, the mirror 
is actually textually present in only two scenes of the narrative, and only one where it figures 
explicitly. That is the scene which the segment quoted above takes place in—the scene that 
                                                 
92 “Bioy Casares had come to dinner at my house that evening, and we had lost all track of time in a vast debate 
over the way one might go about composing a first-person novel whose narrator would omit or distort things and 
engage in all sorts of contradictions, so that a few of the book’s readers—a very few—might divine the 
horrifying or banal truth.” (F: 7) 
93 Emir Rodríguez Monegal does a psychoanalytic reading of Borges’ somewhat strange fear of mirrors in 
Borges: A Literary Biography (1978: 30-36). 
94 In the Middle Ages encyclopaedias were called speculum mundi, or mirrors of the world. 
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initiates the search for Uqbar: “Desde el fondo remoto del corredor, el espejo nos acechaba.”95  
(431) This near-personification of the mirror implies that what has been discussed is laden 
with meaning, as the mirror—which all along reflects them—is also spying on them. If we 
take the heresiarchs claim seriously, the mirror’s reflection is also an act of divulging, of 
making known. Given that the story opens with the conjunction of a mirror and an 
encyclopaedia—in effect two mirrors—the story’s logic seems to indicate that this discussion 
also has a divulging role.96 But in this instance it does not reflect the world we are reading 
about, like the encyclopaedias come to do. The text appears to indicate that we have a mise en 
abyme—a mirror of the text. First, however, I will discuss some of the duplications of this 
proposition outside of the story. 
 The proposition is discussed again by Borges in a later story, “Examen de la obra de 
Herbert Quain” [“A survey of the works of Herbert Quain”], with a slight variation. It regards 
the plot of an apocryphal detective novel called The God of the Labyrinth, written by equally 
apocryphal Quain: 
 
Hay un indescifrable asesinato en las páginas iniciales, una lenta discusión en las intermedias, una 
solución en las últimas. Ya aclarado el enigma, hay un párrafo largo y retrospectivo que contiene esta 
frase: Todos creyeron que el encuentro de los dos jugadores de ajedrez había sido casual. Esa frase 
deja entender que la solución es errónea. El lector, inquieto, revisa los capítulos pertinentes y descubra 
otra solución, que es la verdadera. El lector de ese libro singular es más perspicaz que el detective.97 
(462) 
 
First published in 1941, a year after “Tlön”, “Herbert Quain” seems to bear clear reference to 
the earlier story, considering they were published together in El jardín de los senderos que se 
bifurcan. The short summary of the book’s plot (which the narrator claims to completely have 
forgotten the details of) neatly coincides—except for that the mystery is transformed into a 
murder—with the structural divisions of  “Tlön”: a) a mystery (the article on Uqbar); b) a 
slow discussion (the idealism of Tlön); c) a solution (the discovery of a secret society seeking 
                                                 
95 “Down at that far end of the corridor, the mirror hovered, shadowing us.” (F: 7) The translation “hovered, 
shadowing” does not convey the original’s full meaning; acechar means to watch or spy, but also to lie in 
ambush.  
96 We may also note that no mirrors elsewhere in the story are without their divulging counterparts. Besides the 
opening sentence, there is the quote from the heresiarch, which is placed inside an encyclopaedia, and 
additionally, the article tells us that excavations of Uqbar have unearthed stone mirrors. Mirrors are also 
mentioned later, at the beginning of part II, in the hotel at Adrogué. It is here, among the “illusory depths” of the 
mirrors that the narrator comes upon the eleventh volume of A First Encyclopaedia of Tlön. 
97 “There is an incomprehensible murder in the early pages of the book, a slow discussion in the middle, and a 
solution of the crime toward the end. Once the mystery has been cleared up, there is a long retrospective 
paragraph that contains the following sentence: Everyone believed that the chessplayers had met accidentally. 
That phrase allows one to infer that the solution is in fact in error, and so, uneasy, the reader looks back over the 
pertinent chapters and discovers another solution, which is the correct one. The reader of this remarkable book, 
then, is more perspicacious than the detective.” (F: 60) 
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to transform the world). This is, of course, a relatively redundant explanation of the formal 
structure of the novel; all detective novels are like this. 
 However, in the works of Borges is another occurrence of this idea, in the pages of El 
Hogar, a magazine for Argentine middle-class women, where Borges pseudonymously wrote 
a section named “Foreign Books and Authors” (Weinberger 2001: 533). In a short review 
from 1938 Borges tells us that  
 
I conceived it one night, one wasted night in 1935 or 1934, upon leaving a café in the Barrio Once. 
These meagre circumstantial facts will have to suffice for the reader; I have forgotten the others, 
forgotten them to the point where I don’t know whether I invented some of them. Here was my plan: to 
plot a detective novel of the current sort, with an indecipherable murder in the first pages, a long 
discussion in the middle, and a solution at the end. Then, almost in the last line, to add an ambiguous 
phrase—for example: “and everyone thought the meeting of the man and woman had been by 
chance”—that would indicate, or raise the suspicion, that the solution was false. The perplexed reader 
would go through the pertinent chapters again, and devise his own solution, the correct one. The reader 
of this imaginary book would be sharper than the detective… (Borges 2001: 184) 
 
Here we have an idea which is repeated with slight variations: first in the magazine in 1938; 
then in “Tlön”, published in 1940; finally in “Herbert Quain”, published in 1941. The two 
most prominent examples were published in two stories from the same work, La jardín de los 
senderos que se bifurcan, and later, Ficciones; the first one was written under a pseudonym. 
 
4.3.2 The discussion as mirror 
Dällenbach has two narrative requirements for a mise en abyme. First, it has to operate on the 
intra- and metadiegetic levels, which, in reference to figure 2.2 in chapter 2 we see is 
consistent: this particular segment of the text is within part I, which is within the narrative 
frame I have labelled (B), and also includes part II. This frame is within (C), and thus this 
mise en abyme can be reflective of (B) and (C) in Dällenbach’s definition, thus fulfilling the 
first requirement. Additionally there are no narrative frames at a higher level, excepting the 
sophism of the coins, which does not take place within the main narrative. Second, the mise 
en abyme has to be set apart from the narrative, an interruption of it, as Bal writes. Though 
there seems to be narrative action in the segment—they are having a discussion, the mirror is 
spying on them—it is effectively set apart from the rest of narrative action because this scene 
constitutes a contextual description. They were having this discussion when they started 
searching for the origin of a memorable epigram. Therefore we can consider it to be set apart 
from the narrative action because it is not strictly a part of it, but a contextualising setting for 
the initiation of it. Thus the second criterion is also fulfilled, and we can content ourselves 
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that the theoretical requirements have been fulfilled. Now we can look more closely at the 
contents of this textual mirror to see what the implications are for the reading of the story. 
 The discussion between the narrator and Bioy Casares constitutes three distinct 
elements: it refers to what a first-person narrator would do, omit or distort things, engage in 
contradictions; why the narrator does this—so that the truth behind these actions remain 
hidden from all but a select few readers; the nature of the discussion is how this is to be done. 
The how and the what are the instances that bear direct reference to the story. If we refer to 
the linguistic model which Dällenbach uses, we see that they correspond to the utterance, or 
what the narrator does, and the code, namely how one composes it. The why does not 
explicitly refer to the linguistic model, but it provides in the text a motive for doing it, and 
gives the readers an incentive to look for the hidden truth. It does not provide the author the 
motive for composing it in such a way, however.98 
 So we see that the two instances that reflect the story in some way can be classified as 
respectively a mise en abyme of the utterance and a mise en abyme of the code. From 
Dällenbach’s model it would appear that the textual mirror here is what he calls textual mise 
en abyme, which, while being a mise en abyme of the utterance, is always also a mise en 
abyme of the code. However, we can also interpret it as a mise en abyme of the origin, of 
transcendence. Bearing in mind that Borges originally proposed this way of writing a story in 
El Hogar two years before the story was published, cf. section 4.2.1, this discussion is not 
only revealing on how the story is structured, but also as a possible point of departure for 
Borges’ intentions for the story. If we read it thus, the discussion bears reference both 
internally on how “Tlön” works structurally, but also why it was written thus. The discussion 
transcends the text—it is a transcendental mise en abyme. 
 That it works both on the level on the utterance and on the code also means that the 
understanding of this textual mirror must be based on the interdependency of the two separate 
parts of it. The how depends on the what, because the what dictates the form it must take. The 
what depends on the how, because without the form it cannot achieve the goal of the why. 
Announcing that the following story will mislead most readers, but also giving incentive for 
the search of some nebulous truth—it is the why that sets these two elements in relief, and has, 
                                                 
98 A motive for the original proposal, as I will discuss later in this chapter, is of a somewhat ludic character: it 
would be a detective novel with a faulty conclusion, where the alert reader finds the real killer. Borges also 
explores this in “Examen de la obra de Herbert Quain”. Interestingly, Pierre Bayard has apparently taken 
Borges’ proposition seriously, and has written two books, Qui a tué Roger Ackroyd? (1998) and L’affaire du 
Chien des Baskerville, where he argues that the actual killers in The Murder of Roger Ackroyd by Agatha 
Christie and The Hound of the Baskervilles by Conan-Doyle are not the ones the detectives in the respective 
books deduce them to be. 
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as mentioned, spurred much academic detective work. We could therefore say that the 
detective nature of “Tlön” as a story is not so much in the unfolding of the story,99 as it is in 
an ambitious reader’s search for what secrets it may hide—the interpreter becomes the sleuth. 
And if one is to search, one has to understand the nature of this initial revelation to know how 
to proceed.  
 Therefore we understand that what the narrator does to omit, distort and engage in 
contradictions is also dependent on how it is presented to us in the story. As a consequence 
we must pay attention to the narrator two-fold: what is given to us in the way of facts and 
what is omitted, and how this is structured so as not to arouse suspicion on reading it, to 
deliberately mislead readers. As mise en abyme of both the utterance and the code, we are 
engaged—if we take the bait—to pay attention to them both when reading.  
 Additionally, since it is a mise en abyme of the utterance, the placement right at the 
opening of the story exerts control over the reading. Urraca writes that “Control is precisely 
what Borges is after when he opens ‘Tlön’ first with a mirror, and immediately after with the 
description of an imaginary novel that the narrator is discussing with his friend.” (Urraca 
1992: 157) The way this is done, however, is quite distinct from how Dällenbach defines it, 
and Urraca misidentifies it solely as a fictional mise en abyme. Though it is a prospective mise 
en abyme it does not reveal the contents of the story; due to the restricted way it is composed 
it only reveals that the narrator might be obfuscating the sequence of events or the facts. As 
such it gives a somewhat ironic result that it does not reveal anything of what happens 
outright in the story. There is more to it than there seems to be, making its reflective status 
more negative, leading us to look at what is left unsaid. This is a metafictional declaration: 
this is not just a story; there is more to it than a superficial reading.  
 If we consider the mirror as a metaphor for mise en abyme this is apt, for in a sense the 
device here actually is an inverse reflection of the story. Consequently, the control this 
prospective mise en abyme affects the reading in a very special way. It does not prime us to 
pay attention to what is there and what is going to happen, but rather to pay attention to what 
might not be there, and how the story we get is unreliable. Therefore, on reading one pays 
even stronger scrutiny to what is actually there, to figure out what is not. As I have shown in 
                                                 
99 Though many refer to the plot as a detective story, the truth is that there is no real detection in it. All the 
“clues” the narrator(s) find are come upon by chance or discovered by other people than the narrator(s). Even the 
solution to the “crime” is not evident; the narrator seemingly does not understand that the world is becoming 
Tlön until it is almost overwhelming in its presence. The revelatory nature of Tlön’s presence is therefore made 
clear only to the reader; to anyone within that world it would be obvious. We could almost call it an inverse 
detective story: there is no detection, and there is no solution. 
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my chapter on the narrator, the surprises go beyond just omitting or distorting the facts, but 
extend to how the story is structured. 
 
4.3.3 The sophism as a mirror 
The second instance of mise en abyme I am going to study is the “sophism of the coins,” 
which in the story is supposedly taken verbatim from the narrator’s copy of Volume XI, 
presented as a philosophical argument for the improbable doctrine of materialism. Though I 
have quoted it before in section 2.2.1, I quote the sophism again for the sake of the argument:  
 
El martes, X atraviesa un camino desierto y pierde nueve monedas de cobre. El jueves, Y encuentra en 
el camino cuatro monedas, algo herrumbradas por la lluvia del miércoles. El viernes, Z descubre tres 
monedas en el camino. El viernes de mañana, X encuentra dos monedas en el corredor de su casa. El 
heresiarca quería deducir de esa historia la realidad —id est la continuidad— de las nueve monedas 
recuperadas. Es absurdo (afirmaba) imaginar que cuatro de las monedas no han existido entre el martes 
y el jueves, tres entre el martes y la tarde del viernes, dos entre el martes y la madrugada del viernes. 
Es lógico pensar que han existido —siquiera de algún modo secreto, de comprensión vedada a los 
hombres— en todos los momentos de esos tres plazos.100 (437) 
 
The argument originally ignited debate in Tlön, as its author used it to propose the heresy of 
materiality: the permanence of objects in space and time. As Fishburn points out, the 
argument is in fact impossible, as there would not be any real possibility of the last two coins 
found on the veranda to be the same coins as those lost on the road, concluding that  
 
the last two could only have been hrönir, objects of the imagination and desire. The fact that this 
difference in the status of the first seven and last two coins is glided over seems to me to be an 
indication that all nine coins were hrönir. (Fishburn 2008: 61) 
 
As such, the argument invalidates itself; the contention that the language of Tlön wasn’t 
suited to formulating the idea of materialism is reinforced by the fact that the specious 
argument proposing materialism actually does not do it properly itself. 
 This observation is in fact central to the understanding of hrönir, because it ties 
together the physical objects as they are described in the story in connection with 
archaeological finds with the reformulation of ideas, as there is widespread agreement that the 
sophism of the coins is directly inspired by the story of the coins of memory that Borges tells 
Burgin. Incidentally, the sophism of the coins is situated structurally right at the centre of the 
                                                 
100 “On Tuesday, X is walking along a deserted road and loses nine copper coins. On Thursday, Y finds four 
coins in the road, their luster somewhat dimmed by Wednesday’s rain. On Friday, Z discovers three coins in the 
road. Friday morning X finds two coins on the veranda of his house. From this story the heresiarch wished to 
deduce the reality—i.e., the continuity in time—of those nine recovered coins. ‘It is absurd,’ he said, ‘to imagine 
that four of the coins did not exist from Tuesday to Thursday, three from Tuesday to Friday afternoon, two from 
Tuesday to Friday morning. It is logical to think that they in fact did exist—albeit in some secret way that we are 
forbidden to understand—at every moment of those three periods of time.” (F: 16)  
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story, undoubtedly giving it meaningful prominence. Recalling Borges’ father’s idea of 
memory and connecting it to the duplication and proliferation of ideal objects makes the 
hrönir more clearly one of the most central conceits of the story, making it more general than 
the curious story of doubling objects, and into more of a concept—an idea—of the 
uncertainties and proliferations of ideas. 
 Dällenbach’s criteria for placement are fulfilled to the letter: as a textual segment it is 
separated from the text by being at a metadiegetic level in relation to the surrounding 
narrative. We can dismiss the narrator’s interpolations—the words not set in cursive—as they 
confuse the point of origin for the sophism, and I argue conclusively in my chapter 2 that the 
segment must be considered at another diegetic level from the surrounding text. Placing it at a 
metadiegetic level also effectively fulfils the other criterion, since it is at the highest possible 
diegetic level, or narrative frame. It must further be an example of a simple duplication, given 
that it is not presented as the main story itself, and can thus only be a mise en abyme that 
resembles the framing narrative. Having established these formalities, we can look closer at 
why this segment should be considered an example of mise en abyme and why this specific 
textual mirror is important for the understanding and interpretation of the story. 
 First we observe how it is placed in the story. Not only is it at the highest diegetic 
level, it is also almost exactly at the very centre of the text of “Tlön.” A line count of the 
original text from Sur (1940) shows that there are 257 lines before the “sophism” and 231 
lines after it. While this is not completely in the centre, it is arguably a negligible discrepancy 
as the difference between the line counts amounts to about half a page. If we also include 
paratext like the footnotes, it becomes narrowed further down, to 260 vs. 241. This central 
placement of the text puts it in the crosshairs of structural placement, since the very centre of 
the story is elevated at a narrative level above the surrounding text, and the text of the 
sophism itself is set apart as a direct citation from the encyclopaedia—the encyclopaedia 
being the thematic pivot in the story for the movement from one world to the next. Looking 
for structural evidence in search of “important” text, the sophism of the coins clearly stands 
out.  
 For its central placement, this segment of “Tlön” has been discussed in depth 
surprisingly little, and to my knowledge nobody has identified it as a mise en abyme. Mary 
Luskin Friedman (1987), in reference to Borges’ description of a story his father told him 
about coins and memory, argues that Borges wrote it as a therapeutic reaction to the loss of 
his father. Though Friedman’s reading is interesting regarding the origins of the story, it 
cannot be read as an originary mise en abyme due to the obscure nature of this origin—Borges 
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only told about his father’s story almost 30 years later in an interview with Burgin (1969: 10-
11). However, Fishburn’s observation that the sophism is an example of hrönir, though not 
specifying the segment as a textual mirror per se, calls attention to an overlooked detail: that 
the coins found on Friday morning are not in  the same place as where the original coins were 
lost, in the road: “while the first seven coins may have been the originals or their hrönish 
duplications, the last two could only have been hrönir, objects of the imagination and desire,” 
(Fishburn 2008: 61). Keeping this in mind would potentially have broader consequences for 
the reading of the story, if the segment is read as a mise en abyme. But to read it as one, we 
have to understand the sophism itself in greater detail. 
 
4.3.4 A misleading unity 
Looking at the first part of the segment, we see that it is essentially narrative, since there is a 
sequence of events that take place during the weekdays. The loss of nine coins on Tuesday; 
the discovery of four coins on Thursday; rain on Wednesday; three coins found on Friday; and 
an additional two on Friday morning. We see that the story told here is one of loss and of 
finding. Nine coins are first lost then found again, over the course of some days.  
 The lost nine coins are gradually rediscovered, and thus we are left with nine coins 
again by the end of Friday. However, as Fishburn notes, two of the coins are found at a 
different location, and cannot possibly be the same coins. Here is the crux of my argument 
that follows: the coins that are not part of the original nine are indistinguishable from them, 
and effectively the unity of the nine coins is upheld. When talking of nine coins, one does not 
pay attention to each coin, given that each of them are of the same type and identical; one 
speaks of the nine coins as a single unit. Thus the continued identity of the coins is not what 
matters; it is what defines the unity of them that needs to be upheld. As such, the materialist 
argument it supposes to propose is poorly constructed, because the points of departure and 
arrival are both of a more Platonist sort—the gradual discoveries of the coins are not 
dependent on the coins’ continued identity, but of their role in the unity. Seen in this way, the 
argument is formulated in words (i.e. “find”; “lose”) that are perhaps unfavourable to the 
Tlönian idealist mindset, but the actual result is an upholding of it. The unity is perhaps 
defined by its constituents, but not of their individual existence. This is similar to the classical 
paradox of the ship of Theseus, whose parts were all replaced; could it still be considered to 
be the same ship, even if its parts were not? It would appear that Tlönians believe this, if only 
because they do not have materialist concepts to believe otherwise.  
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 There is an additional peculiarity of the sophism, which is that the rediscovery of the 
coins is done by three different persons. One of these is the one who originally lost them—
and in a materialist view, X, who lost them, discovers two coins that cannot possibly be the 
same as the ones lost. However, it does not seem like any of the discrepancies between finders 
and losers makes any difference to the central axis of the sophism—the coins. Importance is 
only placed with upholding the unity of the coins, regardless of whether the coins are in fact 
the same or whether they are in different people’s possession.  
 We therefore see that the supposedly materialist nature of the argument is flawed in its 
basic construction. What we would consider a continuing unity of nine coins would naturally 
depend on their being in the possession of a single person, and that all of these coins continue 
to be the same ones as the ones lost. In this argument, however, the only consistent aspect is 
that there are nine coins in total. Possession and identity are of no importance—the only 
important thing is an abstract entity with an arguably ideal existence: a unity of nine coins. It 
should therefore be no wonder that the philosophers of Tlön struggled to refute the sophism. It 
was perhaps constructed in a language that evades their logical categories, but the argument 
itself is of a nature that is fully in league with what they already know and believe. And 
therefore the sophism additionally becomes an example of how language can be misleading, 
and here it creates—to the Tlönians—the fiction of materialism.  
 Having looked at what the sophism actually formulates, we can now consider how this 
relates to “Tlön” in a grander scale, opening up for further understanding and interpretation. 
It can tell us something about the nature of losing, finding, and the reestablishment of unity, 
and perhaps affirm further some of the findings I have presented in previous analyses, 
especially from chapter 2. 
 
4.3.5 The world regained 
The sophism can better be understood as a mise en abyme if we consider it as a reflection of 
the narrative action of “Tlön,” but reflected as in a mirror, played out in reverse. The narrative 
action of the story unfolds as a series of discoveries, or findings: the article on Uqbar found 
by Bioy Casares and the narrator; the First Encyclopaedia of Tlön discovered in the hotel at 
Androgué; the letter from Gunnar Erfjord among the pages of one of Herbert Ashe’s books; 
and the two mysterious Tlön-like objects the narrator witnesses by chance. These discoveries 
all lead to the gradual entrance of Tlön upon the actual world; in the end, the known world has 
been lost in its favour. If we concentrate just on the narrative action, the sophism of the coin is 
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played out in reverse order of the framing narrative. To compare the two, we can say that the 
sophism begins with a loss, leading to a search that ends with the reconstitution of what was 
lost—with a slight difference; the framing narrative of “Tlön” seen as a whole plays out as a 
series of discoveries that leads to the loss of the known world—the cost of constituting a new 
one. This inversion does not in my opinion invalidate that the sophism is a textual mirror, 
because of the explicit thematic correspondence between the smaller text and the larger one. 
Mirrors abound in the story, and they invert what they duplicate; the textual mirror gives us an 
inverted version of the narrative events in the story as a whole. 
 The inverse projection might give us another clue as well, however, one that 
transcends narrative chronology. Given that the pivotal mise en abyme placed at the centre is 
retro-prospective, we are perhaps given a clue here to the point of departure for the text’s 
“publication” in 1947—at the outset, the textual world (in the story’s logic) is already in the 
process of losing the known world to enter Tlön. As I have shown in chapter 2, the narrative 
level the story starts at is higher than at the text’s framing narrative, even though this is first 
hidden to the reader.  
 But how does this reformulated paradox relate to the story? We can think of it like 
this: the world we have known is perhaps lost, but it has also been put together again of parts 
we already know. The composition might be different, but the parts that constitute it are 
essentially the same—though in this case there have been some changes in emphasis. The 
idealist philosophy that constitutes the world-view of Tlön is the same idealist philosophies 
that have been abundant in the former world. Nothing is new; it is the belief in them that has 
changed. The intrusion of Tlön upon the world is a reformulation of the known world, but 
with parts that the world already knows. The unity is upheld, but its composition has 
constituents that perhaps are similar, but not quite equal to, the former ones.  
 Additionally we may discern a similarity between the sophism and the framing 
narrative when it comes to characters. If we are to take it as a mise en abyme it becomes 
revealing indeed, because when attributing relationships between the finders of coins with 
gradual uncovering of Tlön, we might well see the same as what I found in chapter 2: that the 
narrators, or “finders” in the different parts of the story are not the same. So the mise en 
abyme tells us, if we are prepared to see it, that the framing narrative hides more than it says 
outright. What the framing narrative in this case is hiding is that the narrator is not a 
continual, inseparable “I,” the use of the first person is in this sense deliberately misleading. 
In fact, if we are to interpret what the mise en abyme tells us literally, the various discoverers 
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of information about Tlön must be different people altogether. My previous analysis confirms 
this possibility. 
 Perhaps this makes more sense. That a single person should be the first to come across 
various portents of the coming of an entirely new world-view that is to completely take over 
seems improbable. But if the first-person narrator of the Posdata has become so entrenched in 
the coming subjective idealism that it cannot discriminate between individual subjects any 
more, it makes the story that much stronger. The self-conscious subterfuge we are alerted to 
with the initial discussion becomes subterfuge that makes the story as a whole stronger.  
 Though the world appears to change, we can take comfort in the sophism of the coins, 
because it tells us that it is not the world that changes, but its constituents that are numerous 
and interchangeable. And if it seems like changing an aspect of the world has enormous 
consequences, we must remember that in truth all these aspects are, depending on your 
perception of them, so similar as to be the same. The world changes, but as it does, it stays the 
same. The unity may have been seen to be broken in one way of looking at it, but in another it 
is impossible to see any change at all.  
 
4.3.6 “Tlön” as “Hrön” 
While, as I have shown, the concept of hrönir is enacted throughout the story, it is similarly 
not a stretch of the imagination that Tlön the planet can itself be considered to be a hrön-
representation of the actual (textual) world. However, there is an interesting circumstance that 
can be said to dramatize “Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius,” the textual artefact, as hrönir. I refer to 
the original publication of the story, where there are two versions: one, the first publication in 
Sur 68, the second in Antología de literatura fantástica. It is the version from the anthology 
that was included in La jardín de los senderos que se bifurcan and subsequently Ficciones, 
and it is this version that we normally read today. Published around the same time, the story in 
the versions is the same, but there are minor variations there that makes the texts slightly 
different.  
 To show this I have made a comparison of the texts, and I have made a table of this 
comparison, included in Appendix A, which shows the various discrepancies between the 
texts. I have found a total of 30 discrepancies between the editions. While there are some of 
the differences that are no doubt the result of printing errors, and some may be considered 
purely stylistic changes, some of the discrepancies seem to be intended: in Sur there is an 
entire footnote comparing certain properties of Tlön to some combinations of words found in 
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Goethe, while it is left out in the version from Antología; the Antología has included a 
sentence that is lacking from Sur. Similarly, changes in word tenses, where the sentences still 
carry the same meaning, seems to be motivated for other reasons than purely stylistic ones.  
 It is my impression, considering the structural implementation of hrönir within the 
story, that perhaps Borges was creating an artefact in the actual world that had some of the 
same properties of Tlön. Even if this was not actually the case, the result is, when considering 
hrönir as a principle of reality, the “Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius” we are reading today is a 
hrön of its original publication: it is the same story but with minor change. “Tlön” has become 
hrön, and the hrönir can thus become, as Fishburn points out, a way of looking at the world 
we have not seen before. The fictional element in the story pushing across the narrative 
boundaries to upset our ontological beliefs. 
 
4.4 Duplications: metafiction and possible worlds 
The way Borges has incorporated mise en abyme in “Tlön” is not a truly explicit one. Since 
the segments I have singled out as examples of mise en abyme do not proclaim themselves as 
thus, we can therefore say, in Linda Hutcheon’s terminology of metafiction as “covert” 
metafiction, since they do not call attention to their metafictional status. The examples we 
have seen are both what Dällenbach calls simple mises en abyme, because their relationship to 
the framing narrative is not one to one, bearing a similarity to it, but are not explicitly stated 
as identical within it. Additionally Borges uses them as mirrors in the text in a way that is 
more literal than they usually are. The reflections of the narrative function so that they show 
more clearly what the reader cannot see when taking the whole of the text in. In this sense, 
Gide’s contention that the mise en abyme reveals the structure better than anything is very 
precise, because it reveals to the reader things that would perhaps be difficult to discover 
otherwise, and it helps to make more certain some suspicions one might raise. Not only is the 
mise en abyme employed for control, but to open the interpretation of the whole story. The 
words of the heresiarch of Uqbar rings true: mirrors multiply and divulge the world.  
 Borges was fascinated with textual mirrors for several reasons, something that he was 
to explain in detail in a later essay. What he describes in “Magias parciales del Quijote” are 
instances of mise en abyme and what encountering this device in literature results in. 
The essay, from 1949 and collected in Otras Inquisiciones, first discusses how Cervantes’ 
Don Quijote is essentially a realist novel, but gradually segues into a discussion of the famous 
intermingling of the books reality and the reader’s reality. Thinking of the protagonists of the 
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Quijote who are also readers of the Quijote, Borges then discusses other known and lesser 
known works that employ a device that resembles the device from the Quijote: 
 
Aquí es inevitable recordar el caso de Shakespeare, que incluye en el escenario de Hamlet otro 
escenario, donde se representa una tragedia, que es más o menos la de Hamlet; la correspondencia 
imperfecta de la obra principal y la secundaria aminora la eficacia de esa inclusión.101  (OC 2: 46) 
 
Dällenbach takes particular notice of this section, and what follows, because the variations on 
them relate closely to the typology he has presented. Thus, the incorporation of a play within 
Hamlet that is a variation upon the events of Hamlet itself is an example of the mise en abyme 
of simple multiplication. Following Hamlet is a description of the paradoxical inclusion in 
Ramayana of itself, before telling us of night 602 in the Thousand and One Nights: 
 
Algo parecido ha obrado el azar en Las Mil y Una Noches. Esta compilación de historias fantásticas 
duplica y reduplica hasta el vértigo la ramificación de un cuento central en cuentos adventicios, pero no 
trata de graduar sus realidades, y el efecto (que debió ser profundo) es superficial, como una alfombra 
persa. […] Ninguna [de las interpelaciones] tan perturbadora como la de la noche DCII, mágica entra 
las noches. En esa noche, el rey oye de boca de la reina su propia historia. Oye el principio de la 
historia, que abarca a todas las demás y también—de monstruoso modo—, a sí misma. ¿Intuye 
claramente el lector la vasta posibilidad de esa interpolación, el curioso peligro? Que la reina persista y 
el inmóvil rey oirá para siempre la trunca historia de Las Mil y Una Noches, ahora infinita y 
circular…102 (47) 
 
Dällenbach identifies this with the paradoxical duplication, although he is perhaps too fast to 
identify it: night 602 of the Thousand and One Nights is similar to the framing narrative, but 
not the same. In this respect both the Quijote and Ramayana are more precise examples, as 
they feature themselves in the narrative. Finally however, Borges tells of a thought-
experiment by the philosopher Josiah Royce, of a perfect map: 
 
“Imaginemos que una porción del suelo de Inglaterra ha sido nivelada perfectamente y que en ella traza 
un cartógrafo un mapa de Inglaterra. La obra es perfecta; no hay detalle del suelo de Inglaterra, por 
diminuto que sea, que no esté registrado en el mapa; todo tiene ahí su correspondencia. Ese mapa, en tal 
caso, debe contener un mapa del mapa, que debe contener un mapa del mapa del mapa, y así hasta lo 
infinito.”103 (47) 
                                                 
101 “Here we inevitably remember the case of Shakespeare, who includes on the stage of Hamlet another stage, 
where a tragedy almost like that of Hamlet is being presented. The imperfect correspondence of the principal 
work and the secondary one lessens the effectiveness of that inclusion.” (Borges 1964: 45)  
102 “Chance has caused something similar to occur in A Thousand and One Nights. That compilation of fantastic 
stories duplicates and reduplicates to the point of vertigo the ramification of a central tale into subordinate ones, 
without attempting to evaluate their realities; the effect (which should have been profound) is superficial, like 
that of a Persian rug. […] “None [of the interpolations] is so disturbing as that of nigh DCII, magic among the 
nights. That is when the Sultan hears his own story from the Sultana’s mouth. He hears the beginning of the 
story, which embraces all the other stories as well as—monstrously—itself. Does the reader perceive the 
unlimited possibilities of that interpolation, the curious danger—that the Sultana may persist and the Sultan, 
transfixed, will hear forever the truncated story of A Thousand and One Nights, now infinite and circular?” 
(Borges 1964: 45)  
103 The quote is imperfect; Borges has subtracted significantly from the original text in his translation of it, which 
has led some to believe that Borges invented the source. Simmons’ translation of the essay quotes from the 
original, however, which is found in the “Supplementary Essay: The One, the Many, and the Infinite. Section 
III,” of Royce’s book, and reads: “… let us suppose, if you please, that a portion of the surface of England is 
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While we can perhaps trace the influence from this to Borges’ later parable “Del rigor en la 
ciencia” from El hacedor (1960), about cartography reaching such a level of precision in 
China that it renders it useless, Dällenbach observes how it is also an example of his 
classification of infinite duplication. Therefore Borges has given examples of all three types.  
 The Thousand and One Nights, and especially night 602, is dear to Borges. It is 
mentioned outright in “El jardín de senderos que se bifurcán,” and Fishburn has demonstrated 
that it might act as a structuring principle in “Emma Zunz” (Fishburn 2004). In “Tlön” the 
allusion is both direct and subtle: the First Encyclopaedia of Tlön has 1001 pages, a detail we 
cannot ignore considering Borges’ love of the Nights. 
 It is the final section, however, that really sets into relief why Borges’ fascination with 
the device is interesting in relation to the use of it in his fictions. He writes:  
 
¿Por qué nos inquieta que el mapa esté incluido en el mapa y las mil y una noches en el libra de Las Mil 
y Una Noches? ¿Por qué nos inquieta que Don Quijote sea lector del Quijote, y Hamlet, espectador de 
Hamlet? Creo haber dado con la causa: tales inversiones sugieren que si los caracteres de una ficción 
pueden ser lectores o espectadores, nosotros, sus lectores o espectadores, podemos ser ficticios.104 (OC 
2: 47) 
 
Additionally, Emir Rodriguez Monegal tells of a lecture Borges held where he outlined four 
procedures to destroy reality in fiction. Among these procedures was “the work of art within 
the work of art” (Monegal 1978: 406). Thus Borges by his own admission used this device 
because it had a double effect: it could be used to destroy the sense of reality within the 
fiction, but it could also be used to make the reader unsure of her or his own reality. The 
unsettling use of mise en abyme opens for the ontological abyss, of not knowing whether one 
is within the story or outside it.  
 Furthermore “Tlön” duplicates in a broader sense, due to the hrönir’s function as a 
structuring principle for several aspects of the text, including the mises en abyme that I have 
                                                                                                                                                        
very perfectly levelled and smoothed, and is then devoted to the production of our precise map of England … 
But now suppose that this our resemblance is to be made absolutely exact, in the sense previously defined. A 
map of England, contained within England, is to represent, down to the minutest detail, every contour and 
marking, natural or artificial, that occurs upon the surface of England … For the map, in order to be complete, 
according to the rule given, will have to contain, as a part of itself, a representation of its own contour and 
contents. In order that this representation should be constructed, the representation itself will have to contain 
once more, as a part of itself, a representation of its own contour and contents; and this representation, in order to 
be exact, will have once more to contain an image of itself; and so on without limit.” (Royce 1923) Royce’s 
book sprang out of a series of lectures, and is available in its entirety online (see the bibliographical entry). 
 
104 “Why does it make us uneasy to know that the map is within the map and the thousand and one nights are 
within the book of A Thousand and One Nights? Why does it disquiet us to know that Don Quixote is a reader of 
the Quixote, and Hamlet is a spectator of Hamlet? I believe I have found the answer: those inversions suggest 
that if the characters in a story can be readers or spectators, then we, their readers or spectators, can be 
fictitious.” (Borges 1964: 46)  
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analysed. The result is a second level of duplication, and this is one that in several of the 
examples reaches outside of the text itself. The story can be said to dramatize itself as a 
duplication of the world, but conversely, the world as a duplication of the text. “Tlön” 
becomes a possible world, because it reveals a point of view within fiction that we can 
generalize outside of it. This possible world is a possibility within a possibility, and the 
duplications duplicate themselves, in an act similar to the mirror being set up against another 
mirror. 
 It is a possible world—and “Tlön” turns the notions of where one stand upside down. 
Already from the point one starts reading the world we think is our own is a world of fiction 
from times past. The implication is that the world of Tlön is a possible world, and that it could 
be here already. Metafiction’s function to question the nature between fiction and reality, as 
Patricia Waugh writes, is dramatized. 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have analysed the myriad of duplications observable in “Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis 
Tertius,” contextualising them both within and without the story. Beginning with a theoretical 
discussion of mise en abyme, I have first argued that the story’s concept of hrönir can be read 
as a structural principle which is enacted throughout. Some instances of this are the 
encyclopaedias and reference-works that appear throughout the stories; another is the use of 
quotations that vary, or are taken with variation from other sources from Borges’ own works. 
 I have also analysed two textual segments of the story as mises en abyme, as 
metafictional elements which reveal the inner working of the story itself. I have interpreted 
the use of mise en abyme as a device to cross narrative frames within the story, making worlds 
possible. I find that the discussion of a novel from the start is used as an element which 
programs the reading of the story, leading the interpretation. The sophism of the coins is 
shown to be reflective of narrative as a whole, but in reverse, mirroring the inconsistencies 
and showing that it is also formulated as an idealistic allegory, rather than a proposition of 
materialism, as stated within the text.  
 Finally, the frustration of narrative boundaries reveals the uncertainty of ontological 
boundaries, showing us that fictional conceits can have relevance in the actual world, making 
the fictional world a possible one. 
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Chapter 5: Concluding remarks 
 
The only way to give finality to the world is to 
give it consciousness. 
 
— Miguel de Unamuno,  
The Tragic Sense of Life (1913) 
 
 
 
 
In the first chapter, I posited that though “Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius” has been frequently 
mentioned as a metafictional story, it has not been studied exhaustively as such, and that it for 
this reason were grounds to study it at length in depth in this perspective. In order to do this, I 
chose to make three analyses: of narrative frames and the role of the narrator; of the 
philosophies the narrator discusses from A First Encyclopaedia of Tlön in part II of the story; 
and a closer look at the metafictional devices of duplication, self-reflection and mise en 
abyme. 
 In chapter two, on narrative frames and narrators, I proposed that what at first reading 
seems like a single, unchanging narrator, may not be the case, due to the distortion of 
narrative frames, especially in light of the Posdata which recontextualises the entirety of the 
text before it. Taking as my point of departure various critical pronouncements that the 
narrator can be considered a version of Borges, I looked into the possibility of a narrator 
which, though perhaps evoking a person similar to Borges, cannot theoretically be considered 
to equate Borges. The Posdata, dated in 1947, which was seven years after the original 
publication of the story, upsets a traditional consecutive reading of narrative progression. 
What I found there was that the narrator of the Posdata effectively edits and reformulates the 
two preceding parts, and thus places them in a narrative frame which is diegetically at a 
higher level than the last section. The result is that the more fundamental narrative frame the 
story is told within is at a remove to the future, placing the initial textual world of the first two 
parts at a narrative remove to the reader. Additionally, I concluded that what seems to be a 
single narrator throughout the story, must actually be considered to be two separate narrators, 
one for parts I and II, and one for the Posdata. Furthermore, I showed that the narrator carried 
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a closer relation to the implied author of the parts, rather than to the actual Borges, and that 
there are grounds for the argument that there are two separate implied authors in the story. 
 Metafictionally speaking, this play with narrative frames frustrates traditional 
narrative. At the same time the narrative structure makes the textual world of the first two 
parts—which at first seems to be a world of minimal departure in reference to the actual 
world—to be the world at the greatest departure considering the different textual ontologies. 
In a possible-world’s view this means that the readers are habituated progressively to a 
possible world which is at a great remove from the actual world.  
In chapter three I have explored in depth the various philosophies and allusions to 
philosophers throughout the story. With a thorough discussion of the principal idealist 
philosophies I show that the ontology of Tlön is an ontology that is fundamental to the nature 
of a textual world. Of these philosophies, of special interest are some examples I have studied 
closer and explained in relation to idealist philosophers: the philosophy of George Berkeley 
took as a fundamental truth that anything outside of our perceptions is unknowable; Hans 
Vaihinger argued that how we understand the world is through useful fictions of it; Alexius 
Meinong argued for the validity of impossible objects; and Fritz Mauthner posited that we 
operate with a language-superstition in that we believe words have direct reference to the 
objects they relate to. I also show, however, that even if the philosophies in Tlön have their 
counterpart in the actual world, many of the allusions are misappropriations or quoted out of 
context deliberately.  
 I conclude that the appropriation of the philosophies of Tlön is inevitable in the textual 
world, because it is an ontology that reveals directly the nature of fiction. This is highly 
metafictional, because within the story the inhabitants of the textual world become, through 
the philosophies, aware that they are fictions, a truly metafictional conceit. However, the 
ontologies become blurred through the inconsistent allusions to actual-world philosophers; all 
philosophies presented from Tlön have their counterparts in the works of actual-world 
philosophers, though the philosophers are not necessarily quoted in context. However, as I 
show, the possible world of Tlön is accessible due to the nature of ideas, where the origins of 
ideas are incidental. The ideas presented in Tlön, within the ontology of the Tlönian idealist 
pantheism where there is a loss of individuality and authors are meaningless, are the same 
ideas in the actual world; the ideas of Tlön have been conceived in the actual world, bringing 
Tlön closer to it. 
 In chapter four I analyse the theme of duplication and mirroring, taking as my point of 
departure the concept of hrönir as a structuring metaphor. I show that the hrönir, the duplicate 
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objects called forth from hope and expectation, act as a structuring principle for the story as a 
whole, giving examples such as the proliferation of encyclopaedias and the variation on the 
use of quoting. I then analyse two of the textual hrönir as examples of mise en abyme, 
showing how they reflect upon the story: the discussion at the beginning of the story between 
the narrator and Adolfo Bioy-Casares; and the “sophism of the coins” which is placed at the 
exact centre of the story. These examples each reflect on the inner workings of the story; the 
first revealing how one should read; the second revealing the structure and its inherent 
inconsistencies. Through these examples I show that there is both a high degree of what one 
in metafictional theory calls “self-consciousness,” or “the fiction’s consciousness of its own 
nature.” These examples flaunt the fictionality to the reader, forcing them to consider the 
story’s status as artifice rather than as a realistic presentation of the world. 
 However, as I also show in the fourth chapter, the story has dramatized itself as an 
example of hrönir through its different publications. Thus a fictional device has become a part 
of structured reality—implying that we should question whether actual reality is also fictional. 
 This final point is what ties together the results of the three analyses. “Tlön, Uqbar, 
Orbis Tertius” is not only a story that calls attention to its own artificiality, it also aims to 
upset the boundaries between what we believe is real and what is fictional. The intrusion of an 
entire planet upon the world, it seems, happens all the time. It is intimated in the story that 
perhaps the people of Tlön know better than us: “They know that a system is nothing more 
than the subordination of all aspects of the universe to any one such aspect.” As the story 
shows, the lure of a system to describe the world is tempting, both within fiction and without. 
 
This study of the short story “Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius” by Jorge Louis Borges raises new 
questions which I have not had the opportunity to go further into. The words Uqbar and Orbis 
Tertius in the title are mentioned, but could, like Tlön, undergo a deeper analysis. I suspect 
that the three nouns reflect the narrative structure of the novel, but this has to be discussed 
further. Likewise, there are themes that are worth examining, like the consistent use of the 
number 11, or how the story shows that attempts at structuring the world are futile. While I 
discuss the symbol of the mirror, an analysis of the story as a labyrinth, Borges’ other major 
symbol, is omitted. 
 More questions could be added, but for me, in the real world, I have been limited by 
the circumstances of time and space. 
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Appendix A: Variations between publications 
 
Sur 68 Obras Completas Vol. 1 
enciclopedia (30) encliclopedia105 (431) 
[The sentence is not included in this version.] Bioy había adquirido su ejemplar en uno de tantos remates. (432) 
Smerdis (32) Esmerdis (432) 
History of the land called Uqbar (32) History of the Land Called Uqbar (432) 
A general history of labyrinths (32) A General History of Labyrinths (432) 
XLVI (33) XXVI106 (433) 
dió (33) dio (434) 
first (34) First (434) 
guarecía (34) cubría (434) 
admitían (35) admiten (435) 
causaban (35) causan (435) 
Upward behind onstreaming it mooned (36) Upward, behind the onstreaming it mooned (435) 
El germanista recordará ciertas formaciones 
de Goethe: morgenschön, Nebelglanz. Estas, 
aunque binarias, pueden ilustrar lo que 
afirmo. (36n) 
[The footnote is not included in this version] 
Esa (36) Esta (436) 
   —    [the typographical sign is included] (436) 
el instante poderoso del coito (39n) el vertiginoso instante del coito (438n) 
llegan a (40) logran (439) 
                                                 
105 This variation is probably a typographical error in the edition, rather than an intentional change. 
106 Same as above. 
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el primero, el segundo (41) la primera, la segundo (439) 
Este (41) Éste (439) 
fué (41) fue (439) 
conocedores de (41) que conocieran (439) 
1940, Salto Oriental (42) Salto Oriental, 1940 (440) 
el número 68 de SUR —tapas verde jade, 
mayo de 1940— (42) 
la Antología de la literatura fantástica, 1940, 
(440) 
excisión (42) escisión  (440) 
Este (43) Éste (440) 
nihilismo¹: (43) nihilismo:¹ (441) 
Faucigny-Lucinge (43) Faucigny Lucinge (441) 
hospitalidad temeraria… (44) rudimentaria hospitalidad. (441) 
correntoso; (44) correntoso. (442) 
plan¹… (45) plan…¹ (442) 
 
 
I have included the pages where the discrepancies are in the respective publications. Where 
the differences are not obvious, I have underlined the relevant parts. 
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